Composing in the internet age of post-auratic art by Leary, Christopher Scott
Composing in the Internet 
Age of Post-Auratic Art 
 
Christopher Leary 
Ph.D. Thesis 
 
Submitted in part for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Music 
 
February 2012 
ii 
 
iii 
Abstract 
This thesis argues the emergence of problematic issues arising from the dematerialisation of 
studio music technology and its compositional output, compounded by increasingly 
technically homogenised means of production and distribution. The thesis contends that 
optimistic claims of democratisation and emancipation surrounding computer music, in 
addition to proclamations extolling the virtues of the decentralised, distributive opportunities 
of the web, obscure the effects of such technologies, inviting critical inquiry. An 
understanding of the origins of techno-romanticism, and the technical processes that inform 
such utopian viewpoints, are therefore essential in addressing these issues. 
 Using Jacques Attali’s Noise, with his Adorno-influenced ‘Repeating’ and utopian 
‘Composing’ chapters in particular as a starting point, this thesis illustrates how the critical 
stances of Adorno and Benjamin are reflected in Attali’s chapters, and how their respective 
ideas translate to the imbalances between modes of production and reception present in our 
fragmented cultural music economy. The thesis argues that the emancipatory affordances that 
arise within the quotidian use of music, resulting from an unprecedented access to portable 
music, are at odds with the increased technical demands placed upon musicians within such a 
system. 
 Additionally, via Heidegger’s modes of revealing and the work of McLuhan, this 
thesis attempts to articulate the polarising, quasi-deterministic effects of hardware and 
software technology involved in music production, plus the myriad activities pertaining to its 
distribution and promotion, as indicative of the subsuming nature of a technological monolith. 
The existence of contemporary techno-romanticism, resulting from such technical modes of 
revealing, is posited as driving the mythological dialectics at the core of technological 
progress, with Platonic dualism at its foundation. 
  Conclusively, I proposed several practical means of addressing the concerns raised by 
my research, by rematerialising my own practice and music, including the creation of auratic 
artefacts, site-specific works, and physical mechanical instruments. 
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Introduction 
Over the past two decades, we have witnessed unprecedented growth in the power of the 
internet as a common global forum for the sharing of information. Ideas, images, video and 
music have all been mobilised to an extent unthinkable prior to the advent of Tim Berners-
Lee’s ‘World Wide Web’ in 1990. As a studio musician, growing up and developing my 
creative practice alongside the growth of the web, I have been fortunate in my ability to utilise 
these technologies to distribute my music. Advances in computer processing speeds, 
affordable music technology, and the development of music software, have also greatly 
increased the possibilities of creating music to a ‘professional’ standard.1 More so today than 
ever before, one can freely download music software and the associated tools necessary to 
create music on a home computer, at minimal cost, before uploading the resulting music, to be 
shared globally over the web. Indeed, I owe my moderate success as a musician to these 
‘democratising’ modern technologies, allowing me to disseminate my music without the use 
of a traditional record label (though I have, to date, released three albums through 
commercial, independent record labels). This ability to distribute my music online has 
additionally led to live performance opportunities around the world.
2
 
 So, then, the development of the internet, plus the ever-increasing power of affordable 
home computers, are often championed as democratising forces of immense empowerment; 
within the music industry, these technologies are frequently cited as finally providing the 
means for musicians to create and disseminate their work without the mediation of record 
labels, distribution companies and other middlemen. 
 Yet over the past ten years or so that I have been writing music to be shared or sold in 
a variety of guises, I have become increasingly conscious of a vague sense of dissatisfaction 
with my practice. Spending many hours per day on my computer, performing myriad music-
related activities as well as non-musical tasks, I have come to question just how much of my 
practice is actually me, and how much is my computer software. Aware that my music and 
studio effectively ceases to exist once I shut down my computer, I have felt compelled to raise 
the question: If modern computer technology, coupled with the distributive potential of the 
internet, is so empowering and emancipatory, then why do I feel such an entrenched 
dependence on it? If music technology provides a near-infinite number of compositional 
                                                 
 
1
 The use of ‘professional’ as a metric of production quality is a core irony engendered by the internet’s capacity 
2
 This, as a computer musician, presents a series of performative issues in itself. 
xi 
possibilities, then why do I feel my practice is becoming increasingly homogenised? Might 
the technologies be, in part, responsible for this? The question of technological determinism 
remains highly pertinent to my practice, and will be addressed towards the second half of this 
thesis. 
 First, I will discuss the implications of dematerialised music as it pertains to the 
utopianism present in Jacques Attali’s Noise (with his ‘Repeating’ and ‘Composing’ chapters 
bearing particular scrutiny), in an attempt to articulate my growing concern with my techno-
centric practice. Using the work of T. W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin (both clear influences 
on Attali), with specific regard to technology and its supposed emancipatory potential, I will 
examine how music as artefact is affected and disrupted by its informational transition and 
subsumption (with particular focus on its auratic character). Following this, I will investigate 
how the perspectives of production and reception are affected by the technologies surrounding 
dematerialisation, before assessing notable online mechanisms and strategies currently in 
place to assist us in navigating the online music economy. 
 In the second half of my thesis, I shall turn towards a critical investigation of the role 
played by technology within my practice, assisted by the work of Marshall McLuhan and 
Martin Heidegger, examining the issue of technological determinism and the ensuing 
implications of technical interdependence. On uncovering the prismatic modes of engagement 
that comprise my composing, I will unpick the mythology at the root of modern thought that 
gives rise to technical biases, and discuss how this affects my creative process. 
 Alongside my research, I shall document the journey I have taken towards restoring 
meaning in my practice, beginning with a dematerialised EP download release, and 
progressing towards collaborative album work. Identifying the key practical issues raised in 
the process, I will illustrate how I have implemented various measures that address these 
issues, serving to revive and reclaim bodily agency in my practice. Armed with a fuller 
understanding of the modes of engagement that encompass both production and reception, I 
will put in motion my practical plans for auratic restoration, including site-specific works that 
extend an exploration of bodily agency with the use of the human voice, as well as the 
creation of a series of ‘auratic’ musical artefacts, emphasising uniqueness and physical 
permanence. Tying together several of these threads, I will conclude my practical exploration 
with the creation of a handcrafted mechanical musical instrument, bridging the divide 
between the dematerialised software realm and the physical, material world. 
 Finally, I will explain our propensity for romantic proclamations in the name of 
technology, despite the effects of its use, charting some of the ideologies that have informed 
xii 
modern thought, from Plato, through Descartes, noting how these ideologies are connected 
with our current engagement with computer music technology and software. I will critique the 
viewpoints of techno-romanticism in as much detail as is practical within this thesis, insofar 
as these ideas have informed the development of my creative response to the contemporary 
technological and cultural conditions under which I work. 
 
xiii 
1 
Chapter 1. The Dawn of Dematerialisation 
In this chapter I will outline Jacques Attali’s influential book, Noise: The Political Economy 
of Music, focusing specifically on the ‘Repeating’ and ‘Composing’ chapters.3 I will compare 
the relevant inferences of these chapters with my own experiences as a computer musician, 
and discuss the implications of music’s dematerialisation from both the perspectives of 
musician and listener. I shall discuss T.W. Adorno’s clear influences on Attali, as well as 
explore Adorno and Walter Benjamin’s critical stances towards the use of technology in 
accessing and distributing art, and how their ideas translate to our present online music 
economy. 
 As a composer working largely within the domain of the computer, I will also attempt 
to articulate my concerns with dematerialised music as artefact, regarding the complications 
that arise during the transition from economic exchange-value to pure use-value. Accordingly, 
I will identify the practicalities and difficulties of working within the immaterial software 
realm, proposing a need to rematerialise my musical practice. 
 Additionally, I will explain how the pessimistic portrayal of Repeating is at odds with 
the current cultural function and use of dematerialised music, and propose a more positive, 
liberating interpretation of Repeating. I will discuss the emergence of a ‘ubiquitous’ mode of 
listening, resulting from increasingly portable and accessible music, leading to a ‘re-
ritualising’ of music through its quotidian use, evidencing an active agency on the part of the 
listener, contradicting Adorno and Attali’s negative and monolithic view of Repeating. 
 Finally, I shall illustrate that whether one subscribes to the view that we remain in a 
state of Repeating, or indeed have entered an age of Composing, depends on the subscription 
to a modal perspective of either production or reception. Consequently, the splitting of 
Repeating into its component modes of production and reception illustrates an imbalance; for 
listeners, Repeating is hugely liberating and rewarding, and thus appears to signal the dawn of 
Composing, yet for musicians, the case remains, at best, unclear. 
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 To avoid confusion, I shall refer to Attali’s chapters and the appropriate activities therein, with capital letters. 
Thus ‘Composition’, ‘Composing’ and ‘Composer’ all refer specifically to the ‘Composing’ chapter, while 
‘composer’ and ‘composition’ can be read with their usual meanings. Similarly, ‘Repeating’ and ‘Repetition’ are 
both specific references to the ‘Repeating’ chapter. 
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1.1 Noise: Violence and Order 
Before we examine the present culture of renewed technoromantic utopianism and its origins, 
I will quickly recap Attali’s points within Noise that have set the stage for this utopian 
optimism within Composing. 
One of Attali’s central tenets within Noise, as outlaid within his introductory 
‘Listening’ chapter, is that of music as a harbinger of social change. Attali proposes that the 
basic character of music throughout history has foreshadowed subsequent cultural, political 
and economic revolutions, and suggests that changes in music today predict future changes in 
society. Two pages into the first chapter, Attali boldly suggests, “if it is true that the political 
organisation of the twentieth century is rooted in the political thought of the nineteenth, the 
latter is almost entirely present in embryonic form in the music of the eighteenth century.”4 
When we combine this portentous view of music with Composing, we bear witness to a 
romantic ‘epochism’ typical of the kind of rhetoric employed by technologists and techno-
evangelists. We are always ‘almost there’, constantly on the cusp of a great revolution that 
will apparently usher in an era of unprecedented opportunity for musicians operating in the 
online age.
5
 
Within Noise, Attali historicises music into four distinct phases, with a chapter 
dedicated to each, tracing the political economy of music by constructing a map of influential 
points of interference and dependency between music and society, rather than the usual 
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 Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 
1985), p. 4. 
5
 Self-styled ‘media futurist’ Gerd Leonhard springs to mind (www.mediafuturist.com), offering predictions on 
the future of music, as well as providing a didactic approach to realising them. An interesting symptom of advice 
from such technology ‘gurus’ as Leonhard is the curious conflation of music production (and media production 
in general) with the language of business and corporate economic planning. As musicians, fending for ourselves 
online, we are now instructed on how to maximise our ‘brand’s’ marketing effectiveness and earning potential. 
This overt corporatising of our artistic pursuits, while arguably necessary to be heard amidst the online glut of 
artists and music, seems at odds with Composing. 
 Kevin Kelly’s popular and enticing ‘1000 True Fans’ theory from 2008, discussed in the following 
chapter, is a powerful attempt to convince musicians of the possibility of earning a living writing and performing 
music in today’s niche markets, via online connectivity. While not quite as hot a topic these days, the theory is 
still being continually refined, refuted and defended, as musicians and technologists repeatedly attempt to devise 
a formula for financial success. 
 In 2009, Techdirt founder Mike Masnick took up the challenge quite literally, boiling-down a set of 
principles to create his ‘CwF + RtB’ formula (i.e. ‘Connect with Fans + Reason to Buy’). A concession to the 
nature of dematerialised music (or any other unlimited goods) and the difficulty selling it, Masnick suggested 
artists take a boutique approach to selling music and merchandise, selling higher-priced limited edition works 
that would appeal to Kelly’s ‘True Fans’ (www.techdirt.com). 
 Articles also worth noting are ‘Danger Mouse’s Grey Album, Mash-Ups, and the Age of Composition’ 
by Philip A. Gunderson (Postmodern Culture, Volume 15, No. 1, September 2004), and ‘MP3s Are Killing 
Home Taping: The Rise of Internet Distribution and Its Challenge to the Major Label Music Monopoly’ by 
Kembrew McLeod (Popular Music and Society, vol. 28, no. 4, October 2005). 
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diachronic or stylistic categorising of music history. These successive phases are 
‘Sacrificing’, ‘Representing’, plus the aforementioned ‘Repeating’, and ‘Composing’ phases. 
These sequential phases do not completely supplant one another, but add to the previous 
phase, according to Attali, resulting in a greater complexity of the role of music in society, 
alongside the gradual removal of its ritual value. Throughout this thesis, I will be 
concentrating primarily on the last two phases, as they are without a doubt the most pertinent 
of Attali’s ideas given the fertile yet tumultuous online culture in which I find myself as a 
modern composer. Both chapters beg for a critical assessment of the problematic implications 
they raise, and invite a discussion concerning the ideas at their foundations. 
Before I examine these final two chapters in detail, I wish to present a brief summary 
of the initial chapters leading up to them, as although Attali is keen to stress that each phase 
does not supplant the previous, they do nevertheless follow a distinctly progressive trajectory. 
The first of these four phases is ‘Sacrificing’, which Attali explains in the 
anthropological sense, suggesting the theory of René Girard, in that sacrifice served the 
earliest human society in order to channel and replace violence in society that would 
otherwise destroy order. Attali writes, “The majority of ancient societies lived in terror of 
identity; this fear created a desire to imitate, it created rivalry, and thus an uncontrolled 
violence that spread like a plague.”6 In an attempt to control this threat, society created 
designated scapegoats, a ritual sacrifice or simulacrum of violence, to control and inhibit 
social chaos, or violence. Society thus created a set of stable social hierarchies, with organised 
religion being one notable example of this. 
According to Attali, the earliest essential role of music was to perform this exact 
function: to serve as a simulacrum of sacrifice. Attali initially equates noise with violence: 
“To make noise is to interrupt a transmission, to disconnect, to kill. It is a simulacrum of 
murder.”7 Noise, like violence, is silencing. Music, then, becomes a channelling of noise, a 
way of controlling and subduing the chaos of noise by creating a harmonious order in the 
realm of sound. Attali sees within this the ability to bolster and strengthen social order, 
despite the continued threat and presence of ‘noise’ or dissent at the periphery of society. 
Attali makes several historical references to illustrate the importance of music as an 
important tool of the governing class of society, as well as their opponents. Quoting the 
Chinese historian Ssu-ma Ch’ien, Attali writes, “The sacrifices and music, the rites and the 
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 Attali, Noise, p. 26. 
7
 Ibid. 
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laws have a single aim; it is through them that the hearts of the people are united, and it is 
through them that the method of good government arises.”8 
Attali stresses that, at any point in time in society, a struggle takes place between the 
‘official’ music, symbolising order and stability, and able to channel violence into harmony, 
and a subversive music, expressing anger and disquiet from the powerless sectors of society. 
With these points in mind, Attali’s notion of music as premonitory is tenable, as it makes 
sense that society will project an ideal vision through its arts before that vision can become 
fully realised. 
During this sacrificial phase, Attali feels that the function of music essentially 
remained unchanged, until the rise of capitalism in the late medieval and early renaissance 
periods in Europe. Attali notes a shift in the use of music, with roaming jongleurs becoming 
court-employed minstrels, as feudalistic society transforms into early capitalism. This 
transition marks the introduction of Representing. No longer is music in society performed 
solely by improvising jongleurs, but also written specifically for entertaining royalty and 
nobles alike. This in turn progresses to the entertainment filtering down to the middle classes, 
with tickets sold for predefined performances, such as opera and theatre. For the first time, 
music is created specifically for financial gain through mass public consumption. It is a small 
step, from the primitive capitalism of commodified performances within Representing, to the 
technologically driven reification of performances as mass-produced musical objects within 
Repeating. 
Attali’s penultimate phase, Repeating, stems from the early twentieth century dawn of 
recording technologies, mass-production and mass-consumption of music in the home: the 
commoditisation of music and the birth of the recording industry. As such, this phase of 
Repetition is typified by large conglomerates, which control the music styles we hear, how we 
hear it, and since the advent of radio and music television, when we hear it. As before, this 
phase joins the previous two phases of music, further complicating the role of music in 
society. It is with this phase that Attali brought his theories up to his present day when 
published in 1976, and we remain, overall, within the throes of this phase today. However, for 
Attali, the technological advancements that established the dominance of Repetition and the 
recording industry up to the present also nourished the embryonic fourth stage, Composing. 
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 Attali, Noise, p. 29. 
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Assuming suitable conditions were established, Composition would hypothetically 
emancipate us from the cycle of Repetition, heralding the arrival of new social relations.
9
 
1.2 Composing: A Positive Refinement of Repetition? 
In July 2001, The Wire magazine carried a transcription of a speech made by Jacques Attali 
during the Cybersalon Net.Music conference from May that year. Attali suggested that his 
utopian ‘Composing’ chapter was being partly realised due to the creative and distributive 
autonomy afforded by the internet. In Timothy Taylor’s popular Strange Sounds book on 
music technology and culture, published that same year, Taylor draws a similar conclusion 
regarding DIY electronica artists, suggesting that the availability of affordable equipment, 
coupled with the dissemination of online information, would “indicate that Attali’s moment of 
composition is here, at least, on the fringes. Perhaps the day will come when our shiny new 
Packard Bell personal computer will be seen not just as a fancy type-writer or internet 
connection, but as a machine that allows people to make their own music instead of buying 
it.”10 
 Since 1999, I have been producing music as one of a generation of computer 
musicians who have grown up alongside the rise of the personal computer. Taylor’s 
portentous appraisal, informed by his case studies of two electronic musicians reflecting my 
own experience, would certainly seem vindicated. Concerning his last point regarding the 
replacement of purchased music with our own creations, this too appears evident judging by 
the number of artists vying for online attention; album sales have suffered a consistent decline 
since the turn of the new millennium,
11
 although clearly, factors such as alternative rival 
means of entertainment will also come in to play. 
 It appears that Noise resonates saliently with a renewed relevance among the music 
community, and with the emergence of a thriving online information economy, it resonates 
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 Attali, Noise, p. 20. 
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 Taylor, Timothy D., Strange Sounds: Music, Technology and Culture (New York, London: Routledge, 2001), 
p. 164.  
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 Figures published by Nielsen Soundscan illustrated a drop in combined CD and downloads sales in the US of 
54.1%, as reported by the Digital Music News website, <www.digitalmusicnews.com/stories/012709album> 
(Accessed 16th September 2010). National Public Radio (NPR) reported sales figures published by Billboard 
that mirror the findings of Nielson Soundscan, displaying falling overall sales throughout the decade, despite a 
rising proportion of download sales, <www.npr.org/blogs/money/2010/08/25/129428450/album-sales-hit-record-
lows> (Accessed 16th September 2010). The Guardian reports a similar fall in sales between 2003 and 2009 in 
the UK, followed by a 1.4% rise in sales figures towards the end of 2009, 
<www.guardian.co.uk/music/2010/apr/26/uk-recorded-music-sales-rise> (Accessed 16th September 2010). 
6 
more strongly than ever before. Indeed, Noise was a celebrated work upon its release in 1977 
(followed by the release of its translated edition in 1985, from which I reference), tapping into 
the emerging DIY mindset and punk aesthetics that were rising throughout the late seventies. 
During the Cybersalon conference, Attali was keen to update his seventies utopianism 
with a contemporary relevance, tempering it with a smattering of possible contingencies, 
suggesting three viable routes that may shape the musical economy in the immediate future. 
Which of Attali’s chapters best describe the logical terminus of current musical practice: the 
dystopian corporatisation of Repeating or the emancipatory and utopian Composing? 
 Two of these options propose the sustained domination of Repeating, i.e. the 
continued mass-reproduction and commoditisation of music, though each for quite different 
ends. One option would closely resemble the enforced mode of production typified by the 
music industry as it has been for the past eighty years: a powerful conglomerative control by 
the few (now the big four music industries) over the many. The second of these routes would 
see artists individually take control of a similar mode of production, with each artist 
controlling the decentralised sale and distribution of their music in an open-ended but 
somewhat splintered interpretation of Repeating. For example, each artist would sell music 
from their own website, sell their own CDs at gigs etc., with no core third-party organisation 
controlling or profiting from these individuated operations. Effectively, these two scenarios 
would see music, whether as mp3 or CD, vinyl etc., treated as a single finite commodity, 
governed by the traditional economics of scarcity and demand. Given the dizzying abundance 
of music available for purchase today, the production of demand constitutes the most 
important aspect of music commoditisation. 
However, following the dematerialisation
13
 of the music format and the evolution of 
peer-to-peer file sharing, music torrent sites and music blogs,
14
 it is clear that music cannot be 
governed by traditional laws of economics, unless an artificial scarcity can be imposed on 
dematerialised music in the form of DRM (i.e. digital rights management, restricting how and 
when we listen to our music). There are many facets to this issue, some of which I shall 
explore later in this chapter, but it must be clear to musicians operating in this current 
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 I use the term ‘dematerialised’ in reference to Philip Auslander, ‘Looking at Records’, The Drama Review, 
Vol. 45, No. 1 (Spring, 2001), pp. 77-83. Although it can be said that the music exists through each medium in a 
particular instance (i.e. on the internet, on my computer’s hard disk, on my iPod, phone etc.), its tenuous reliance 
on any particular medium or context is diminished to the point of near-meaninglessness. 
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 Specifically, illegal music blogs created for the sole purpose of providing music downloads (usually via one of 
the many separate anonymous sharing/hosting websites such as Rapidshare and Megaupload. BitTorrent is a 
decentralised file distribution protocol that has been adopted, for the most part, for illegal file distribution, 
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economic climate that these two related scenarios most closely describe our current situation. 
The music industry is still attempting to sell music downloads as a commodity, whether 
through iTunes, eMusic et al., or through artists’ own individual websites. 
 Attali’s third suggestion, however, is a more intriguing extension of his musings from 
his Composing chapter. Here he proposes a “potlatch scenario, where people will exchange 
music just for the pleasure of actually giving”.15 It is, in short, a ‘gift economy’, as 
prominently posited by Marcel Mauss in The Gift (1990), and while beyond the remit of this 
thesis, certainly merits further investigation, especially as such scenarios appear to neatly 
side-step the economic issues plaguing commercial dematerialised music (as well as 
introducing the problem of how musicians can be remunerated for their work). With the 
advent of the Creative Commons, we are seeing more artists work and re-work each other’s 
material free from the constraints of copyright law.
16
 Indeed, the Creative Commons enjoys 
ardent followers, many of whom strongly believe that the future of music is with such a 
system.
17
 
 Lewis Sykes, head of Cybersalon and self-styled technologist, supports Attali’s 
prophesising, using the Hip Hop genre, as well as artists such as the sample-heavy producers 
Coldcut, as precursors of a forthcoming age of Composition.
18
 Sykes notes Susan McClary’s 
remarks in her Afterword to Noise, identifying a Composer as someone who can create music 
free from the institutional training of our academies and universities, with the tools to do so, 
and with the unconstrained social networks in place through which music dissemination, 
decentralised collaboration, and interaction can all take place. But, as Sykes also points out, 
Hip Hop thrived on the very existence of a Repetitive economy: “The exponents of Hip Hop 
elevated the deck and mixer, the mechanism for playing the simulacrum of exchange in the 
Repetition economy, to the level of an instrument ... The irony of subverting both the sign and 
the machinery of Repetition is obvious.”19 This example, a genre that relies on Repetition in 
order to exist, illustrates the uneasy transition between Repeating and Composing. Repeating 
is a foundation to Composing, existing while technology and practice mature until a critical 
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mass ‘crisis of proliferation’ is reached.20 However, I do take issue with Sykes’ notion of the 
elevation of the deck and mixer to the level of an instrument as subversive, and would argue 
that this is no more a subversion of Repeating than the electric guitar has been; these are 
merely small cogs in the larger machine, serving to power the cyclical momentum to 
Repeating.
21
  
As we find ourselves firmly within the throes of the internet economy, witnessing 
promises fulfilled that were initially made during the dot-com boom and bust of the late 
nineties and turn of the new millennium, Attali’s utopianism is now also supported by a 
chorus of technologists, self-proclaimed ‘social media experts’ and techno-gurus.  All of 
whom promise to help us realise the ostensibly unlimited potential of a decentralised, so-
called ‘democratised’, online economy. 
1.3 Death in Repetition: The Dematerialised Commodity 
Attali’s Adornian ‘Repeating’ phase (echoing sentiments of Adorno’s ‘Mass Culture’ 
essays),
24
 stems from the early twentieth century dawn of recording technologies, mass-
production and mass-consumption of music in the home, the commoditisation of music and 
the birth of the record industry.
25
 As a model commodity, this era of popular music is prone to 
rapid but superficial stylistic change, in a constant state of flux, necessary to create and 
facilitate the demand for more music. New styles, genres and sub-genres continually spring 
up, with musical media formats being invented and reinvented, to ensure a healthy financial 
turnover from eager consumers.  
Attali uses the term ‘Composing’ in direct response to the age of Repetition, which 
according to Attali can be seen as a rather lifeless era of reconstitution and recycling, rather 
than of innovation and the composition of new music. Death recurs thematically throughout 
Repeating, compared to Composing, which is positioned as a rebirth. In contrast to the 
preceding chapters, which site music within and of the body, Repeating sees the removal of 
music from the body, which is instead stockpiled within the disembodied recording (and thus 
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‘dead’). In addition to its centrality to Repeating, Attali ties together his motif of death with 
his notion of music’s portentousness: “For death, more generally, is present in the very 
structure of the repetitive economy: the stockpiling of use-time in the commodity object is 
fundamentally a herald of death.”27 
Attali is far from alone in considering music recordings as a metaphor of death. As 
Jonathan Sterne posits: “If there was a defining figure in early accounts of sound recording, it 
was the possibility of preserving the voice beyond the death of the speaker.”28 As a powerful 
document of speech, recording technologies were advanced by the opportunity to create an 
audible legacy that would cheat death. Evan Eisenberg also notes various historical allusions 
towards recorded music as a kind of musical entombing, taking the viewpoint that music was 
a superior art form until the advent of sound recording, due to the fact that it could not be 
contained or embodied. In his Lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel considered music second only to 
poetry as the superior art form, due to music’s sensual and romantic nature, whereas poetry 
could claim superiority as a product of transcendental reason.
29
 For Hegel, music’s “temporal 
ideality” and its “inwardness of matter and inspiration of soul”, places it at the centre of the 
romantic arts.
30
 True art “is never fixed, but always flowing”, wrote Emerson,31 “if life is flux, 
fixity is death”.32 From these perspectives music would seem unsuited as a reified objet d’art. 
This romantic idealisation of the spontaneous and ephemeral is echoed in Composing, 
although from a decidedly socialist standpoint. Attali posits the free-improvising strain of jazz 
as the perfect candidate to foreshadow his idealised state of creative autonomy, only to be 
dismantled by Repeating, the monopolising manufacturing of recordings (and the ‘stockpiling 
of death’33), smothered due to a lack of alternative distribution networks (which of course 
arguably now exists in the form of the internet, technical caveats notwithstanding).
34
 
It is not a huge leap of imagination to view the shedding of music’s physicality within 
the past couple of decades, since the advent of mp3 encodings, as a kind of musical 
transcendence, discarding the bounds of material vessels, commodity fetishism, reasserting its 
superiority and ‘temporal ideality’. But even though this is at first sight a plausible construct, 
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it would be a naïve viewpoint. What we still see is a strong sense of a ‘trading cards’ 
fetishism, a hoarding of mp3s and musical stockpiling that would put compulsive phonograph 
collectors such as Eisenberg’s ‘Clarence’ character to shame.35 What Eisenberg notes as a 
philistine, competitive consumption of music,
36
 or even the compulsive collecting of music 
commodities, can be re-read through Attali’s ‘use-time stockpiling’, whereby at the very 
height of ‘Repeating’, so much music can be collected that one’s own finite lifetime itself 
becomes the limiting factor on the music’s use. If we note, at the time of writing, that the 
iPod’s storage capacity of around 160 gigabytes means we may store a total of approximately 
110 continuous days of music without hearing the same song twice,
37
 then we might be 
forgiven for reaching the conclusion that we have nigh-on arrived at the almost comical limit 
of Attali’s use-time value.38 Simultaneously, dematerialised music has zero economic 
exchange-value, unlike its physical counterparts (CDs, cassette tapes, vinyl records etc. which 
can be sold on the second-hand markets), and so the act of collecting dematerialised music 
takes on an irrational, compulsive state, existing in an economic limbo.
39
 McLuhan anticipates 
this, writing in 1964, that “today the action and the reaction occur almost at the same time. 
We actually live mythically and integrally, as it were, but we continue to think in the old, 
fragmented space and time patterns of the pre-electric age.”40 It certainly seems plausible, as 
noted by Erik Davis, that “once touched with archive fever, the forest grows more important 
than the trees, and the forest keeps growing.”41 We only have to look at the proliferation of 
exclusive membership-only music torrent sites on the internet to see proof of such active and 
compulsive foraging, in an effort to sustain user ‘share ratios’.42 It appears that the currency of 
music for many people, more than ever before despite dematerialisation, lies in its 
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accumulation, thereby becoming “a sign rather than a sound”.43 As a composer, I must 
consider the necessary measures I need to take to ensure that my music is exactly the opposite 
of this, and is, as at the very least, a sound to be experienced, not simply a signal of 
accumulation. Increasingly, I find dematerialised music to be an unsatisfactory product of my 
compositional practice, even before I consider its existence amid a crowded online economy. 
For Eisenberg, we “can have a sincere love of culture without having any interest in it. 
That kind of love is almost as well satisfied by owning records as by listening to them.”44 This 
nod towards the philistine approach to commodity collection can easily apply to 
dematerialised music, though as evidenced by the activity on music torrent sites, this 
collection process need not include actually buying the music. Eisenberg suggests the desire 
to listen to music is completely separate from the desire to buy, and only occasionally happen 
to coincide: “The buying is what counts, which is one reason why the record buyer is 
insatiable. The desire to buy does not always coincide with the desire to hear music. If I want 
to hear music; surely there is something on my shelf or on the radio that can satisfy me … 
[t]he desire to buy, on the other hand, explodes when my wallet reaches a certain critical 
mass, or when I’m anxious, or when I’ve worked hard at something idiotic and want a 
reward.”45 In downloading huge collections of dematerialised music, legally purchased or 
otherwise, we are compounding our commodity fetishism, adding to our use-time stockpiles 
without necessarily satisfying our consumerist urges, traditionally sated by physical goods; in 
one fell-swoop music has become pure use-value.
 46
 
What then, do we make of this curious transitory stage, during which our commodity-
trained habits of consumption play catch-up to the vagaries of dematerialised music? Philip 
Auslander touches upon this cultural disconnect between the consumer acts of purchasing and 
listening using Guy Debord’s Situationist ‘anti-ocularcentrism’47 as a framework within 
which to work. Debord’s critical notion is of a passive consumer society led chiefly by its 
visual contemplation of the spectacle with an alienated gaze, at the expense of individual 
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agency: “The more he contemplates, the less he lives; the more he identifies with the 
dominant images of need, the less he understands his own life and his own desires”.49 Debord 
defines the spectacle as “capital accumulated to the point that it becomes images”,50 
functioning as “the concrete manufacture of alienation”.51 As Auslander explains: “In 
Debord’s terms, sound recordings are abstract representations of music, objects that become 
visual signs for music whose very proliferation subordinates the actual use of music to its 
status as commodity object.”52 In creating record sleeves and CD booklets with attractive 
artwork, enticing visual extras such as posters, and striking exotic packaging to tempt 
consumers, the actual music contained on the record or disc has been subordinated to its 
visual physical commoditisation. For a commodity intended for consumption through 
listening, the apparently passive, contemplative gaze about the music’s physicality can be 
read as an unwitting challenge to the intended aural spectacle; it is a temporary rejection of 
the prescribed method of consumption, illustrated most explicitly by collectors like 
Eisenberg’s ‘Clarence’.53 For the rest of us, this trans-sensual consumption usually merely 
primes us for the main event, inducing an excitement and inflating expectation ahead of the 
music. This friction between the musical commodity as a visual spectacle or artefact, as well 
as aural, is intoxicating. Whether or not we class the visual facet of audio medium subversive 
or supportive, I feel it is vitally important to acknowledge this complex multi-sensory 
engagement; I feel as a producer that dematerialised music strips away all we thought we 
could do without, only to find what we are left with strangely lacking. Consequently, I will 
seek to retain this tension between physical commodity and the music it represents or 
challenges, as part of my practical work in support of this thesis. 
Considering dematerialised music in this Situationist light, Debord’s premise ceases to 
resonate; free from the material commodity fetishism (and free from exchange-value), music 
no longer exists as physical spectacle, only as ‘pure’ music. Lacking this Situationist friction 
between multi-sense modes of consumption, plus the loss of exchange-value, music once 
again appears to transcend this crass reification, returning to a state of apparent ethereality or 
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purity. Of course, this is not true; though dematerialised music may once again appear to have 
achieved ethereality, its entrenched dependence upon technology is far stronger than ever 
before. Not only does it require computer technology for its decoding, such as a fetishised 
gadget like an iPod, it requires such technology to exist, stored on hard disk platters or 
memory chips in a barely tangible state of constant fragility. 
As Auslander argues: “The trend we are seeing now towards the disappearance of 
specific physical objects and the consumption of music as pure digital information (as mp3 
files and such) constitutes a hypercommodification of music in which musical sound becomes 
a commodity in itself ... [removed] from the realm of spectacular object.”54 For a society 
conditioned to value music in accordance with its exchange value as a Debordian spectacle, 
rather than its use-value, this has troubling implications for recording musicians hoping to 
earn a living selling dematerialised music. It raises the issue of whether the shift from 
exchange-value to use-value as the primary currency of music will see a corresponding shift 
in consumer attitudes, and if so, how long this lag between states will be. Pragmatically, this 
also explains a return to the ‘boutique’ approach of limited edition vinyl pressings and 
suchlike, as a concerted effort to retain value via the economics of scarcity and spectacular 
visual commoditisation. 
1.4 Composing vs. Repeating: From Disintermediation to Recentralisation 
According to Attali, Composition can exist outside the monopoly of the musical commodity, 
breaking the cycle of Repetition. Attali describes Composition as an activity “in which the 
musician plays primarily for himself, outside any operationality, spectacle, or accumulation of 
value; when music, extricating itself from the codes of Sacrifice, Representation and 
Repetition, emerges as an activity that is an end in itself, that creates its own code at the same 
time as the work.”55 He continues, defining the role of the Composer as follows: 
Composition thus appears as a negation of roles and labour as constructed by the 
old codes. Therefore, in the final analysis, to listen to music in the network of 
composition is to rewrite it: ‘to put music into operation, to draw it toward an 
unknown praxis’, as Roland Barthes writes in a fine text on Beethoven. The 
listener is the operator. Composition, then, beyond the realm of music, calls into 
question the distinction between worker and consumer, between doing and 
destroying, a fundamental division of roles in all societies in which usage is 
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defined by a code; to compose is to take pleasure in the instruments, the tools of 
communication, in use-time and exchange-time as lived and no longer as 
stockpiled.
56
 
The traditional roles of composer, performer, and even listener, Attali contends, will break 
down to become different facets of a single Composer. Attali’s notion of the listener as 
composer has important implications for music, especially within the field of electronic 
music, where music becomes detached from the original composer, to be re-assimilated and 
remixed, in the age of the DJ and so-called ‘bootleg remixes’ or ‘mashups’. The life of such a 
piece of music often undergoes many transformations over a relatively short period of time, 
and as Attali suggests in the above paragraph, a new era exists for music to be exchanged and 
reworked, transformed, and in effect reincarnated, rather than simply be stockpiled as dead 
commodity. Never before has the distinction between composers, performers and listeners 
been so unclear, though it is certainly not difficult to envisage how Attali formulated these 
ideas amidst the burgeoning punk and anti-establishment DIY movements of the mid-to-late 
seventies. However, I do feel that the notion of music existing outside a sphere of 
‘operationality, spectacle or accumulation of value’, currently sounds particularly utopian; if 
the ability to download, rework and exchange each other’s dematerialised music via the 
internet constitutes Composing, then it represents a technologically mediated act of isolation 
and alienation. Being required to sit in front of the computer in order to process the 
simulacratic data signs of dematerialised music does not, in my mind, appear emancipatory; if 
empowering, it is, as I will argue in later chapters of this thesis, an acutely technical 
polarisation of empowerment. For the listener, however, such a state of technical 
interconnectedness may indeed prove emancipatory. As I will shortly attempt to illustrate, the 
apparent synthesis between modes of production and reception that Composing suggests, 
belies the technically dependent imbalances that will inevitably emerge. 
 This idea of the listener as composer or compositional partner, like many of Attali’s 
ideas within Noise, echoes Adorno, for whom an understanding of Schoenberg’s music 
developed a critical reasoning; as Tia DeNora states: “in and through its tonal breadth, it 
inculcates a form of advanced cognition, a mode of sense-making that could accommodate 
more of material—lengthy stretches of tones and attenuated tonal relationships, for 
example.”57 To understand Schoenberg necessitates an understanding of the nature of musical 
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composition. In effect, Adorno’s ideal listener would realise his potential playing the part of 
Attali’s Composer, acting upon his latent musical knowledge: “To interpret language means 
to understand language; to interpret music means to make music.”58 Adorno appreciated 
modernist composers such as Schoenberg and Berg precisely due to their refusal to employ 
what he saw as compositional clichés and conventions, which relied on a comfortable 
familiarity of prior musical structures encountered by the listener—a musical crutch. For 
Adorno this reliance on what he saw as ‘pre-digested’ music would engender a passive mode 
of listening, rather than the active mode necessary to interpret a piece with no such familiar 
sonic comforts. Yet, as I will later argue, such a view assumes a direct and uninhibited 
dialogue between music and listener, and ignores the potential for meaning engendered 
through the multiple modes of reception, leveraged by portable and ubiquitous music. When 
we consider how the modes of production are affected by dematerialisation, against the modes 
of reception, we will discover an ambivalence created between Repeating and Composing, 
mediated by these emergent technologies. 
 According to Attali, “Representation made repetition possible by means of the 
stockpile it constituted. And repetition created the necessary conditions for composition by 
organising an amazing increase in the availability of music.”59 This point also catches my eye, 
given the continued boom of music distribution over the internet. Over the past decade, file 
sharing (or ‘peer-to-peer’) programs have allowed users to share their music collections with 
one another across the world. From Attali’s descriptions of the necessary conditions for the 
phase of Composition to emerge, it seems there has never been a better time for Attali’s 
Composer to flourish, though Susan McClary’s afterword adds a disclaimer: “For in Attali’s 
eyes, only if the individuals in society choose to re-appropriate the means of producing art 
themselves can the infinite regress of Repetition be escaped.”60 
Could it be that Attali’s Composer exists at work among the sea of digital information 
on the internet? The suitable conditions appear to exist, as Repetition creates the necessary 
stockpile of accessible music for Composition to emerge. In our age of file-sharing, we have 
almost unlimited access to each other’s music collections, as well as being able to purchase 
and download digital music. This marks an interesting departure from the traditional sale and 
consumption of physical music, with music traded as digital information. Indeed, Attali 
acknowledges this, illustrating the difficulties in managing information on an economic basis: 
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The whole of economic theory is the theory of scarce resources. If milk is scarce, 
the price is up: this is economic theory. But it doesn’t work for music; it doesn’t 
work for information as a whole. If I have a pot of milk and give it to you, I don’t 
have it any more. But if I give you a piece of information I still have it, I keep it. 
Which means that if I give something to you I create something new: abundance. 
And this means that economic theory doesn’t work for information, when that 
information can be separated from its material support—a CD, or whatever is the 
case today.
61
 
This illustrates the difference between selling music in the form of a tangible analogue music 
format, such as vinyl or music cassette tape for example, and selling CDs and dematerialised 
mp3s. ‘Limited edition’ CDs may command higher prices because of their physical scarcity 
compared to the standard run of CDs, yet when the same limited edition becomes encoded 
and introduced to file-sharing networks, duplicated thousands of times over the world, the 
physical scarcity of the release has considerably less impact.
62
 The physical format of the CD 
and the digital information contained beneath its surface can be separated from each other far 
too easily, unlike analogue formats such as vinyl and analogue tape, which feature transcribed 
information as a physical component of the format itself. The digital medium is far too 
promiscuous with its sharing of information to be considered scarce or unique; the superficial 
relationship between digital information and its physical carrier medium affirms this. I would 
then offer a clarification to Attali’s above quote, and state that the economic theory of scarce 
resources does not work for digital music. This takes Walter Benjamin’s notion of mass-
production as diminishing an artwork’s unique ‘aura’ of originality to new levels. Digital 
formats can be duplicated perfectly, retaining the ‘originals’ yet existing as bit-for-bit copies 
of them.
63
 It makes little sense in such an environment to even differentiate between original 
and copy; dematerialised music seems apt as a quintessentially post-auratic work. 
 There is a shift of focus, then, from the value of the information or commodity itself to 
the value of the network within which the information spreads; as Attali states: “the value of a 
good increases with its scarcity. The value of an information tool, such as language or a 
telephone network, is increased by the number of users.”64 The implications for the online 
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music economy are significant, as the ‘value’ of music becomes dependent upon the extent of 
its distribution and permeation, rather than any single piece of music’s individual price. This 
troubling mismatch between the online and offline economy has led to the sky-high 
valuations of dot.com services and companies, regardless of whether or not money changes 
hands through their use. From a musician’s perspective, it seems certain that under such an 
economic guideline, the music aggregators and network service providers hold all the cards 
when it comes to making money from online music; it would appear then that Repetition has 
strengthened its grip. Accordingly, rather than the fantasised revolution of decentralisation, a 
more grounded assessment would note a simple shift in power from one centralised 
corporation to the next. Music obviously holds value to us, but in a stark contrast to the 
materialised formats of CD, vinyl etc., the terms or grounds on which we decide to place 
value in music is uncertain. However, from the perspectives of the listener, the unprecedented 
access to new musical modes of reception, afforded by Repeating, is very much a positive 
outcome. 
We are therefore in the unique and uncomfortable position of having to artificially 
place a price on information, as with music stores such as iTunes and the long-since legalised 
Napster, whose rationale lies outside of the traditional rules of economic theory. Indeed, 
music is first to successfully readjust to an economy of the infinite and immaterial, and would 
seem to portentously pave the way for similar ventures within the television and film 
industries, such as digital TV and film ‘on demand’.65 If we take account of Attali’s claim that 
music is a harbinger of social change, then might we interpret music as foreshadowing an age 
of increasing corporatisation within an all-subsuming information economy, and furthermore, 
a loss of value in the musical object and an increase in value of its distributive system, as 
management over production? We are already witnessing the technological push towards the 
consumption of eBooks in very much the same manner as our dematerialised music (and to a 
lesser extent, film) consumption, even through the same single-company services such as 
iTunes or Amazon, all vying for control of our leisure time—our use-time. All are outcomes 
that are at-odds with the utopian vision invoked by Composing. 
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 Whereby we see an increased fragmentation of television that began with pay-per-view, progressing towards a 
non-broadcasted atomising of programming. A pick ‘n’ mix of individual TV series’ episodes and films 
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 Placing a value on music’s use-value rather than its traditional commodity exchange-
value creates some interesting problems when considering the mp3 as a cultural artefact 
analogous to a CD or vinyl LP. Attali notes the following paradox concerning music’s initial 
transition from use-value to exchange-value following the introduction of sound recording: 
We must not forget that music remains a very unique commodity; to take on 
meaning, it requires an incompressible lapse of time, that of its own duration. 
Thus the gramophone, conceived as a recorder to stockpile time, became instead 
its principle user. Conceived as a word preserver, it became a sound diffuser. The 
major contradiction of repetition is evident here: people must devote their time to 
producing the means to buy recordings of other people’s time, losing in the 
process not only the use of their time, but also the time required to use other 
people’s time. Stockpiling thus becomes a substitute, not a preliminary condition, 
for use. People buy more records than they can listen to. They stockpile what they 
want to find the time to hear. Use-time and exchange-time destroy one another.
66
 
Attali’s reasoning is extremely reminiscent of Adorno’s concerns regarding the distinctions 
between the exchange-value and use-value within music commoditisation, placing this 
friction at the heart of his ‘fetish-character’.67 As a computer musician, I have to ask myself if 
I wish to contribute to the glut of online stockpiled recordings, as the economic value of 
dematerialised music approaches zero. This is another area within which the boundaries 
between Composing and Repeating become indistinct, and where the technologies and 
opportunities that in one light appear to offer the fertile circumstances from which the 
Composer can emerge, simultaneously appear to strengthen Repetition’s grip on the musical 
climate at large.  
 Attali continues, referencing Benjamin’s ideas regarding the ‘aura’ of uniqueness and 
originality: “Reproduction, in a certain sense, is the death of the original: in mass production, 
the mould has almost no importance or value in itself.”68 While Attali had industrial mass-
production in mind when he wrote this, it becomes even more pertinent when considering the 
self-similar perfection of digital replication, as well as its potentially relentless propagation 
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once online.
69
 While for an artist, the process is arguably more important than the results, I 
cannot help but wish for a more substantial artefact to emerge from the fruits of my labour 
than a collection of musical encodings on a hard disk. If the results of my artistic output have 
become increasingly dematerialised, then, for reasons that will become increasingly clear 
throughout this thesis, I should wish to rematerialise it. The satisfaction I feel when I 
complete an album and hold a CD or piece of vinyl in my hand is accompanied by a strong 
feeling of accomplishment; a goal has been achieved and the project is concluded. A ‘mould’ 
of sorts exists in the form of multitrack audio files, but as this is now as dematerialised the 
final music file, a physical artefact feels necessary in the name of permanence. I know 
through experience that the temptation to continue working on my music, given the ability to 
perfectly recall a session within the sequencing program, is difficult to resist, leading to the 
‘98% complete syndrome’, making it difficult to finish a piece of work. Having your music 
exist as an mp3 on your own web site is not enough to avoid the temptation to re-work a piece 
of music, but concluding a project by funding the pressing of CDs or vinyl is very much a 
final act, allowing one to move on to the next project.
70
 This contradiction between extended 
time spent working on music, against its prompt reification, is a notable incentive for me to 
produce physical goods, at the very least alongside dematerialised versions, as a productivity 
measure. These psychological effects on modes of production are considerable. 
Regarding modes of reception, Jonathan Sterne also notes that unlike physical 
commodities, mp3s inherently lack an economic exchange-value,
71
 and so we would expect 
them to be approached by consumers in a different manner.
72
 Yet consumers still appear to 
collect and stockpile mp3s as though they were physical commodities. This apparently 
inexhaustible supply of music, combined with limited use-time, changes the way music is 
consumed; in an increasing attempt to maximise use-time, listeners have embraced portable 
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players (iPods, smartphones etc.). In relying on such technologies, consumers participate in 
the continued production of demand for music, despite the extant glut of online music, and in 
turn keep the large aggregators’ pockets lined.73 
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Chapter 2. Post-Auratic Dematerialisation 
It would be tempting to suggest that in embracing portable music, aided by dematerialisation, 
listeners have relegated music to a background noise, becoming little more than an incidental 
soundtrack to their lives. This is a familiar, if unconvincing, fear concerning music and its 
consumption in the technological age, and has perhaps been most notably explored by 
Adorno. 
Adorno’s essays on popular music and its surrounding culture (‘Mass Culture’ is his 
term; culture churned out for the lowest common denominator by the ‘Culture Industry’) have 
become a benchmark of anti-capitalist cultural critique, and clearly form the basis of much of 
Attali’s scornful stance on popular music within Repeating. One can almost picture the zeal 
with which Adorno would tear into the contemporary use of iPods; Adorno pulls no punches 
when critiquing the phonograph, and the listening habits of those who enjoy music on such 
devices. 
In his 1927 essay, ‘The Curves of the Needle’, Adorno expounds his concern with the 
continued and rapidly growing fetishisation of Emile Berliner’s gramophone, as a dumb 
surrogate to the family piano (itself a bourgeois commodity status symbol of its time), stating: 
“The gramophone belongs to the pregnant stillness of individuals.”74 Here we note the root of 
Attali’s notion of music commoditisation as silencing, separating recording from 
performance, supplanting Representation with Repetition. Furthermore, we are introduced to 
the emergence of Attali’s aforementioned use-time/exchange-time paradox, concomitant with 
a deritualisation, as Richard Leppert notes in his commentary, “wherein the aesthetic labour 
of others is privately heard rather than experienced intersubjectively and socially, as may 
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occur in musical ritual, whether ecclesiastical or secular.”75 With the advent of the Walkman, 
music becomes even more private, taken to the extreme with the iPod, abundant with use-
time. The swapping of cassette mix tapes, a popular social activity in the medium’s heyday, 
has been absorbed within the technological frame. Our sharing of music is now online, as we 
decide what to add to our music libraries within iTunes, in preparation for our next iPod 
‘sync’. 
Adorno followed his ‘Curves’ essay in 1934 with ‘The Form of the Phonograph 
Record’, a brief essay scrutinising the physical recording medium itself, rather than the 
gramophone. Adorno begins with a cautious cursory assessment of the phonograph’s physical 
properties, describing it with an almost reverential wonder: “Fragile like tablets, with a 
circular label in the middle ... at the very center, a little hole that is at times so narrow that one 
has to redrill it wider so that the record can be laid upon the platter.”76 Although marvelling at 
this delicate wafer of music, Adorno seems less entranced by its primary function, as though 
questioning how it is possible for such a thing to be traded and fetishised: “It designates the 
two-dimensional model of a reality that can be multiplied without limit, displaced both 
spatially and temporally, and traded on the open market. This, at the price of sacrificing its 
third dimension: its height and its abyss.”77 However, the most pertinent point of Adorno’s 
‘Form’ essay is his insight into the recording as a document of sound; his description of the 
phonograph as “covered with curves, a delicately scribbled, utterly illegible writing.”78 
Adorno’s respect for music saves the would-be commodity from the kind of vituperative 
assessment he would later be characterised by, for he acknowledges the permanence of the 
phonograph in very much the same manner as a stone tablet, linking music and writing: 
There is no doubt that, as music is removed by the phonograph record from the 
realm of live production and from the imperative of artistic activity and becomes 
petrified, it absorbs into itself, in this process of petrification, the very life that 
would otherwise vanish. The dead art rescues the ephemeral and perishing art as 
the only one alive. Therein may lie the phonograph record’s most profound 
justification, which cannot be impugned by an aesthetic objection to its 
reification.
79
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It is the phonograph record’s saving grace as a reified, codified musical script, a “scriptal 
spiral”80 that physically describes the frequency and amplitude of vibrations across time, 
rather than a set of performative instructions (such as a score), which Adorno finds valuable 
(the word ‘phonograph’, after all, derives from its Greek origins, translated literally as ‘sound 
writer’). It achieves an archival and historical permanence hitherto unavailable, and arguably 
still remains the most stable reification of music, especially since the tenuous status it has 
acquired through digitisation, not to mention dematerialisation. Interestingly, as recording 
formats have progressed throughout the last century, through magnetic analogue and digital 
technology, it does indeed appear that the phonograph record (or modern variant thereof) 
would remain at the zenith of fulfilling the criterion of archival record or document. With 
each successive technological step, an extra layer of abstraction has been inserted between the 
music format and its musical, acoustic decoding, despite the accompanying increase in 
reproduction sound quality.
81
 
 Digital dematerialisation is an extreme illustration of the developing gulf between the 
scriptal origins of recorded music and its latest incarnation, also noted by Auslander using this 
quote from Baudrillard’s Simulations: 
And here it is a question of a reversal of origin and finality, for all the forms 
change once they are not so much mechanically reproduced but even conceived 
from the point of view of their very reproducibility, diffracted from a generating 
nucleus we call the model. ... Here are the models from which proceed all forms 
according to the modulation of their differences.
82
 
As Auslander reiterates, “The code and model is the binary code that defines all products of 
digital technology, products that differ from one another only according to different 
modulations of the common code from which they are all diffracted.”83 As part of the online 
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digital edifice, dematerialised music is no different from any other software: “There is no 
intrinsic difference between the binary code on a music disc and the code in the software that 
controls the launching of missiles.”84 
 It would be tempting to paraphrase Arthur C. Clarke, and say that to access and 
playback music, as one of myriad modulations of digital data, within such a technology, is 
indistinguishable from magic.
85
 Furthermore, the transformation from CD to dematerialisation 
will no doubt affect how we value music, not to mention how we consume it. While from a 
consumer standpoint, the many advantages afforded by dematerialised music appear to 
outweigh the disadvantages, as a composer I feel I need to remain sceptical and critical of the 
increasingly totalising effects of the information economy. The ability to distribute my music 
online, simply by uploading mp3s to my own website is undoubtedly a bonus for musicians; 
however, I am aware of just how dependent I am on the computer for almost every musical 
task I undertake on a daily basis. Whether I’m writing music, mastering other musicians’ 
music, uploading my music, developing and updating my website, purchasing and listening to 
music, shopping, writing emails, contacting fans and friends on Facebook, updating my 
Twitter feed, or writing this thesis, it is all mediated by my computer, via the screen I gaze at 
and the keyboard and mouse I manipulate. As far as my body is concerned, I am physically 
carrying out a single task, as all the aforementioned activities have been subsumed within the 
literal frame of my computer monitor—a single portal into my musical existence, which, once 
closed, leaves little evidence of my activities, as my hardware synthesisers and samplers are 
gradually replaced by software. Consequently, in addition to a conclusive physical artefact as 
fruits of my labour, I wish to re-introduce a physical engagement with my music, a multi-
sensory crafting, to reclaim part of my practice from the computer. The freedom to create and 
distribute my music over the internet is sullied by my need to remain anchored to the 
computer; the myriad liberating modes of reception owing to Repeating have yet to mirror 
similar modes of production in my own practice. 
 Attali’s issue of recordings as an “incompressible lapse of time”, resulting in the 
“valorization of very short works”,86 is shared and explored by Evan Eisenberg, opining that 
music, as uncompromising in its temporal linearity, “does not lend itself to being scanned or 
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searched or ‘surfed’” by listeners.87 The way we seek, collect and consume music online may 
well then be incompatible with the way we listen to the music once we have it on our hard 
disks. As Eisenberg implies, our endlessly distracted and fragmented online multitasking 
cannot possibly serve our listening needs as required by an hour of liquid audio. Indeed, we 
are seeing an increasing consumption of singles rather than albums; with services like iTunes, 
Pandora and Spotify, the cherry-picked singles playlist dominates the album (at the very least, 
we need not suffer albums stuffed with ‘filler’ any longer).88 The seldom-used ‘shuffle’ 
feature on our CD players finally makes sense on our iPods, filled with a variety of single 
tracks. Our previously compartmentalised actions as consumers, first discovering music, then 
purchasing and finally listening to it, have joined the soup of our daily diversions and 
distractions (a consequence exacerbated by our mobile internet boom—our emails granulated 
into Tweets).
90
 Consequently, taking his cue from Adorno regarding the technological 
mediation of music as regressive and pacifying, Eisenberg concludes that digital music can 
only continue to become whittled-down to “hooks, riffs, melodic fragments ... music is now a 
soundtrack for catchy words and captivating images. All music aspires to the condition of the 
jingle.”91 However, as we shall see later in this chapter, the modes of reception employed in 
our online, digital age have adapted accordingly, accommodating the varied circumstances 
through which we experience music, and derive meaning from this active agency. To side 
with Eisenberg would assume a single static mode of listening, anchored to the phonograph. 
The contrast between Attali’s utopian Composing and his critical account of 
Repeating appears to be unyielding and resolute, yet typically, the reality exists in a nebulous 
grey area open to interpretation, between these two phases. If we can interpret aspects of an 
age of decentralised mp3 distribution over the internet as signs of an impending era of 
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Composition, we can equally interpret iTunes and similar stores as a level of entrenching 
Repetition; we might then designate the present as a hypercommodified extension of 
Repeating. 
 When, within the same sentence, Attali suggests that this mode of power is 
simultaneously “exacerbating the fiction of the spectacle as a mode of government”,93 and yet 
in the next sentence suggests that the stockpiling of music recordings portends an end to our 
society of the spectacle, we again find ourselves at odds with our present situation. For Attali, 
recorded music appears to be a supplanting of performance, and leads to the elimination of 
Representation and the isochronic spectacle. Yet as the online exchange of abundant 
dematerialised music (as records of a supposed ‘performance’) devalues recorded music by 
negating the economics of scarcity, we see the opposite occur: a re-appreciation and 
subsequent monetising of the live spectacle (i.e. music concerts, performances and 
installations) as an authoritative and ‘authentic’ mode of production.94 Repeating, in this 
instance, reinforces Representation rather than undermines it, by reminding us of the auratic 
qualities that are inherently diminished by dematerialisation. 
2.1 The Adorno-Benjamin Debate: Mapping Modes of Production and Reception 
The debate between Adorno and Benjamin concerning music’s function and use in society is 
still highly relevant today, for through their debate we witness how their standpoints are 
reflected at the core of Repeating and Composing respectively, mapping on to these phases 
with a striking resonance. Their different perspectives are very useful at illustrating the 
differences between Attali’s Repeating and Composing, depending on whether one’s 
considerations focus primarily on modes of production or modes of reception; this will also 
bias our conclusions on whether we perceive our current musical climate as best described by 
Repeating, or signalling the dawn of Composing. Similarly, whether we deem these stages as 
emancipatory or repressive also comes down to which side of the production/reception divide 
our standpoints sit. 
 Benjamin was unable to subject recorded sound, as an art form, to the kind of scrutiny 
he applied to the visual arts—recorded music, after all, was barely half a century old by the 
time ‘Work of Art’ was published, and for Benjamin could not offer as rich a retrospective to 
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dissect as the many preceding centuries of visual arts. Recorded sound gets scant mention, 
and when it does receive attention, it is merely used to help illustrate the extensible if, in 
Benjamin’s view, somewhat compromised ability of reproductions to “enable the original to 
meet the beholder halfway, be it in the form of a photograph or a phonograph record.”95 
However, in debating with Adorno, Benjamin provides us with an insight into how his views 
towards technologically mediated art can apply to recorded music, sounding-off against 
Adorno’s beliefs.  
The ephemeral and transitory nature of sound is distinctly at odds with the revered, 
contemplative permanence of the fresco, statue, or other exhibition works of visual art with a 
clear ritualistic precedence. For Benjamin, visual art throughout the ages has followed a 
comparatively slow, gradual progression, accelerating in its ability to capture and accurately 
convey reality, culminating with the motion picture: “Lithography enabled graphic art to 
illustrate everyday life, and it began to keep pace with printing ... Since the eye perceives 
more swiftly than the hand can draw, the process of pictorial reproduction was accelerated so 
enormously that it could keep pace with speech.”96 Conversely, since its relatively abrupt 
inception just under a century and a half ago, recorded sound has existed for a relatively short 
period of time before being subsumed by capitalist modes of mass production. As such, it 
suits a more compartmentalised periodising, as employed by Attali, for instance. 
According to Benjamin’s thesis, mass reproduction withers an artwork’s aura, in 
favour of widespread access, availability and subsequent portability, as “the technique of 
reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many 
reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence.”97 Benjamin remains 
optimistic of the emancipatory potential of technology, a severe bone of contention in his 
correspondence with Adorno at this time, though as importantly noted by Richard Leppert, 
this optimism is firmly from the perspective of reception, rather than production.
98
 
The aura of a unique work of art may indeed wither if the artwork is subject to 
mediating technologies not factored into its creation, as in the case of ritual works of art, 
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paintings, frescoes, sculptures and so forth.
99
 But for works of art that depend inextricably on 
technology and reproducibility as core constituents of their very form—as Benjamin argues is 
the case with film—a very different dynamic exists between the production and reception of a 
reproduction. Instead of adversely affecting the ‘authenticity’ of the ‘original’, thus 
diminishing aura, Benjamin argues that with cinema we witness an empowerment resulting 
from, and dependent on, its media multiplicity. “For the first time in world history, 
mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of art from its parasitical dependence on 
ritual. To an ever greater degree, the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed 
for reproducibility.”100 Rather than relying on ritual value in the domain of tradition, such an 
artwork now thrives within the socio-political ecology, though as I will argue shortly, 
freedom from ritual within the domain of tradition does not engender a disconnection from 
other, quotidian ritual meanings.  
Adorno takes a suspicious and critical stance against the gramophone, appearing 
conflicted concerning the phonograph record, and sees the emancipation that Benjamin argues 
for as irredeemably tainted by commoditisation. Initially conceived through his critical 
exchange with Benjamin, his scathing polemic, On the Fetish-Character in Music and the 
Regression of Listening, criticised what he saw as a fetishisation of music commodity 
consumption, as well as a correspondingly regressive, passive mode of listening. In contrast to 
Benjamin’s optimistic view of technology as a democratising force for liberation, Adorno 
viewed the technological mass-mediation of art with much greater scepticism, acting more as 
a suppressive force than anything remotely emancipatory. However, Adorno did emphatically 
endorse Benjamin’s core hope for technology to demystify inaccessible bourgeois ‘high’ art, 
catalysing “the liquidation of the traditional value of the cultural heritage”,101 but he did not 
subscribe to Benjamin’s belief that the use of technology necessarily nullifies ritual value. 
Benjamin’s propounding of the slow continuum in the visual arts, progressing from 
the ritual and ‘auratic’ artwork on one side, to the technologically-mediated and 
‘democratised’ film on the other, gives rise to a corollary emancipation of the beholder. 
Benjamin suggests that “a man who contemplates a work of art is absorbed by it. He enters 
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into this work of art the way legend tells of the Chinese painter when he viewed his finished 
painting.”102 In this manner, it is the artwork that absorbs the contemplative viewer, not vice-
versa, because as Richard Leppert notes, “the artwork colonizes the viewer, though less by 
what it is, more because of what it has become (a cult object).”103 The ritual work of art 
entrances us through its auratic properties, its ritual site and associated culturally appointed 
deference, and we are thus at its mercy. Film, on the other hand, according to Benjamin, does 
not permit such contemplative passivity, as it is sufficiently familiar to everyday life for us 
not to require our undivided concentration. Instead, film is continually jarring from one 
‘shock’ edit to the next, eliciting active viewing in compensation for this sustained shock 
distraction; “the distracted mass absorbs the work of art.”104 
But, perhaps as an attempt to temper this technological optimism, Benjamin closes his 
essay with a concession towards the habituation of this distraction: 
The distracted person, too, can form habits. More, the ability to master certain 
tasks in a state of distraction proves that their solution has become a matter of 
habit ... The film makes the cult value recede into the background not only by 
putting the public in the position of the critic, but also by the fact that at the 
movies this position requires no attention. The public is an examiner, but an 
absent-minded one.
105
 
These final sentiments appear to be echoed later by Susan McClary regarding Composing, in 
her afterword to Noise (as mentioned earlier), in that we may identify and attribute potentially 
emancipatory factors to media technologies, but which remain latent unless we choose to act 
upon these liminal opportunities. For Benjamin, the once privileged tools of liberation have 
been unlocked, ‘democratised’ and distributed, and thrown at our feet, yet the last choice 
remains ours to decide whether to pick them up and use them. 
 Typically, Adorno feels Benjamin gives the viewer far too much credit, and accuses 
Benjamin of being overly romantic: “The idea that a reactionary individual can be 
transformed into a member of the avante-guard through an intimate acquaintance with the 
films of Chaplin, strikes me as simple romanticization.”106 In fact, film—the medium 
Benjamin regards as post-auratic, for having no ritual value or original copy—is considered 
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by Adorno to possess an “auratic character ... to an extreme and highly suspect degree.”107 For 
Adorno, the cinema as a motion picture temple is no different to an art museum, and as such 
retains the same site-specific aura, with its own codes and rituals (contemporarily, what is 
popcorn snacking if not a site-specific ritual? One can imagine the resulting outcry from a 
move against the traditional lobby-sale of popcorn).
109
 As Richard Leppert notes, advertising 
and marketing hype, trailers and promotional interviews, the cult of the superstar, are all 
artificial boosters supporting the aura surrounding cinema.
110
 Once in place, these 
mechanisms that serve to create a simulacrum of aura are perpetuated through familiarity and 
unquestioned repetition (a trait Adorno would also level at popular music). Adorno seizes the 
opportunity to suggest that Benjamin focuses too narrowly on the medium of film itself, with 
a typically techno-centric romanticism, without fully considering the surrounding social 
practice through which ritual meaning is created. Indeed, Adorno challenges Benjamin’s view 
of film as empowering the proletariat, suggesting that in becoming entrenched in the 
technological potential of film, he has not considered the balanced axial dialectics between 
film as low/dependent art and high/autonomous art: “You underestimate the technical 
character of autonomous art, and overestimate that of dependent art.”111 Although technology 
for Benjamin is seen as potentially emancipatory, Adorno suggests its use can also be 
employed to enforce the dominant market ideology, promising freedoms that will never arrive 
while ensuring continued turnover; both high and low art “bear the stigmata of capitalism ... 
Both are torn halves of an integral freedom, to which, however, they do not add up.”112  
 Benjamin’s closing disclaimer regarding inattention strays closest to Adorno’s 
sentiments concerning the reception of mass media. Yet while for Benjamin the state of 
distractedness during the viewing of a film is, at least until habituation, a mode of 
empowerment and emancipatory potential, it is this exact same mode that Adorno criticises 
regarding the reception of pop or ‘mass’ music within his ‘Fetish Character’ essay. Adorno 
describes the ensuing ‘passive’ listening mode to result from music fetishism as losing “the 
capacity for conscious perception of music”, “fluctuating between comprehensive forgetting 
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and sudden dives into recognition”, listening “atomistically”.113 Akin to Benjamin’s ‘shock’ 
edits, combining the familiar with the technologically-imposed unfamiliar (resulting in his 
illustrative ‘orchid in the land of technology’), Adorno denigrates the standardisation in pop 
music song formats likening it to the “inconspicuous familiar and the unfamiliar 
conspicuous”114 blueprint that he also recognised in advertising. For Adorno, the instant 
gratification of memorised hooks and ‘hit lines’ among otherwise familiar yet slightly 
different pieces of music, engendered a mode of ‘deconcentration’, analogous to Benjamin’s 
absent-minded critic: “Benjamin’s reference to the apperception of the cinema in a condition 
of distraction is just as valid for light music.”115 
 Here it becomes apparent how the analyses of Adorno and Benjamin differ, with both 
parties betraying their respective dialectic lines of enquiry. As mentioned earlier, Benjamin is 
fascinated and preoccupied with technologically mediated modes of reception, and in a 
distinctly technoromantic sense, how these modes offer emancipatory potential. He examines 
the route from the unique, enveloping and contemplative auratic art, steeped in tradition and 
ritual, to an empowering accessibility; when viewed through Attali’s framework, Benjamin 
identifies technology as the emancipatory potential for Composing. 
 Adorno, on the other hand, is fixated on the dichotomous relationship between what 
he calls ‘autonomous’ art and ‘dependent’ heteronomous art (i.e. commoditised or politicised 
art), examining the social function of each.
116
 Following a similar trajectory to Benjamin, 
Adorno sees dependent art as having an inextricable social function, such as religious music, 
in contrast to autonomous art or music, such as serialism (Adorno typically cites the music of 
Schoenberg as an example). Unlike Benjamin, Adorno does not consider technological 
mediation as a catalyst of autonomy, and instead views technological agency with suspicion, 
for in his view it allows the ‘culture industry’ to create and fulfil the cycle of commodity 
fetishism with increasing efficiency (creating and sustaining the ‘Fetish-Character’ in music). 
Relating this to Attali, we can identify this ideology as the foundation to Repeating. 
 The views of Benjamin and Adorno, regarding their respective standpoints of 
reception and production, can be read into the contemporary issues facing musicians. 
Benjamin’s views are reflected in the fantasies of myriad technologists and tech-evangelists, 
for whom our online disintermediation and interconnectivity are a tantalising glimpse of a 
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future techno-centric liberation, celebrating the release of the industry stranglehold on work 
dissemination. Counter to this optimistic romanticism we have Adorno’s stance representing 
the producers (the musicians within such an economy), wary of the mechanisms and modes of 
production that will dictate not just if and how the music we produce will be received, but 
how these modes of production and reception/consumption, in turn, affect what we create or 
produce. 
 Crucially, if like Adorno, you are critical of the consequent modes of production given 
rise to by Repeating, then Composing will forever remain a distant dream. If, on the other 
hand, you acknowledge the myriad modes of reception afforded by Repeating (in improving 
access and availability to more music than ever before), then you will surely conclude that an 
age of Composing is already underway. 
2.2 Aura and Re-Ritualising Repetition 
The monolithic understanding of Repeating, as posited by Attali, supported by Adorno and 
promoted by Eisenberg, starts to unravel when we examine the varied modes of reception 
made available by Repeating’s technological and infrastructural expansion. Additional 
complications arise through the use of portable, ubiquitous music, when viewed with a single 
binary understanding of how we listen to music. 
 Rather than resulting in a “generalisation of Representation”,117 the superabundance of 
recordings has led to an acute reassessment of Representation. Not only does live 
performance become more valuable as a unique spectacle, it also becomes a more reliable 
commodity, resulting in the largest musical acts leveraging ticket prices to an all-time high, 
which by all accounts we will still happily pay for.
118
 Although it would be dangerous to carry 
this assumption across the board and suggest the same applies to independent recording 
artists, the unwitting re-appreciation of live performance is certainly one positive consequence 
of Repeating. Once again, the enhanced modes of reception created by Repetition appear at 
odds with Attali’s critical Marxian portrayal. 
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 As noted by Eisenberg, when we consider Benjamin’s thesis with regard to recorded 
music, it does not appear to mesh with a removal of ritual use-value, hand in hand with its 
aura, through its reproducibility. Benjamin’s case is clear: “It is significant that the existence 
of the work of art with reference to its aura is never entirely separated from its ritual function. 
In other words, the unique value of the authentic work of art has its basis in ritual, the location 
of its original use-value.”119 Eisenberg argues that this may hold true for the visual arts, 
occurring in one-dimensional space, but for recorded or dematerialised music we encounter a 
re-ritualising of music dependent on its very repeatability. “Photogravure reproduces an art 
object, proliferating it in space. This, Benjamin says, cheapens its ritual value, which depends 
less on the observable qualities of the object than on its haecceity or ‘thisness’, its unique 
identity. Phonography, by contrast, reproduces an art event, proliferating it in time.”120 But as 
Eisenberg continues to clarify, although an event implies a unique spectacle, it must repeat if 
it is to have ritual value. In this respect, live performances have become valuable amidst a 
superabundance of recordings precisely because of their lack of ritual repetition, as a unique 
event in time. “To have ritual value an event must recur. In other words, it must not be an 
historical event at all, but an instance of something timeless.”121 
 Timelessness is the exact quality studio musicians strive to achieve; modern music 
recordings are no longer documents of time, no longer ‘records’ of a portion of time, of a 
performance or an event, but are repeatable portions of time as an event, and this is where 
ritual value is derived. Rather than Attali’s gradual removal of the ritual channelling of 
violence within music in each stage throughout Noise, Repeating re-injects a substitute ritual 
value into recordings.
122
 Studio musicians, such as myself, do not specialise in recording 
performances, as there are often no performances involved in the creation of such recordings. 
Instead the act of composition is a slow, stratified, and highly iterative process that creates a 
recurring event to be initiated by the listener. Eisenberg writes about the associative ritual on 
the part of the listener throughout his ‘Ceremonies of a Solitary’ chapter, concerning the 
ritualistic manner in which we’ve listened to music since the birth of its reproducibility; there 
is a case for arguing that this highly portable event may then become part of such an 
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associative ritual. Once portable, music becomes unavoidably utilitarian; the listener is free to 
employ this Gebrauchsmusik (‘gebrauch’ being German for ‘use’) in any manner he or she 
sees fit, as background music, music to motivate, soothe or invigorate, and so forth. Thus, 
Gebrauchsmusik or ‘use-music’ can be understood as music performing a utilitarian function. 
Strengthening the argument for re-ritualisation, Eisenberg clarifies: “As the critic Paul 
Rosenfeld noted some years later, Gebrauch can mean not only ‘use’, but also ‘custom’ or 
even ‘ritual’.”123 “Anyone who owned a phonograph could use music for whatever he chose, 
in cheerful contempt for the composer’s intentions, cultural conventions, and the sacred Geist 
or spirit of the music.”124 In this Benjaminian sense, Repeating is liberating and empowering. 
What we bear witness to regarding such practices of re-ritualisation, is a dismantling 
of the rigid top-down prescriptive ritualising of traditional art and music, of religious 
institutions, concert halls, museums etc., in line with Benjamin’s thesis. However, where 
Benjamin stops, we can continue with a further reconstructive, bottom-up, interpretive 
meaning-making that exists within the new prismatic modes of reception created by music 
recordings in Repeating. This active and complex re-ritualisation shows up the pessimistic, 
Adornian view of the iPod-jacked masses as passive consumers, as simplistic and inaccurate. 
Adorno loathed the functional use of music within advertising and marketing, 
imbricated within the capitalist economy and deployed for commercial gain by, as he saw it, 
attempting to passively and unconsciously persuade us into purchasing goods (appealing to 
what he terms the ‘commodity character’ in us).125 But as Simon Frith notes, “On the one 
hand, we primarily think of music in terms of its use; on the other hand, usefulness means 
individual use. ... it is equally important to note that people nowadays routinely use music to 
manipulate their moods and organize their activities for themselves.”126 The same influencing 
mechanisms as employed by marketeers can be self-induced as part of the personal rituals 
mentioned earlier, as part of what sociologist Tia DeNora calls emotional “self-regulation” 
and “self-modulation”.127 The range of music we can accommodate on our portable players 
allows us to tune our emotional circumstances as we see fit; rather than exist as passive 
respondents of the external functional use of music in Repeating, we display an active agency 
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in how and why we choose to listen to the music we do. Susan Hallam writes, “The easy 
availability of music in everyday life is encouraging individuals to use music to optimise their 
sense of well being.”128 Additionally, interest in the power of music as a therapeutic tool is 
growing following reports such as Hallam’s; music therapies are used to promote relaxation, 
improve children’s capacity for learning, and for increasing the quality of life of those beyond 
medical help.
129
 
Whether listening to music to get us into the mood for going out with our friends, 
putting on background ambient music while we study, playing music while we do the 
washing up (or something similarly mundane), or turning music up to dance to cathartically, 
we are engaging in periodic private rituals that serve or enhance specific activities for our own 
ends.
130
 In the case of mundane tasks (such as housework, cooking or driving to work), we 
can transform this activity from a necessary routine, into an engaging ritual, utilising music to 
elevate our emotional state while de-emphasising our involvement with the activity. A prime 
example of such a situation is illustrated by Lesley, a respondent of DeNora’s studies: 
“[Music] keeps you going – almost like nullifying in a way, because you don’t think about 
what you’re doing, you just listen to the music and get on with the routine of house-work or 
whatever.”131 Another respondent, Nancy, describes her use of music as motivational: “First 
thing in the morning I quite like – sort of music that will get you up and get you going, so 
something that’s quite upbeat and cheerful. And late at night as well if I’m going out.”132 We 
use music to feel in control, in command of these activities rather than passively at the behest 
of them, transmuting routine diversion into ritual act, in order to restore emotional comfort 
and balance that would otherwise be compromised. 
Music’s increased portability and accessibility has exposed its functional malleability, 
even among private individuals; the diverse explosion of music’s use-value in contemporary 
society, resulting from dematerialisation, mirrors a similar broadening of the modes of 
reception. We now have evidence to dismantle the simplistic binarisms as proposed by 
Adorno used to describe modes of reception, such as ‘active’ or ‘passive’, thanks to the 
continued research into the quotidian use of music. 
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2.3 Splitting Binarisms: Ubiquitous Listening 
If I share Adorno’s (and consequently Attali’s) concern with the increasingly technocentric 
means of production and mediation of music from a musician’s perspective, I do not share his 
condemning of the engendered modes of reception. While the music Adorno identifies as 
exhibiting his ‘fetish character’ is but a tiny subset of the musical landscape, he tars great 
swathes of music spanning countless genres and styles with the same brush; as DeNora notes, 
“the culture industry is too quickly written off as a monolithic force, its products dismissed a 
priori as undifferentiated, equally worthless.”133 While Adorno recognises that music and art 
should be analysed as a whole, both ‘low’ and ‘high’ art, it would seem that this same holistic 
approach focusing on commoditised music would prove less fruitful. Adorno overlooks the 
fragmented and variegated nature of the music industry, consisting of small ‘cottage industry’ 
independent labels, as well as larger independent labels, genre-specific labels, offshoots and 
sub-labels, whether operating in competition with one another, or under completely different 
modi operandi. In contrast to the increasing technical homogeneity of production, we witness 
a diverse subcultural landscape, again with some scenes and subcultures ‘competing’ against 
others, or operating independently, each displaying a further array of different listening modes 
and functions, as discussed earlier. In this light, Adorno’s censure of music commoditisation, 
particularly regarding modes of listening, seems overly severe, as does Attali’s subsequent 
pessimistic portrayal of Repeating. 
 In an attempt to update theories regarding modes of reception, such as Adorno’s 
active/passive models, in light of the opportunities afforded by near ever-present access to 
music and its ensuing myriad functions, Anahid Kassabian has formulated a theory of 
‘ubiquitous listening’. Kassabian argues that music’s ubiquity, whether through the 
prevalence of portable devices (either ‘library’ iPods or ‘cloud’ streaming network devices) or 
the increasing ‘sourceless’ use of music all around us in public (as part of advertising, in the 
background whilst we shop, have our hair cut, drink with our friends etc.) has necessitated an 
engendered mode of listening that is neither ‘active’ nor ‘passive’, but of a more flexible 
(arguably more forgiving) and practical nature. 
 The genesis of ubiquitous listening, according to Kassabian, builds on the passivity of 
‘muzak’ or ‘elevator music’, as well as drawing from ambient music. Ambient music, as 
springing from Erik Satie’s experiments with ‘furniture music’ and Brian Eno’s ‘discreet 
                                                 
 
133
 DeNora, After Adorno, p. 28. 
37 
music’, prides itself in functioning as either background music or through active engagement; 
ideally, it will satisfy both listening modes. Kassabian continues: 
But since the 1980s, ‘background music’ has become foreground music. 
According to the industry, ‘background music’ is what we colloquially call 
‘elevator music’, and ‘foreground music’, which is most of contemporary 
programmed music, consists of works by original artists. While background music 
has all but disappeared, you can now hear everyone from Miriam Makeba to the 
Moody Blues to Madonna to Moby in one public setting or another—and quite 
possibly all of them at your local Starbucks.
134
 
At this juncture, to pose as an Adornian devil’s advocate for a moment, we may argue that the 
increasing use of foreground music, in replacing what has traditionally been background 
‘muzak’, is simply a symptom of an escalating and increasingly desperate means of attracting 
individuals’ attention—individuals who have become increasingly passive and numb to the 
incessancy of ubiquitous music in the econo-social sphere. It is a case of Benjamin’s 
habituation of distraction setting in as a result of the rising din. If widespread evidence for the 
use of similar modes of reception in more private and solitary environments did not exist (see 
Tia DeNora, as mentioned earlier, plus Christopher Small’s Musicking), then one might 
indeed be inclined to reach this conclusion. 
 However, as Kassabian remarks, “The development of recording technologies in the 
twentieth century disarticulated performance space and listening space. You can listen to 
opera in your bathtub and arena rock while riding the bus.”135 Ubiquitous listening, as a mode 
employed during DeNora’s ‘self-regulation’, Small’s ‘musicking’ and the like, is a clear 
empowerment resulting directly from Repeating. This ‘ubiquitous subjectivity’, as Kassabian 
calls it, will no doubt feedback into and inform compositional practice, as a harbinger of shifts 
in modes of production, but whether it will truly yield anything resembling Attali’s 
Composing remains to be seen. The notion that modes of reception have been richly 
developed into a blooming variegation of corresponding social functions in both the private 
and public spheres, is difficult to deny. A similarly positive assessment regarding modes of 
production is presently far from conclusive; the spectre of Attali’s ‘crisis of proliferation’ 
would appear to loom far more threateningly for musicians than for listeners, despite the 
blurring of the distinction between them. Thus we are presented with a prismatic imbalance 
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between modes of production and reception; the increasing technological homogeneity at one 
side of the prism, at the point of production, and the myriad facets of use-value on the 
opposite modes of reception. As we are still firmly entrenched within the capitalist machinery 
of Repeating, it is unclear how modes of production have been empowered by the 
technological ubiquity and increasing interconnectedness to the same degree as modes of 
reception. 
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Chapter 3. The Democratisation of Discovery 
Before we examine the issue of technology in musical modes of production over the next two 
chapters, let us first study the pragmatics of distributing one’s music amidst our crowded 
online economy. One of the key aspects to the suggestion that we near, or have entered, an 
age of Composing, is the open availability of the necessary tools needed to create and 
disseminate one’s music. Plenty has already been written about the potential of creating 
professional-sounding recordings from our increasingly affordable recording equipment and 
music software, given the experience and knowledge.
136
 Parallel to this means of production, 
the internet now provides us with a second essential factor of democratisation, as an 
increasingly rapid conduit for dissemination. In his book, The Long Tail, Wired Magazine 
editor-in-chief, Chris Anderson notes this shift from “passive consumers to active producers”, 
and continues: “You can see it all around you—the extent to which amateur blogs are sharing 
attention with mainstream media, small-time bands are releasing music online without a 
record label, and fellow consumers dominate online reviewing.”137 Developing the theme of 
empowerment, Anderson notes the thoughts of technologist author Doc Searls, who terms this 
shift from consumer to producer as “producerism”, further echoing the spirit of Composing.138 
Philosopher and author Andrew Potter concurs, summing up this democratised movement 
succinctly: “What we are seeing now is the fulfilment of the old Romantic ideal of every 
individual as a creative spirit, as millions of amateurs flood the Internet with their own songs, 
videos, photographs and stories.”139 As we recall, an abundance of music creates a scarcity of 
attention; this ‘attention’ economy is therefore now predicated on the sale and availability of 
use-time rather than exchange-time. 
As Potter intimates, it is clear that the resulting glut of creative output now fuelling 
some of the net’s most popular sites such as MySpace and YouTube has led to the necessary 
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creation of a third democratising factor, that of filtering and recommendations.
140
 Increasingly 
precise filtering and recommendation algorithms are necessary in order to negotiate the online 
music ecology accurately; the consumer reviews and recommendation methods, as used by 
retail giant Amazon, typical of the interactive ‘Web 2.0’, are of limited use. Such methods, 
being ‘reactive’ rather than ‘proactive’, risk simply reinforcing the convergence of consumer 
habits typical of ‘blockbuster’ economics, doing little to encourage the discovery of lesser-
known artists. 
Yet rather than accept a passive reliance on fan-driven models of discovery, 
independent artists are utilising increasingly novel and highly inventive means of attracting 
and receiving attention for their music. In direct acknowledgement and defiance of the post-
auratic state of music, singer-songwriter Sufjan Stevens generated publicity for his means of 
imposing artificial scarcity on one of his songs. In 2007, Stevens decided that instead of 
releasing this song as part of a CD, he would trade it as part of a Christmas-themed 
competition.
141
 Fans submitted their own songs for the venture, in the hope that Stevens 
would select a winner to receive the master rights to one of his own tracks, ‘The Lonely Man 
of Winter’. As the master rights holder, the winner would then be free to do what he or she 
pleased with the song, and in return, Steven’s record label (Asthmatic Kitty Records) would 
hold the rights to the winning entry song, which turned out to be a song by Brooklyn-based 
musician Alec Duffy.
142
 In recognising the unique nature of the competition, as well as the 
press opportunities, Duffy chose to maintain this artificial scarcity by holding free private 
listening parties for Sufjan Stevens fans at his home; fans could arrange a time to visit Duffy, 
who would provide them with homemade cookies and drinks while they listened to Stevens’ 
song just once.
143
 
 Other promotional tactics employed by artists in the hope of raising attention to their 
music include not only the increasingly commonplace bundling of limited goods and collector 
items, but unique activities. A most notable and humorous example of such tactic comes from 
ex-Nine Inch Nails drummer, Josh Freese, who used a tiered model to sell his own 2009 
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album Since 1972 (not quite a ‘freemium’ model, but very similar.145) The Guardian 
newspaper lists Freese’s ‘product’ list in full,146 which in itself is a testament to the 
effectiveness of his novelty model in gaining press attention. Apart from the seven-dollar 
download format of his album, Freese offers additional limited packages such as a fifty-dollar 
double CD/DVD set that includes a phone call from Freese himself, up to a limited edition 
thousand-dollar option that includes signed drums and cymbals, CDs and a tee shirt, a dinner 
date, plus the option to “[g]et drunk and cut each other's hair in the parking lot of the Long 
Beach courthouse (filmed and posted on YouTube, of course).”147 Freese’s top package, 
costing $75,000, includes the usual assortment of CDs, DVDs and a tee shirt, but additionally 
allows you to tour with Freese, have him join your band for a month, take home one of his 
drum kits, plus numerous other activities. At present, his top package is still unsold, though he 
has sold numerous packages from the lower tiers (still with prices reaching five figures). In a 
desperate attention economy, novelty sells. However, a variety of models and strategies have 
been posited as means of negotiating such an economy from the perspectives of both 
production and reception, the most notable of which I will now discuss. 
3.1 Plundering the Long Tail 
In The Long Tail, Anderson unwittingly examines Attali’s philosophical idea of Composing 
from an economic perspective, pragmatically analysing the commercial effects and 
implications of this net-centric creativity boom. Although Attali envisaged Composing as 
existing outside of our current capitalist economy, it is undoubtedly difficult to imagine the 
full realisation of such a scenario on a scale exceeding its current fringe activity. The notion 
that an age of Composing acts as a musical presage to greater societal emancipation, for now 
remains a techno-romantic dream. Yet for computer musicians, composing within their home 
studios, the dream of turning fruitful hobbies into thriving careers is still a highly motivating 
factor, despite the unfavourable odds. Every week sees the arrival of ‘new music strategies’, 
on how best to capitalise on the opportunities provided by the decentralised online economy; 
                                                 
 
145
 ‘Freemium’ models offer the base product (in the case of musicians, usually mp3s) for free, but offer 
additional, more expensive premium bundles for fans, such as limited vinyl, signed posters, home gigs and other 
artefacts and event/activities. 
146
 <www.guardian.co.uk/music/2009/feb/23/full-list-josh-freese-album-package-deals> (Accessed 16th 
September 2010). 
147
 Ibid. 
42 
how best to differentiate one’s music from the myriad other musicians also vying for 
attention, far down the Long Tail. 
 Anderson suggests that this huge growth in so-called ‘Pro-Am’148 output, combined 
with the global dissemination potential of the internet, creates a huge market made up of 
thousands of individual niches. Given access to these niches through aggregators and online 
music retailers such as iTunes, to whom the traditional economics of scarcity and product 
inventory logistics simply do not apply, we have a potential market of millions of individual 
products, selling by small amounts on their own, yet combining to provide enough overall 
sales to make iTunes and the like an overwhelming financial success. 
The Long Tail is a visual representation of product sales, ordered by decreasing sales 
units and plotted on a graph (creating a curve known statistically as a ‘long tail distribution’, 
according to Anderson). We have the handful of million-selling albums nestled together in an 
initial sales peak or ‘head’, which drops off sharply as the music gets more obscure, selling 
less and less. The important point to note about this is that the Long Tail is extremely long. 
Anderson stresses this point in the first chapter by illustrating this sales curve at various 
points along the tail.
149
 The first example shows the number of track downloads via the US-
only on-demand music streaming service, Rhapsody (subscription-based rather than track-by-
track purchase-based), with the track limit set to equal that of a standard brick-and-mortar 
Wal-Mart inventory, of around twenty-five thousand tracks. What we are presented with is a 
clear power-law distribution curve. All these sales are part of The Head; these are the 
blockbusters that allow a brick-and-mortar retailer to survive. Given that physical product 
retailers need to populate a finite inventory, these are the products they decide to stock; a 
single CD takes up the same amount of space regardless of how many are sold, so the cost of 
‘rent’ for an individual blockbuster per unit will be far less than a CD that sells just a dozen 
times per month. In short, traditional retailers’ inventory is a zero-sum game, based on 
blockbuster economics. 
Contrast this with download stores and it quickly becomes clear that these limits of 
finite stock inventory and storage disappear (or at least become so miniscule as to be 
meaningless). Consequently, download stores can hold a much greater amount of music in 
their inventory, providing the exact same music in the ‘head’ as Wal-Mart does, but 
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additionally reaching all the way down The Long Tail, to provide thousands of tracks that 
were previously economically unviable. 
The inference here is that you do not need to be selling thousands of CDs each month 
to consider selling your music alongside those who might well sell that much. As touched 
upon earlier, the contention is less about access, and more of discovery. Filtering and 
recommendations currently fall short of providing the necessary means of digging in among 
the Long Tail products and linking purchases with those inside The Head, to draw consumers 
out beyond the territory held by top-ten charts and expensive ad campaigns. Instead of relying 
on traditional means of promotion and exposure, through magazine reviews, radio coverage 
and large advertising tie-ins, available only to larger record labels with the resources to 
bankroll such campaigns, burgeoning artists need to look elsewhere to help raise their profile. 
What we see evolving alongside the new Composers is a network of would-be taste mavens, 
challenging the existing media network by launching their own websites, starting blogs, 
contributing to online communities, reviewing and evangelising the work of new musicians—
what we might call ‘the democratisation of discovery.’ 
Music blogs and music communities in general are essential resources to be mined 
when discovering new music; as a musician, I have found that locating and tapping into these 
communities is the first rung on the ladder in finding an audience for my music. Members of 
these communities are passionate enthusiasts, who live to discover and spread their musical 
discoveries to other enthusiasts, as online tastemakers who, in theory, will make or break new 
artists residing in the Long Tail. As our online music economy evolves from one predicated 
on the scarcity of goods to the scarcity of attention, mobilising as many fans to evangelise 
about one’s music is an obvious strategy. 
We will certainly witness a rise in the complexity of algorithms used to guide listeners 
through search engines, or for purchase profiling, as well as monitoring the activity of 
listeners on huge communities such as MySpace and Facebook. These sites have a huge 
potential draw of music lovers, millions of potential listeners; actively attempting to 
accurately profile and make consequent recommendations will be huge undertaking, but 
necessary to be able to direct listeners to the smaller niches and artists with otherwise 
inconspicuous outposts on the internet. The large-scale user profiling from internet giants 
such as Google, MySpace, as well as retailers such as Netflix and Amazon, relies on 
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harvesting what James Surowiecki calls ‘the wisdom of the crowds’,150 whereby the market is 
adjusted to suit the evolving tastes of consumers (and in our case, listeners).
151
 Although this 
sounds very much like the kind of marketing and focus group-led activity we are accustomed 
to in our daily lives, in using this crowd ‘wisdom’, it is hoped we can achieve a more efficient 
method of finding information, music, and products ourselves as consumers and listeners 
rather than being passively subjected to marketing campaigns. Instead of relying on a small 
group of individuals to make choices for us about what we should listen to, it is hoped that we 
can be presented with the information necessary to find what we are looking for. According to 
Anderson, “these new tastemakers aren’t a super-elite of people cooler than us; they are 
us”.152 
Last.fm is one of the more popular attempts so far to tailor new music to one’s tastes; 
using a small plug-in for your software music player, Last.fm will tally each track you play, 
noting the artists and tracks you play most, and update your account accordingly. Then using 
this data in co-ordination with other listeners of the same artists, it will attempt to fill in the 
blanks in your music tastes. If the service stopped here it would be unremarkable, and this 
aspect of the service obviously relies on other customers doing the groundwork to find new 
artists for you, but there is also a very powerful online component to Last.fm, built around a 
huge community with streaming access to a huge catalogue of music. This is where the 
service becomes more interesting. 
If you want to take a more active approach to your musical discovery, you simply find 
your favourite artists on Last.fm’s site, where you will be given the option of selecting tracks 
to play from that artist. You will also be presented with a playlist of similar artists, and can 
select any artist you enjoy, to hear more from and read about, presented with a discography 
and statistics showing how popular each release is. If you do not enjoy a track within a 
playlist, you simply click on a button to ensure the recommendation system does not present 
similar tracks to this in the future. Conversely if you come across a track you love, then you 
can say so, to positively refine your recommendations. It is a similar idea to Amazon’s 
‘customers who bought this also bought…’ system, only more highly nuanced and immediate. 
Community is a very useful aspect of Last.fm; if you do not wish to search through 
track after track for something you like, you could try leaving a message on the artist’s page 
about the track you do like, asking other fans to offer suggestions. We all take pride in sharing 
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our knowledge with others; it is part of our human nature to contribute and feel valued—
though some of us can be all too eager to share opinions or suggestions—so it makes sense to 
tap into this communal wisdom in case the algorithmic approach bears little fruit. 
The last site I wish to mention, thesixtyone.com, is the most promising means of 
democratic discovery I have encountered so far, and a relative newcomer compared to 
Last.fm. On the face of it, thesixtyone could be yet another social networking site, but is 
instead rather novel. By recognising hierarchical social music listening habits fashioned 
around respected tastemakers, and by incentivising listening within the site’s community, you 
have a rich network of music fans eager to listen to new music. Granted, it provides charts of 
all the most popular artists in a particular genre, all the new submissions, the current movers 
and shakers, much like any other social music network site. But it also motivates listeners to 
get involved by creating a tiered, role-playing game-like levelling structure, whereby you 
complete a variety of tasks and challenges to increase your ‘level’ status, thereby increasing 
your standing within the community. 
As a listener, your aim is to discover great new music before anyone else, and proceed 
to ‘heart’ it, bestowing your approval upon it. By carefully ‘discovering’ new music and 
‘hearting’ it, you will then receive further points as other people listen to it, hopefully 
‘hearting’ it too. Thus, your reputation of good musical taste increases. The earlier you can 
discover excellent, original, and prospectively successful music, the greater your chances of 
rising through the ranks, gaining points and eventually amassing subscribers (people who 
recognise and respect your musical taste). There are also extra challenges provided to supply 
you with bonus hearts to use, as well as unlocking features on the site such as direct access to 
individual genres, for instance. 
I have not seen anything that works so effectively at incentivising listeners to discover 
music rather than simply listen to the top of the charts (and thus only sustain the chart-
topper’s hegemony) this successfully before; from first-hand experience, it really does 
manage to expose the majority of the music submitted. There is a much greater movement and 
fluidity to the music catalogued within such a system, as stronger currents reach down into the 
site’s murky depths of the Long Tail, dredging up new music. The only criticism I can level at 
the site at the moment would be the classification of the music, as the genres tend to be rather 
hit and miss, relying on the artists to correctly classify the music, which seems unusual for a 
site relying so much on community action. Perhaps Last FM-style tagging should play a 
greater role in dividing music accurately into genres. 
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The bottom line with thesixtyone, is that it has understood two very important, yet 
simple, mechanisms that lie at the core of any online social dynamic, in order to motivate and 
incentivise listeners. Our feelings of importance, engendered through autonomous control 
over our actions within the site, shape its structure and affect how artists will be heard and 
developed by the community. In implementing its listener hierarchy, thesixtyone has very 
acutely acknowledged the value of what Sarah Thornton calls ‘subcultural capital’,153 i.e. the 
good social standing and respect we accumulate through successfully illustrating astute 
judgement and good taste, and in doing so becoming the necessary taste-mavens to guide the 
less experienced listener towards good music. 
3.2 The Human Touch 
In his 2007 book “Net Blogs and Rock ‘n’ Roll,” David Jennings notes, using car reliability as 
an example, how we react to the immediate personal approach, giving weight to personal 
accounts as we respond empathically.
154
 No matter how many glossy adverts, dry statistical 
surveys or consumer watchdog magazines we read, if someone personally spends half an hour 
recounting the difficulty spent trying to start their car, we will read negatively into that car 
manufacturer, despite this incident probably being in the vast minority. As we search for 
opinions about artists and albums to listen to, who should we listen to, and how do we assign 
value and importance to each of these recommendations? Are there some people we might 
listen to over others? 
As Jennings notes, the best way to create a buzz among a community is by word-of-
mouth, “especially if the buzz reaches a tipping point where it starts to spread under its own 
momentum.”155 The epicentres of these buzzes are often the most ardent fans and followers 
within a particular genre or subculture, quick to notice developments from their favourite 
musicians. Jennings cites a breakdown of the types of music fan by Project Phoenix research, 
carried out by publishers Emap, splitting fans into four main categories, and further split into 
three or four subcategories.
156
 This fan topology contains the whole spectra of music listener 
from the dedicated and informed ‘Savant’, through ‘Enthusiasts’ and ‘Casuals’, to the least 
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interested group, the ‘Indifferents’. It is these Savants and Enthusiasts at the core of any 
online community or music blog that will be the most active and vocal, consuming, sharing, 
and often making new music themselves. These are the tastemakers that will either embrace 
or snub new artists tentatively securing a footing within their young music career. 
Consequently, new Long Tail artists need to seek out these communities, integrate, 
communicate and co-operate with them, to stand the best chance at cementing a small core 
following, whose knowledge and enthusiasm for their particular music niche will act as a 
catalyst for spreading awareness about these artist up through the Tail. Why do the Savants do 
this—what incentive do they have for supporting and spreading the word about new artists? 
Reputation and respect within their community is one factor; these are music lovers who 
spend much of their waking life consuming and researching music, and relish the opportunity 
to exercise their seasoned opinions. Jennings suggests a competitive spirit within Savants’ 
social circles, an element of one-upmanship, with Savants competing to break news about 
new artists before each other, and so distinguishing themselves among their peers.
157
 
However, this behaviour has led to criticism from those outside the scene or subculture, 
labelling individuals displaying this potentially snobbish or elitist attitude as ‘hipsters’, who 
care more for appearing distinguished than about enjoying the music itself. Certain music 
blogs and zines have consequently been subject to the occasional light-hearted jibe, such as 
Pitchfork Media, which was amusingly subject to an article in the long-standing satirical 
website, The Onion, running a piece in which Pitchfork gave music itself a rating of a six-
point-eight out of ten.
158
 
Online communities are still subject to the same subcultural styles and argotic memes 
of online representation as they are offline, and although somewhat abstracted over the 
internet, the primary reasons for communal gathering and interaction are much the same. We 
still see fans eager to differentiate themselves and validate their contributions by posting 
something unique and ahead of the curve (they will certainly be swiftly notified if something 
they have posted is ‘old’ news, usually by community members with a higher standing (or 
post count). Contributors (usually Savants) are keen to develop their ‘subcultural capital’, to 
enhance their image among their peers and establish their growing authority within the 
community (and “to form the vanguard of taste and set the pace of innovation”). 160 This is an 
ongoing balancing act between shared tastes and ideologies and the kind of one-upmanship I 
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described earlier, with one’s subcultural capital enhanced by not only the knowledge of new 
artists but the collection of artefacts about these new artists (such as ‘limited’ editions, white 
label twelve-inches and the like, attempting to re-inject Benjaminian ‘aura’ back into the 
artefact). 
3.3 One Thousand True Fans 
Given we can now distribute our music easily over the internet, and that measures exist to 
assist in the discovery of our music within the Long Tail (measures that are constantly 
evolving and improving), how do artists earn a living? If so many of us are producing, 
remixing and rehashing each other’s music and video, is it still feasible to expect to be able to 
find an audience large enough to sustain ourselves on a full-time basis, without the traditional 
support network of a record label? The Long Tail is clearly a blessing for the aggregators—
the iTunes and Amazons, YouTubes and Last.fms of the world—and all those who enjoy the 
use of these websites and services. Yet I cannot help but perceive a growing frustration 
among the artistic community, watching all these companies amass millions of hopeful 
musicians, each hoping to find their audience yet struggling to make themselves heard among 
an increasing din. 
One of the more popular recent theories proposed to realise the utopian notion of 
making a living disseminating music via our own decentralised home studios, was Kevin 
Kelly’s ‘One Thousand True Fans.’161 In a nutshell, Kelly posits that if we can find just one 
thousand fans willing to part with a hundred dollars each year for the fruits of our artistic 
endeavours (through music sales, gigs and merchandise etc.), then we can call ourselves 
professional musicians/artists/directors and forget about the day job. These numbers are not 
meant to be taken as a definitive rule, but suggest an ethos of gathering a group of dedicated 
fans and producing something a little more unique than a mass-produced CD; more of a 
desirable boutique approach such as hand-signed album sleeves, multitrack DVDs for fan 
remixing, large-format limited artwork prints etc. Again, this suggests reviving a work’s 
auratic character, to return value to a work currently in danger of being viewed as disposable, 
or at least as a basic utility. Ideally, these True Fans would each be a Savant, someone with 
the motivation to create hype and excitement around artists, in turn creating so-called ‘Lesser 
Fans’. 
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It sounds so simple, so tantalisingly feasible, which is undoubtedly the attraction of a 
number like a thousand, being easily conceivable and apparently attainable. Instead of aiming 
for The Head of the Long Tail and failing, attempting to create top-ten blockbusters, we 
should instead concentrate on gradually gaining our True Fans. I would like to believe this 
approach would work, but I have difficulty believing in the balancing act of constant fan 
interaction, producing enough music to fulfil such a relationship to keep my True Fans’ 
attention from waning (as artists compete for their prospective fans’ attention), and wearing 
the umpteen different hats necessary to keep such an enterprise afloat. 
In recognising that his theory had little in the way of case studies to back it up, Kelly 
has since been trying to track down artists who have successfully subsisted on such a model. 
The Thousand True Fans as a premise is not wholly innovative, as independent record labels 
and artists have been following a similar blueprint whether they consciously realised or not, 
but it has undoubtedly struck a chord within the artistic community, such is its simplicity and 
succinctness. One artist who replied to Kelly, offering some grounded feedback, was ambient 
musician Robert Rich.
162
 
Rich has been writing and selling his own music since the early eighties, and admits 
that he is still able to do so today due to the small fan base he built up before the existence of 
the internet, albeit with supplementary income streams from mastering and engineering other 
artists’ music. Although Rich agrees with Kelly’s core thesis, he raises some salient points 
that do not entirely mesh with the premise. 
In your article you quote the term ‘microcelebrities’ which rings ironically true to 
me. I suppose I experience a bit of that, when some of the 600 people whom I see 
on tour come up to me after a show and tell me that my music is very important to 
them, that it saved their life, that they can’t imagine why I’m not performing in 
posh 3,000 seat theatres rather than this art gallery or that planetarium or library. 
In reality the life of a ‘microcelebrity’ resembles more the fate of Sisyphus, whose 
boulder rolls back down the mountain every time he reaches the summit. After 
every tour I feel exhausted but empowered by the thought that a few people really 
care a lot about this music. Yet, a few months later all is quiet again and 
CD/download sales slow down again. If I take the time to concentrate for a year 
on what I hope to be a breakthrough album, that time of silence widens out into a 
gaping hole and interest seems to fade. When I finally do release something that I 
feel to be a bold new direction, I manage only to sell it to the same 1,000 True 
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Fans. The boulder sits back at the bottom of the mountain and it’s time to start 
rolling it up again.
163
 
Rich’s down-to-earth tempering of Kelly’s optimism, reminiscent of Friedrich Engels’s 
remarks concerning the Sisyphean nature of labour,
164
 is a valid criticism of the model. The 
critical mass of fans created by a mass-produced CD, necessary for a reliable income, does 
not exist. You need to be continually creating and touring to create any interest in your music, 
as once you stop working, the interest will wane almost immediately; there is no room for 
failure, with no contingency. Moreover, while you return to the studio to record the next 
album, you are living on the remnants of the last album and tour income, with no guarantee 
that you will create revenue from the next album. You will be working, but, as this is a 
gamble rather than a wage, you will be barely earning. 
In an age where the value of recorded music continues to plummet, whereby we need 
to return to the handcrafted artisanal approach to music production, creating auratic artworks, 
we need to create products with a perceived value above that of mass-produced CDs and 
limitless music downloads. Consequently, given that these products will be more expensive to 
produce, at a price that only our True Fans will be willing to pay, we risk pandering to our 
precious core audience as the main means of income. Will their attention wander if we stray 
too far from our established style, confounding their expectations? The constant attention 
required to keep lines of communication open between artist and fans, to sustain interest in an 
attention-starved ‘global village’, surely risks fragmenting the contemplation and focus at the 
core of the musical process. The growing weight of the risks involved in taking weeks out to 
concentrate on one’s music without interruption becomes difficult to bear and justify; will 
your True Fans wait for you? 
Rich draws a parallel to the True Fans model with evolutionary biology, whereby 
limiting the gene pool causes a greater risk of extinction from disease or environmental 
change. Relying on a committed small core group of listeners could be viewed as similar to an 
animal relying on a single food source for survival; it is a fragile existence at best. 
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Of course, this all assumes that one has found one’s True Fans. We have not even 
begun to discuss how long it might take to accrue them, or how widely we need to cast our 
nets to find them. If we need to reach a thousand listeners, or even a hundred, to secure a 
single True Fan, then it will take quite some time. For those who have already found their 
True Fans through old modes of promotion and distribution, capitalising on these new modes 
of distribution and business models certainly has the potential to be hugely profitable. Two 
such artists that have hit the headlines with their recent approaches to distribution during the 
past six months are Radiohead and Nine Inch Nails—both huge bands borne of the traditional 
recording industry, taking advantages of their respective recording contract expirations to 
experiment with new methods of selling directly to fans. 
Radiohead decided to release their last record online in mp3 format, allowing fans to 
pay whatever they felt suitable to download the release, including nothing at all. The 
revolution had started, or at least many glibly declared something along such lines, apparently 
sounding the death knell of the music industry. This so-called revolution lasted for as a long it 
took for Radiohead to announce traditional CD sales of the album through XL Recordings, an 
independent but nonetheless sizable record label. 
The main issue with Radiohead’s model was the encoding quality of the music itself. 
Many fans, including myself, gave Radiohead the benefit of the doubt when paying for their 
music a couple of weeks in advance, despite having no idea about the quality of the music we 
would receive, as Radiohead decided not to disclose the mp3 encoding rate. It was not until 
the release date that we finally learned of the encoding rate: 160kbps—somewhat low on the 
quality scale given today’s prevalence of 320kbps encodings and even lossless CD-quality 
downloads. Many felt, justifiably in my opinion, a little cheated to have paid for something so 
disposable. Of course, what we had in effect done was pay for the otherwise usual ‘leak’ that 
inevitably occurs when promotional copies of album go out to the press and end up on the 
file-sharing networks. Radiohead had managed to turn the exercise into a canny promotional 
campaign, while pocketing some extra cash and being hailed as internet pioneers at the same 
time, before announcing the traditional CD release strategy with a large independent record 
label. In many fellow musicians’ eyes, they had effectively devalued music downloads by 
displaying a laissez-faire attitude towards pricing downloads, lacking a price stipulated to 
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reflect the album’s value, and instead capitalised on the press furore to promote the more 
conventional physical editions of their album.
165
 
However, in addition to their download and standard CD editions, Radiohead 
interestingly decided to take a more boutique approach by offering a ‘discbox’ containing, as 
well as the CD, a double vinyl edition, a second CD containing additional unreleased tracks, a 
lyric booklet and stickers, packaged in a hardcover book and slipcase, for £40. This appears to 
espouse the kind of True Fan marketing ideology encouraged by Kelly, only on a much larger 
scale. Although no sales figures were officially released, an interview in the Observer 
suggested between sixty and eighty thousand copies of the discbox were sold;
166
 True Fans 
that were no doubt attained through years of touring, marketing and promotion at the hands of 
the ‘old’ music industry. 
 In a similar move, Trent Reznor of Nine Inch Nails, free from the shackles of his 
recording contract with Interscope Records, tried a similar experiment. Critical of 
Radiohead’s model,167 Reznor sought to make a few amendments with his own attempt at a 
multi-faceted direct-to-fans internet release. Offering thirty-six tracks, downloadable in a 
variety of high-quality formats for five dollars (including lossless FLAC, Apple Lossless, as 
well as 320kbps mp3), it certainly felt like a much better deal than Radiohead’s offering. 
Upping the ante in the product variation stakes, Reznor offered an array of physical product 
options, culminating in the ‘Ultra-Deluxe Limited Edition’ box set consisting of CDs, DVDs, 
multitrack recordings, Blu-Ray discs, art prints and hand-numbered with Reznor’s autograph, 
for three hundred dollars. Still, given this high price, Reznor clearly had enough True Fans to 
sell out of all two and a half thousand units of this edition almost instantly, grossing 
$750,000. 
For the artists who have benefited from years of sustained promotion and marketing 
clout, it is clear the options open to them now they already have their fan base provide many 
benefits, offering a freedom and potential for remuneration that young independent artists can 
only dream of at the moment. It remains to be seen whether Kelly’s thesis will ring true for 
artists just beginning their career in the file-sharing internet age. Only then might we dare to 
suggest that Attali’s age of Composing has finally dawned; until then, everyone may be 
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composing, but struggling to be heard amidst the noise. It is becoming increasingly evident 
that within the online ‘attention’ economy, music alone is insufficient; artists need to 
reintroduce an aspect of uniqueness to their work, as part of the process, the product and its 
promotion, to find a voice. I will therefore spend the next chapter examining how I can start 
this process of reintroducing auratic value and meaning to my work. 
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Practical Rematerialisation (Part A): Auratic Restoration 
In explicating my wishes to rematerialise my music and practice, I draw heavily from the 
preceding chapters, most notably in addressing what Benjamin famously observed as a 
withering of an artwork’s ‘aura’ in line with its mass-reproduction, concurrent with the 
removal of its ritual use-value. While I disagreed that the ritual use-value of dematerialised 
music disappears in tandem with its aura, the likelihood that an mp3 file will exhibit auratic 
characteristics will be less likely than even a mass-produced compact disc. Consisting of pure 
use-value, zero exchange-value, existing at the very limits of ephemerality as binary data, 
music in such a state of storage has become as homogenised as any other computer file, 
undermining its value before it has a chance to defend itself (by being played). In the 
marketplace, as a file for purchase on Apple’s iTunes store, music exemplifies a state of 
hypercommodification; yet through this accessibility and portability, ‘ubiquitous music’ 
achieves an alternative means of individual re-ritualising through its quotidian use, allowing 
listeners to create and refashion their own rituals, despite its post-auratic character. In this 
respect, I argued that dematerialised music has catalysed an emancipation for listeners; the 
modes of reception have gained immensely, albeit evincing a decidedly consumerist tint to an 
age of Attalian neo-Composing. 
 As a studio composer, I wish for the modes of production to be similarly leveraged by 
dematerialisation, yet witness the opposite occurring. As hopes for a workable online 
meritocracy or ‘reputocracy’ wane, the pervasive offline economics of scarcity continue to 
inform the mindset of the online economy, curbing movement towards an alternative working 
model of artistic remuneration. As such, the methods involved in rematerialising my practise, 
specific to modes of production, will illustrate my journey from dematerialised mp3s to more 
unique auratic artefacts. 
A.1 Death of an Aura (download EP) 
A.2 Like Dust of the Balance (CD album) [ref. included media] 
Originally completed in 2007, and released during the following year, the Death of an Aura 
EP represented the motivational inception towards rematerialising my practice. Initially 
released as a download-only EP, it provided the core material for my subsequent 2009 album, 
Like Dust of the Balance. Both releases feature a long-distance collaboration with guest 
instrumentalist, Benet Walsh, who emailed me during late 2006, expressing an interest in 
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working together. We initially wrote two tracks that would end up on the EP (namely, 
‘Napoli’ and ‘Raido’), in addition to four of my own tracks. Following our fruitful work on 
the EP together, Benet and I worked on a further two tracks (‘Dustlands’ and ‘A Great Wave’) 
that would end up on the album, alongside five of the six tracks from the EP. The only track 
from Death of an Aura not also feature on the album was ‘Threnodie’ [ref. included media: 
CDR track 1]. 
 On reflection, following completion of the album, I was able to identify a fluidity in 
my composition practice, specific to the collaborative tracks. Benet recorded his instrumental 
parts in his own home studio, before bouncing down a series of multitrack audio files, burning 
them to CD and finally posting them on to me. Once received, I imported the audio files into 
my own sequencing software, and proceeded to flesh out his stark arrangements with various 
synthesised accompaniments and home-sampled sounds. I realised that working with an 
existing framework, around which I could develop with my own compositional elements, was 
instrumental in quickly and fluidly creating music, without having to formulate an initial 
approach from scratch. 
 Using this delegable and collaborative approach, with one party providing the 
compositional seed while the other completes the piece, created an optimised balance between 
creative and technical modes of engagement (which catalysed my research for the remaining 
half of this thesis). Benet recorded the raw instrumental tracks, doing little more than simply 
setting up a microphone and hitting record, allowing him to focus and engage with his 
performative creativity. Meanwhile, I could continue working in a more technical capacity 
with my production software, padding out the music with extra production elements as well as 
handling the overall mixing and engineering. Of course, these two different roles, a creative 
composer and a technical recording/mixing engineer, were traditionally assumed by two 
different people. Having to switch between these conflicting modes of engagement comes 
with the territory of being a solitary computer musician, yet it is a subject often overlooked 
when assessing the emancipatory or democratising effects of technology. I found it more 
liberating to focus solely on the technical requirements of the music, unfettered by a nebulous 
compositional process, precisely due to the inherent technical bias of computer software (a 
subject I will consequently explore over the next two chapters). 
 For the remaining, non-collaborative tracks, I experimented with a more structurally 
relaxed approach to composition in an effort to rejuvenate my practice, as well as attempting a 
more immediate means of injecting my own personality into my practice via the use of vocals. 
I had become somewhat jaded with my prior approach of a more technically-rigid, idiomatic 
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composition style, which was still heavily affected by the initial stylistic framework that 
informed my earlier work (i.e. heavily influenced by Warp Records’ roster), and wished to 
reclaim some of the software-borne sounds and timbres. 
 I found singing on some of these tracks immensely satisfying, due to the intuitive 
immediacy it affords. On ‘Whispers’, I recorded a few takes of vocals, the lyrics being largely 
impromptu and unintelligible, acting more as tonal ornamentation than pop verse. Even so, I 
feel the unmistakable sound of vocals on a piece of music added a certain depth of quality and 
personality that no amount of synthesis or sample-sculpting would achieve, enriching the 
clinical sterility of synthesis and pattern-based quantisation. As a direct means of referencing 
embodied sound, singing requires a creative mode of engagement, outside the graphocentric 
technical mode of engagement typically employed during computer use (which places 
primacy on the mind and the visual, over the body); as such, it represents a first step towards 
reviving these atrophied modes of creative engagement (I will explore and discuss these 
different ‘modes of engagement’ in the course of the following chapters). Just as Benjamin 
notes within ‘The Storyteller’, “traces of the storyteller cling to the story the way the 
handprints of the potter cling to the clay vessel”,168 I try to leave a trace of myself—my 
voice—in the music. 
 Although ‘Whispers’ features the most overt use of my voice, I also added to 
‘Napoli’/’Napolese’ as a background vocal pad, bedded within the strings. Incidentally, I 
renamed the version that appears on ‘Like Dust’, as it contains a slightly different plucked 
lead recording, as well as a tweaked mix balance. In retrospect, I wish I had refrained from 
doing this, as it seems a ludicrous reason for re-titling the track, but it illustrates the 
temptation I felt to tweak the track even though it was already released as a download. To me 
this track simply did not feel complete; I could not move on to the next track. I put this 
inconclusiveness down to knowing that I could simply replace the previous online version if 
necessary; the impermanent flux of the online economy is thus both its strength and 
weakness. For collaborative projects with many contributors, the fragmentary and inherently 
incomplete and extensible nature of the web is a blessing, but as a musician looking to 
complete a project and move on, the endless opportunity for tweaking is a curse. In the end, 
Benet suggested we rename the new mix I had created, and finally halt work on it. 
 Other tracks feature my vocal ornamentation, including ‘Dustlands’, which contains a 
heavily effected ‘ooh’ vocal melody line. The track represented a particularly successful 
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departure from my usual structural working practice, based on more of a drone foundation of 
repetition and harmonic stasis, due to the tuned percussion. This abstract narrative of 
‘grounding’ repetition is exemplified by the interwoven percussion loops (provided by Benet, 
and augmented by myself, with electronic beats). This foundation also provided an 
opportunity to play against its stability; the coda of the track sees the steady rhythms drop 
away, while the vocal melody line remains, this time joined by an animated counterpoint of 
orchestral strings. 
 ‘Dustlands’ also constitutes a concerted effort to move away from the kind of 
‘discursive’ repetition that characterised my previous output, relating, as it did, to a pop 
format of different overarching sections. Instead, focusing on a more gradual building of 
‘musematic’ repetition, I have attempted to create a more emergent track development, 
included the measured addition of layers, to create a narrative arc without the use of 
discursive building blocks.
169
 
 ‘A Great Wave’, another of the collaborative tracks, also features such an emergent 
song structure, albeit of a more sprawling and less nuanced nature to ‘Dustlands’; the track 
progresses through a series of different keys, time signatures and timbres, ending in a 
completely different place to where it began. I took the opportunity to challenge the feel of the 
elements that Benet had recorded, which were particularly well-formed, establishing a clear 
atmosphere, and tried to take the track in an unrelated direction, with mixed results. 
 Where discursive building blocks do appear, such as on ‘Raido’, the stripped-down 
Hang-drum-based ‘Hang Garden’, or ‘Pteron’, I have attempted to ensure each discursive 
repetition is altered slightly, with either musematic variation, or with additional instrumental 
layers. The result is a more circuitous song structure compared to ‘Dustlands’, akin to more of 
a traditional pop e.g. ABABCAB structure. 
 Whether composing on my own or collaboratively with Benet, I have attempted to 
reclaim a certain amount of bodily agency from my software, attempting to impart a more 
indelible sense of my character in my music, through the addition of instrumental recordings 
and singing. Yet still, the end product I create as a result of these actions feels somewhat 
anonymous, whether as a CD, or as is increasingly the case, dematerialised mp3 files. A 
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certain level of agency may have been reclaimed in the process, but the end result of these 
processes had arguably not significantly changed. Therefore the next logical step following 
the rematerialisation of my practice entailed the creation of something more unique than a 
collection of music files. 
A.3 The Auratic Artefacts Series [ref. included media: CDR tracks 3-5, DVD title 1] 
Although I felt I had achieved, in some respects, an improvement in 
my working musical practice, I nevertheless desired to balance this 
with a corresponding rematerialisation for my musical output. Rather 
than settle for a CD or online dematerialised representations of my 
music, I sought to reinstate an element of auratic uniqueness to my 
finished works. Given my research on Benjamin and Adorno, plus my 
assessment of the crowded online ‘attention’ economy, I finally 
decided to research the possibility of creating a set of three playable 
one-off vinyl records, laser-etched with a full side of colour artwork, 
which I would title the Auratic Artefacts series (Figure 2, Figure 3 and 
Figure 4). I would simply designate each disc with a Greek letter, with 
a view to continuing with the series as I produced more music, so we began the series with 
three discs: ‘Alpha’, ‘Beta’ and ‘Gamma’ (this also meant we could start work on designing 
the discs ahead of the music being written and titled).  
 Regarding the choice of recording 
medium, I decided on the twelve-inch record 
format as a balance between accessibility, 
practicality and uniqueness; the format is 
still moderately popular, especially among 
enthusiasts, and therefore retains a high 
element of playability. It also presents a 
large working canvas for eye-catching 
designs, and as an object, it is an inherently 
tangible and tactile slab of transcriptions. 
More importantly, as discussed by Adorno 
and Eisenberg, it is a means of permanence, 
a scriptal spiral of audio, that can outlast 
Figure 1. The Auratic 
Artefacts emblem 
(pertaining here to the 
‘Alpha’ disc). 
Figure 2. The design for Alpha. 
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more technologically-dependent digital media. The audio, as a series of vibrations of varying 
frequencies, is directly ‘transcribed’ onto the vinyl substrate, requiring just a needle and a 
sympathetic resonator to reproduce; in an age of digital corruption, read/write errors, the 
panoply of codecs and file formats, I find this profoundly reassuring. The modern vinyl record 
is also at an advantage in how it responds to physical wear and tear; when the surface is 
scratched, the audio quality suffers, yet such degradation occurs gracefully. Instead of simply 
being rendered unplayable, as a compact disc might be once scratches become so deep that 
the CD player’s error-correction circuits cannot fathom, the record will instead develop an 
audible patina of surface noise, crackle and groove-skipping. Returning to Benjamin, such a 
patina serves to remind us of another auratic indicator, defined as the artefact’s “presence in 
time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happened to be.”170 Consequently, 
each time the record is played back will result in a slightly different performance.
171
 
 But as I was to discover, the logistics 
of creating such an artefact would prove to 
be somewhat of a challenge. Although I 
luckily managed to call upon a designer 
friend, Nathaniel Reeves, who kindly agreed 
to handle the design aspect of the vinyl set, 
we then had to figure out whether laser-
etching was feasible, where it was available, 
and how to create a single vinyl record that 
remained suitably durable. 
 After scouring the net for 
information, I learned about a more recent 
means of creating a ‘dubplate’,172 i.e. a one-
off record typically used by DJs to play unreleased underground tracks during their sets. 
These plates were traditionally known as ‘acetates’ or ‘lacquers’, as they were created by 
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Figure 3. The design for Beta. 
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coating an aluminium disc with a thin layer of nitrocellulose lacquer, soft enough to be 
recorded onto by a record cutting lathe.
173
 This reference disc could then be used to create a 
master disc for high-volume record pressing, or be played by DJs. However, the softness of 
the lacquer discs meant longevity was extremely limited; each time a lacquer disc is played, 
the stylus will subject the disc surface to a certain amount of wear, so lacquer dubplates do 
not typically have a useful lifespan of more than about fifty plays. For my purposes, this was 
therefore a problem, given my need of a permanent artefact. 
 More recently, a process has been 
developed that allows mastering engineers to 
cut directly onto blank discs more similar in 
material to commercially-produced records, 
typically made of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) 
or polycarbonate. The main advantage of 
such a material is hugely increased 
longevity, lasting practically as long as 
pressed vinyl, and so was a perfect choice 
for my needs. The downsides to such a 
material was the increased difficulty in 
cutting to such discs, and different mastering 
engineers favoured slightly different 
methods, often with custom-made or heavily modified lathes, and would only cut to a 
particular material. Typically, cutting would be achieved by raising the temperature of the 
disc before cutting to about forty degrees Celsius, as well as using a heated diamond stylus in 
the cutting lathe to further assist in a deep, pronounced cut (resulting in a healthy playback 
loudness). The problem created by such a varying working practice between studios (given 
this is very much a non-standardised, niche practice), was being tied to using the source 
material (the vinyl ‘blanks’) used by the studio that would carry out the final cut. 
 In the end, I decided to use a London-based studio, and so shortly before Christmas 
2009, I procured a set of transparent blanks from the studio, including a spare blank for each 
prospective design, so that we could work on the art, colouring and laser-etching our blanks, 
before returning them to the cutting studio to have the audio cut. With our cutting studio 
established, Nate, my designer, set about contacting a laser-etching facility that might be 
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Figure 4. The design for Gamma. 
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amenable to our needs. As Nate is based in San Diego, we decided that using a local stateside 
facility, while lengthening the production schedule, meant that he could discuss the 
practicalities of etching his designs in person, able to sort out any design problems quickly, as 
well as being better able to document the process. 
 In the meantime, I was still busy completing the music that would end up on these 
discs. I arbitrarily designated ‘Awaiting the Green Morning’ as Alpha, ‘David Elsewhere’ for 
Beta, and ‘Jack In’ for Gamma, and sent rough demos of these tracks to Nate to provide him 
with some design inspiration. After I had completed the mixing, and Nate had created the 
bespoke designs for each disc, I organised the audio mastering by an engineer based in 
Seattle, before preparing the dubplates for their cutting in London. 
A.3.1 Laser-Etched Dubplates 
As we decided to use transparent blanks, I envisaged the 
final artefact as having a playable side cut with audio, 
with the coloured disc designs on the blank side of the 
vinyl, thus being visible from the playable side. In order 
to achieve this, we would first need to apply our colour 
to the blank design side of the disc, before etching 
through it with the laser. Areas etched with the laser 
would thereby remove the paint, resulting in transparent 
areas in accordance with the black areas in our designs 
(Figure 5). This meant trying out a selection of paints on 
some cheap acrylic plastic, to see which paint was 
easiest to etch cleanly. Pleased with the results, we 
decided to proceed with painting the PVC blanks, until they were fully cured and ready for 
etching. 
 The differences between the acrylic and the polyvinyl became apparent as soon as we 
were a quarter-way through etching the first blank. With the laser set at 10% strength as 
before, it was etching cleanly through the paint, yet began scorching the PVC surface. 
Consequently, the edges of the design started to bow upwards due to the heat created. While 
we expected the PVC to react a little differently to the test acrylic, we were unprepared with 
just how heat-reactive it was by comparison. The heat produced by the laser was absorbed by 
the face of the PVC, curling up and then cooling, destroying the definition of the etch and 
Figure 5. The raw design as sent to the 
laser-etching machine. Black areas are 
etched, white areas are skipped. 
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blurring the intricate designs. Moreover, the laser was causing the PVC to catch fire slightly, 
charring the inner faces of the etched areas. With this first blank ruined, we had a further two 
opportunities to refine the procedure before eating into our final three blanks. 
 Turning the power of the laser down to minimum, and increasing the etching speed 
ended up being the best course of action; this meant that each pass of the laser etched by very 
small amounts, thus requiring repeated passes (ten in total for each disc), but it seemed to help 
keep the scorching to a minimum. This approach, as it turned out, created new problems with 
the type of paint used on one of the discs. The paints used for ‘Alpha’ and ‘Beta’ (green and 
yellow; black and red) were of a high-heat formulation, meaning they would etch cleanly 
without melting or igniting. The paints for ‘Gamma’, however, as different colours (blue and 
taupe), were not of this same formulation, instead resulting in a rather hard and glossy 
enamel-style finish, which the laser could not etch through on the low power necessary for the 
PVC (although of course, it worked perfectly on the test acrylic, etched at a high laser power). 
Nate was forced to strip the paint from ‘Gamma’, before securing high-heat formulations of 
the necessary colours, continuing with the etching. Finally, we had created three discs of a 
quality we were happy with, ready for shipping back to England, to be forwarded on to 
London, for cutting the audio. 
 Sadly, after all that work, the cutting engineer reported that even the minimal warping 
created by the laser heat was causing his cutting needle to jump; given the expense and 
inconvenience of a broken cutting stylus, he had no option but to abandon cutting just one 
minute in to the first track. Crestfallen, Nate and I regrouped and considered our next strategy. 
Still, in the interests of posterity, I have included these first attempts, as they are still attractive 
artefacts, if not quite the musical vessels I initially envisaged. 
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A.3.2 Veneered Dubplates 
Given the incompatibility between the 
processes of laser-etching and vinyl-cutting, 
we decided to split them, literally confining 
the results to separate substrates, before 
adhering them together. Motivated by the 
increasingly limited amount of time we had 
left to create these, Nate and I discussed 
using a variety of materials that would be 
easiest to work with, limiting our risks at 
this late stage, yet allowed ourselves the luxury of 
selecting more unusual materials. We decided on 
some aluminium plates for the design half of the 
dubplate, which were much easier to work with than the PVC, and decided not to paint them, 
lest we create additional problems. 
 Being completely opaque, the dubplates allowed us the opportunity to create a dual-
sided design (e.g. Figure 6), one design showing through the transparent vinyl as before, and 
one on the bottom of the plate. The second material I selected was a handful of wooden 
veneers, including some madrone and laurel burled veneers, plus a simpler maple veneer; our 
only reservations were whether the veneers were going to be too thin to etch. Once the 
veneers arrived, our concerns seemed warranted, as they were very thin and rather distorted. 
According to our vendor, this was normal, as the veneers needed to be moistened and pressed 
flat, before being dried, ready for use. 
  
Figure 6. The rear design 
for the maple wood veneer 
on Gamma. 
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 The veneers did etch remarkably well, far surpassing our expectations, with the laser 
enhancing the character of the wood grain beautifully (Figure 7). While the veneers were still 
somewhat warped, once they had been bonded to the underside of the dubplate, they flattened 
out nicely (though a small amount of warp remained, despite being pressed for 24 hours). We 
made sure to select a suitable epoxy to bond the two materials together, which cured to a 
transparent finish, allowing the unique designs to remain viewable beneath the grooves of the 
disc. Figures 8 to 13 on the following pages show the final bonded artefacts. 
 The aluminium plates also etched well, as expected, throwing up few surprises. 
However, we did encounter difficulties when it came to etching the actual outline of the disc, 
as the machine could not etch all the way through the relatively thick plate of aluminium. 
Instead we hired a CNC (Computer Numerical Control) Router to cut out the discs using a 
disc of wood as a template, before punching the final centre hole with a drill press. The 
machining of the aluminium plates took longer than expected, and I did not have time to bond 
them with the dubplates ahead of submission of this thesis (though the manufacturing of them 
is documented in the included DVD video). Aesthetically, the aluminium plates offer a stark 
contrast to the rough grain of the wood veneers, looking extremely sleek and futuristic 
compared to the wood veneer’s weathered charm. 
  
Figure 7. Close-up detail of the wood veneer for Alpha. 
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Figure 8. The finished, veneered Auratic Artefact (Alpha) 
 
Figure 9. Close-up detail of the grain and grooves on Alpha. 
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Figure 10. Beta, completed. 
 
Figure 11. Close-up of the recording grooves on Beta. 
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Figure 12. Gamma, finished. 
 
Figure 13. Close-up of Gamma. 
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A.4 Site-specific work: Reception [ref. included media: CDR track 2] 
[Note: In the interests of convenience and compatibility, the version featured on the included 
CDR has been mixed down to stereo, from its original 4.1 format.] 
 
In addition to restoring ‘aura’ through the use of unique physical artefacts, I also had the 
opportunity to create a site-specific thematic piece of music for the Music and Machines VIII 
symposium, which took place during Newcastle’s biennial AV Festival. 
 I entitled the piece Reception, to reflect both the ‘Broadcast’ theme of the festival 
(thus, radio reception) and the venue (the reception area of Newcastle University’s Culture 
Lab). The symposium included several responses by various creative practitioners to the idea 
of the ‘haunted house’, inspired by cultural theorists such as Douglas Kahn, Jeffrey Sconce, 
Steven Connor, and Allen S. Weiss, who have proposed that broadcast and recording media 
share cultural resonances with ghosts, and the world of the dead. In particular, responses were 
invited to Antonin Artaud’s Pour en Finir avec le Jugement de Dieu (To Have Done with the 
Judgement of God), a recorded sound work originally commissioned by Radio France sixty 
years ago, but which was never broadcast due to its controversial nature. My nine-minute 
composition draws on sample material sourced from Artaud’s original piece. Written in 4.1 
surround sound, my project necessarily eschewed my more usual quantised, beat-based 
approach (not least due to the acoustics of the site, which are exceptionally resonant). Instead, 
I focussed on the timbral and spectral characteristics of sound, experimenting with 
convolution processing and enhanced quadraphonic spatialisation, as well as continuing to 
work with the human voice, which constitutes the main material of Artaud’s piece. 
 As well as finding it refreshing, composing with the logistical limitations of placing 
loudspeakers in a cavernous reception area, the use of a dedicated subwoofer meant I was able 
to explore the use of sub-bass and its effect on the acoustic environment. Having much more 
energy than the higher frequencies within the piece, the sub-bass travelled much further 
throughout the building. The location-specificity of frequencies within a piece of work had 
not been something I had previously explored, and I enjoyed being able to experience the 
shifting atmosphere that occurred with my changing proximity to the reception area as I 
walked through the building. As such, I viewed this as less of an installation and more of a 
site-specific piece, being tied to the actual building itself, and dependent on the inherent 
acoustics of the building. 
 For me, the limitations in time and space imposed by both the theme of this project 
and the physical logistics of its ‘performance’ were central to reconstructing a sense of auratic 
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meaning and value to the piece. This sense of value and meaning, while similar to that I felt 
was created by the Auratic Artefacts, is clearly derived by very different means, yet is still 
governed by a sense of uniqueness. 
 The location and time-specific nature of Reception, plus the sense of permanence, 
uniqueness and tactile aesthetics of the Auratic Artefacts, successfully restored a sense of 
meaning to my practice. However, as products of my creative process rather than integral 
parts of it, the sense of meaning they have restored still firmly resides in reception; in both 
cases the music was written in a similar manner to my ‘Like Dust’ album. There still lies the 
challenge for me to attempt to further incorporate a meaning and crafting to my practice; to 
rejuvenate it with a more tactile, multi-sensory agency, without eschewing the technical skills 
I have accrued through my compositional use of computer software. But in order to do so, 
motivated by my experiences during my collaboration with Benet regarding optimal modes of 
creative and technical engagement, I need to further investigate and understand how these 
modes of production are informing or influencing my creative practice. Only then will I be 
prepared to devise a creative strategy that balances not only these prismatic modes of 
engagement during production, but also the sense of auratic meaning and value between the 
creative process and its auratic output. Lastly, this further research will also provide a key 
means of understanding our collective proclivity for attributing emancipatory factors to 
technology, without considering the sacrifices we make in the process. 
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Chapter 4. Determining the Techno-Romantic 
Throughout the first three chapters I argued that an ember of techno-romanticism existed at 
the core of Attali’s ‘Composing’ chapter from Noise, more recently rekindled by the 
disintermediated, distributive potential of the internet, and fuelled by optimistic technologists 
following the boom and maturation of the so-called ‘Web 2.0’. I identified a rupture between 
the perspectives of musicians and listeners, in that the emancipatory modes of reception 
afforded by ubiquitous dematerialised music were not met by similarly empowering modes of 
production. On the one hand, as a listener and music lover, I have been spoilt by the 
seemingly endless quantity of music generously made freely available online, in addition to 
the vast catalogues of music to be explored from within commercial download stores such as 
iTunes, Bleep, and eMusic etc. Yet on the other hand, as a producer of music, I feel 
increasingly marginalised by the large aggregative corporations that stand to gain from ‘long 
tail’ economics, while I struggled to find an audience for my own music. I equated these two 
imbalanced perspectives of prismatic consumption and homogenous production with Attali’s 
‘Composing’ and ‘Repeating’ chapters respectively, illustrated by the Adorno-Benjamin 
debate. 
 From my own perspective as a computer musician, the lack of materiality within my 
practice, plus the dematerialised music that results, adding to the online glut of amateur 
‘prosumerist’ music, is dissatisfying and unfulfilling. As noted in chapter 2, the sheer amount 
of music available online, combined with portable players, greatly increases the depth and 
breadth of modes of reception employed by listeners. However, these positively enriching and 
liberating modes of reception do not appear to be reflected in modes of production to the same 
extent. I feel in many respects less mobile, increasingly tethered to my computer as the 
various tasks I perform on it, including writing music, are homogenised by this technological 
monolith; whether writing music or designing my web site, composing emails or purchasing 
consumer goods, I seem only ever to be gazing at my computer monitor, interacting through 
my keyboard and mouse. Consequently, as a central aspect of my doctoral research, I have 
explored various ways to rematerialise both my music and my practice. 
 The previous chapter documented my attempts to rematerialise my music by creating 
unique, physical ‘auratic artefacts’ that serve as a means of achieving a tactile, meaningful 
and memorable means of permanence for my music; these serve as a reminder of what I have 
achieved in extracting my music from the technological frame of my computer and its 
software. Additionally, the creation of these artefacts has provided me with a definite sense of 
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accomplishment, imposing a definitive conclusion to my work. Along similar lines, I have 
detailed my venture towards creating site-specific works, creating meaning and restoring 
value to my music by limiting its exposure in time and space, as I felt my musical output had 
become increasingly disposable and meaningless, marginalised by the technical homogeneity 
of a computer-centric practice. 
 It is with some surprise, then, to continually read about the potential of dematerialised 
music distribution, along with continued optimism surrounding the supposed democratisation 
of computer-based music technology, with increased access to the software tools for music 
production and distribution. While these are indeed positive factors, to which my limited 
success to date is indebted, I also feel this optimism tends to obscure the possibility of a more 
critical evaluation of the ways that these new technical tools affect us as creative artists. I 
personally feel so entrenched and invested in the use of my particular music sequencing 
software that I cannot envisage writing music without it; more than merely a tool or an 
instrument for my own use, my musical practice has become wholly dependent on software, 
shifting accordingly to meet its demands and limitations. 
 While initially seduced by the compositional opportunities presented by modern 
recording software and the distributive potential offered by the internet, I have found myself 
becoming frustrated when what I wish to do is confined by the compositional conditioning 
imposed through the use of my software. I would therefore question whether the high value 
attributed to the emancipatory role of technology (as identified by Attali in ‘Composing’ and 
by Benjamin in ‘Work of Art’, for example) is fully justified. In this chapter, I wish to 
challenge the assumption that these technological modes of production are necessarily 
emancipatory. Additionally, I wish to investigate and examine the possible origins of this 
utopian techno-romantic predisposition, questioning not only how we interact with 
technology, but also how it interacts with and affects us. This is with a view to attempting to 
breakdown the technological monolith and discover what I can reclaim in my own creative 
musical practice. 
4.1 Composing and Technological Determinism 
Marshall McLuhan’s oft-quoted dictum, ‘the medium is the message’,175 is commonly 
deployed when critically examining the significance of the internet, and for good reason, as 
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‘convergence culture’176 has seen the internet’s ‘global village’ assimilate a variety of 
previously discrete media, to be presented through its single experiential portal. By noting a 
shift in modes of engagement that occur during this convergence, we have a chance to assess 
and identify if and how our use of these technologies, rather than simply the contents 
delivered by them, affects and alters us. 
 McLuhan is a clear and unwavering advocate of technological determinism, i.e. the 
school of thought contending that technology itself is an agent of social change; that it 
“transform[s] its users directly”.177 At the opposite end of this dichotomy, technological 
voluntarism posits the (perhaps reflexive) notion of technology as a neutral tool, placing 
agency directly in the hands of its users. McLuhan uses a typical voluntaristic reference from 
media pioneer General David Sarnoff, to argue for his own deterministic position: “[W]e are 
too prone to make technological instruments the scapegoats for the sins of those who wield 
them. The products of modern science are not in themselves good or bad; it is the way they 
are used that determines their value.”178 This statement, derived apparently from a belief in 
the immutability of being human, for McLuhan immediately betrays “the true Narcissus style 
of one hypnotised by the amputation and extension of his own being in a new technological 
form.”179 For McLuhan, such a viewpoint (he terms this ‘Narcissus narcosis’) completely 
ignores the notion of our senses being not only extended through technology, but also 
amputated and replaced in the process. As similarly noted by Neuromancer author William 
Gibson, “The street finds its own uses for things”,180 and as such, while we are part of this 
street (or superhighway, to extend the metaphor) we will be informed and affected as part of 
this environment while engaged with it. As such, technology is not merely a neutral tool 
under human employ, but a hypersensitive, and especially in the case of the internet, totalising 
extension of our audio-visual senses (or as McLuhan would assert, our nervous system), 
exerting agency on us.
181
 We cannot help but be informed by not only the information we 
receive, but also its means, and to ignore this “ignores the nature of the medium, of any and 
all media”.182 
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 The issue of technological determinism is complex, fraught with assumptions, 
polemics and staunch absolutes. Sympathising with McLuhan, Friedrich Kittler attributes the 
phonograph to an amputation of our memory: “ ‘The more complicated the technology, the 
simpler,’ that is, the more forgetful, ‘we can live’. ... We all know hits and rock songs 
precisely because there is no reason to memorise them anymore.”183 As recognised by Taylor, 
“We have all had the experience of being reminded of a song or lyric, which seems almost to 
trigger our singing or humming it”,184 as though we are mindlessly prompted by the 
recordings, replacing our ‘mnemotechnology’, as Kittler terms it;185 diminishing our capacity 
to remember the songs ourselves without technological support. Like Adorno’s deterministic, 
controlling ‘Culture Industry’, such a view does not allow for the possibility of agency within 
the social sphere surrounding the technology. The notion, for example, that we may have 
attributed a particular meaning to a piece of music, creating fond associations or personal 
rituals with a particular piece of music, or that we may simply enjoy singing along, does not 
appear to enter the equation. As such, the tendency towards a prescriptive, deterministic 
renunciation of agency in arguments such as Kittler’s are undermined by such social and 
personal considerations. Taylor attempts to navigate between the problematic poles of 
technological determinism created by divorcing a reified monolithic ‘technology’ from a 
similarly monolithic ‘social’, avoiding the temptation to wholly place agency with either. He 
prefers to view technology “as neither voluntaristic nor deterministic but as caught up in a 
complex, fluid, variable dynamic of each”,186 proposing Martin Heidegger’s argument of 
technology as ‘revealing’, i.e. that which is revealed depends on the mode of revealing 
employed. Michael Heim sums up this ontological approach succinctly: “The type of question 
we ask, philosophers agree, shapes the possible answers we get. The way in which we search 
limits what we find in our searching.”187 Taylor pragmatically sidesteps the problematic issue 
of agency, instead purporting that “technology, while neutral in and of itself, runs the risk of 
decreasing our humanity or creating a rift between our creative sides and our scientific 
sides.”188 I suspect this line of enquiry will be more fruitful and salient given my practice, 
considering that it consists of some very clear, and often conflicting, delineations between the 
creative unconscious and acute technical awareness. I will therefore use Heidegger’s 
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principles as a basis for my argument for a re-assessment of computer technology within my 
own practice, that moves away from a deterministic understanding. 
 Looking more closely at his 1954 essay, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, 
Heidegger appears at great pains not to portray modern technology in a pessimistic light; he 
does not wish to put technology on trial. Instead, he is concerned with how we access and 
understand the ‘essence’ of technology: 
Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we 
passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible 
way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which 
today we partly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of 
technology.
189
 
McLuhan’s issue of technology as ‘hypnotising’, blinding us to its influence once we regard it 
as a neutral tool, appears to reflect Heidegger’s concerns, although Heidegger addresses the 
issue with a much lighter touch than McLuhan, as a decidedly ‘soft’ determinist. However, 
Heidegger’s issue of the ‘essence’ of technology and how it is revealed, requires clarification, 
as “the essence of technology is by no means anything technological. Thus we shall never 
experience our relationship to the essence of technology so long as we merely conceive and 
push forward the technological, put up with it, or evade it.”190 The essence of technology is 
not simply what it is as an object (for technology can never be reduced to the status of a 
neutral instrument), more the meaning it invokes during the time endured through its use. For 
Heidegger, the technology with which we physically engage (the ‘instrumentality’)192 acts as 
little more than a cursory preamble towards understanding the essence of technology. We 
have to consider how our instruments engage with both other instruments and nature, and 
whether this engagement is benign and harmonious or something altogether more intricately 
subversive. In considering modern technology as a mere tool, as a means for man, venturing 
no further than its instrumental facade, we will be unable to reveal and understand its essence, 
and whether this essence, this truth (aletheia),
193
 is revealed via a poetic (poiesis, a Greek 
term meaning ‘to make’, from which ‘poetry’ is derived) mode of revealing—a ‘bringing-
forth’,194 or a technical mode of revealing. Modern industrial and computer technology, 
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through a technical, non-poetic mode of revealing, instead reveals a ‘standing-reserve’,195 to 
be challenged and set-upon, exploited via a complex technical matrix (Heidegger calls this 
underlying system of interconnected technical nodes ‘Enframing’, from the German Ge-
stell).
196
  
 Understanding the abstract nature of these philosophical constructs, Heidegger 
provides us with examples illustrating how the essence of technology is revealed, such as his 
windmill/hydroelectric power plant comparison. Our use of the windmill to utilise energy 
provided by the wind is benign, relying on a constant source of wind, without which the mill 
will immediately cease to work. The link between the wind and a functioning mill is direct, 
explicit and harmonious; it is a poetic revealing (poiesis). The windmill is poetry in motion. 
Contrast this with the hydroelectric power plant: 
The hydroelectric plant is set into the current of the Rhine. It sets the Rhine to 
supplying its hydraulic pressure, which then sets the turbines turning. This turning 
sets those machines in motion whose thrust sets going the electric current for 
which the long-distance power station and its network of cables are set up to 
dispatch.
197
 
In creating a dam of stockpiled water to provide the hydroelectric power station with a 
constant supply of water pressure, technology has now challenged nature, exploiting it for 
maximum yield via scientific technological means. No longer is the Rhine revealed simply as 
a poetic, aesthetic beauty. Instead, the mode of its revealing is now monopolised by a 
calculable scientific Enframing, concerned with how to extract the maximum amount of 
energy from the river’s ‘standing-reserve’ (i.e. its latent potential energy, such as the 
stockpiled water pressure created with the formation of a hydroelectric dam, used to spin 
turbines, creating electricity, to be transmitted and sold to consumers, so they may run their 
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electrical goods). In short, Gestell presents a convoluted technological detachment from 
nature, and once this mode is adopted, it remains unchallenged. 
 It is this modal transition from the poetic to the technical that Heidegger identifies as a 
potentially insidious symptom of modern technology. The harmonious symbiosis between 
man and nature, typified by Heidegger’s windmill example, has shifted in favour of man’s 
dominance via the ‘challenging’ action of stockpiling water (Heidegger uses the term ‘setting-
upon’, stellen, for this challenging, unlocking and exploiting ‘standing-reserve’). In 
implementing this technology, Heidegger argues that man has polarised the modes of 
revealing that make up techne, leading to a single dominant technical mode. In return, the 
complex system of Enframing feeds back and informs man’s consciousness accordingly, 
conditioning man to view the rest of the world via such a technical mode, at the expense of all 
prior modes of revealing. In viewing the world through this dominant technical filter we risk 
being blind to the richness and poetic beauty that would have otherwise been unveiled to us, 
thus to some extent dehumanising ourselves. 
 Carlos Palombini reiterates and clarifies Heidegger’s concerns with the inevitable 
conditioning of Enframing: “The essence of modern technology starts humans upon the way 
of that revealing through which the real everywhere, more or less distinctly, becomes standing 
reserve.”198 Neil Postman affirms this ‘reformatting’ of the mind, proposing that “new 
technologies change what we mean by ‘knowing’ and ‘truth’; they alter those deeply 
embedded habits of thought which give to a culture its sense of what the world is like—a 
sense of what is the natural order of things, of what is reasonable, of what is necessary, of 
what is inevitable, of what is real.”199 Of course, computer music will also be subject to this 
phenomenological polarisation; only now, ten years into my practice, do I feel I have been 
able to reflect upon and articulate these concerns, and set about addressing them. 
 To return to my own practice with Heidegger in mind, it would appear I engage in two 
conflicting modes of revealing when negotiating composition through the use of the 
computer. The first mode, through which I seek to transparently convey my musical 
intentions, can be thought of as a more poetic flow of creativity—the ideal composition state, 
if you will. The second, by contrast, is a visually-dominated mode informed by a technical 
Enframing; it is a language of numbers, of bits and bytes, of virtual instruments, plugins, 
options and parameters—what we may recognise as the engineering portion of music 
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production, rather than the compositional. If we were to contend that the assertions of 
Heidegger are correct, with his technical mode of Enframing dictating and monopolising 
subsequent modes of revealing, then given the technological bias of my music software, this 
second technical mode will inherently dominate, alter and inform the first. Couple this with 
the assertion made by McLuhan, that the hypnotic nature of technology blinds us to 
considerations external to the current technical mode, then we are left with a problematic 
compositional foundation, of a primarily technical bias. As Heim writes, “Once we notice 
how computers structure our mental environment, we can reflect on the subconscious 
agencies that affect our mental life, and we are then in a position to grasp both the potential 
and the peril.”200 I would therefore posit that this is not merely a case of technological 
determinism versus voluntarism, but of an acceptance that our technological considerations 
beget a framing of consequent considerations. My choice of music software, for example, is 
rarely questioned; once inside the virtual walls of my software I see only the options it 
presents, and assume these to comprehensively meet my artistic needs. Technological 
determinism presumes a fatalistic inevitability of the effects of technology, yet I believe that 
while these technically polarising effects are very real, it is also possible to not only gain an 
awareness of these effects, but to work to their strengths when necessary. When technical 
modes of engagement, or ‘revealing’, do not prove conducive to the compositional task at 
hand, I wish to strive towards a recognition of this, extricating myself from these technical 
modes, and instead engage with creative modes as necessary. In short, I wish to be able to call 
upon the full spectrum of modal engagements, including the preclusive technical modes 
through which I have nevertheless developed valuable technical expertise. Only in developing 
an understanding and awareness of my technical engagement with dematerialised music 
software (and the dematerialised music that results from its use), may I set about addressing 
this through my compositional ‘rematerialising’. 
4.2 The Delegation of Techne 
It is this surreptitiously suggestive and almost prescriptive nature of our technology that leads 
me to a more critical view of techno-romanticism. It is easy after all, to get caught up in the 
fervour of technological development if you are within the eye of the storm, and will therefore 
encounter considerable difficulty in securing an objective footing, “for any medium has the 
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power of imposing its own assumption on the unwary.”201 According to McLuhan, it is only 
“when standing aside from any structure or medium, that its principles and lines of force can 
be discerned.”202 It is only when extracting myself from this network, stepping outside the 
constant stream of information and turning off the computer, do I notice how fragile and 
ephemeral my dematerialised practice is. 
Working as a computer musician, I have become very aware of my increasingly 
abstracted, homogenised and solitary practice, whereby my musical composition (via software 
synthesisers and sequencers), music distribution, communication (either via the somewhat 
oxymoronic ‘social media’—Facebook, MySpace, Twitter etc.—or via email), and even 
music listening, are all mediated via the computer.
203
 As the results of my practice create 
mostly intangible results in the form of dematerialised music to be uploaded, I am beginning 
to feel I have lost any connection I once had with my own music, lacking any essence of 
closure. Indeed, knowing that all my work effectually ceases to tangibly exist, as information 
alongside the work of millions of other musicians, does not engender a feeling of 
empowerment or liberation, once I am ‘offline’.204 Here McLuhan’s notion of amputation and 
extension resonates; once the musical instrument has been subsumed as part of the recording 
and distribution technology, accessible directly through extensible intention, bypassing 
immanent muscle memory and the limitations of a linear performance, it becomes both an 
augmentation and a crutch. One might argue similarly that a guitarist is rendered helpless if 
the strings on the guitar break, but even so, the guitarist’s knowledge and technique can be 
retained by the performer and transferred to a spare guitar or even someone else’s guitar. For 
a computer musician, a delegation (i.e. amputation) of technique, passed over to a unique 
combination of music software is necessary, which is then informed by the user’s knowledge. 
But should the computer fail, so does the technique along with it, rendering controller or 
interface devices impotent, and leaving the user with production knowledge he or she is 
unable to realise in the same way. No matter how intricate and expressive my input devices 
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are, my MIDI controllers, keyboards (both musical and computer) and mice are merely 
technical links in a chain of technical language devoid of poetic revealing. 
As Heidegger reminded us, the Greek technikon, from which ‘technology’ is derived, 
belongs to techne, encompassing ‘technique’ as both the skills and activities of the craftsman, 
as well as the artist. Peter Manning notes Adorno’s similar remarks in 1958, specifically 
concerning the integral role of technology in modern composition: 
The meaning of the Greek word techne from which both ‘technique’ and 
‘technology’ are derived offers an indication of the unity of this concept with art. 
If art is the external representation of something internal, the concept of technique 
embraces everything which pertains to the realisation of that interior substance. In 
the case of music, not only the realisation of spiritual substance in the score is 
involved, but the transformation which makes this score accessible to sensory 
perception as well. In short, both production and reproduction are involved. 
Musical technique embraces the totality of all musical means: the organisation of 
the substance itself and its transformation into a physical phenomenon.
205
 
Adorno clearly acknowledges the influence of our technology on the compositional process, 
not simply as a fingerprint on the final work, but as integral and inextricable to the work. This 
raises the question: how much of my music depends explicitly on my music software? In 
considering the tenability of Heideggerian modes at work during composition, I suspect the 
attributable influence of my software on my music production is considerable; Heidegger’s 
Enframing, manifested in the computer system through which I write music, will undoubtedly 
influence the compositional choices I make. 
 But is this at all surprising? We do not have to venture very far to notice the 
technological entrenchment of modern music. Simply turning on the radio or TV would 
instantly reveal the product of a variety of heavily ‘autotuned’ pop vocals,206 vast sound 
libraries of sampled instruments,
207
 virtually-replaced drum hits for unmatched ‘acoustic’ 
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drumming consistency, as well as the culmination of modern mastering: the so-called 
‘loudness wars’.208 There can be no doubt that the possibilities of technical sound 
manipulation now extend to all aspects of modern music production, either recorded or 
performed live. We can fix the pitch of our voice or violin alike, correct the timing of our 
guitar riffs, contort and reshape sample material to be repurposed at our will. 
 Whereby the vast majority of my practice is concerned with technological 
engagement, rather than as a separate secondary process (as in recording or mixing in a large 
studio environment), I feel I could stand to reduce the ratio of technical to creative processes. 
If, as Adorno stated earlier, “musical technique embraces the totality of all musical means”, 
then I would need to investigate a means of applying my own technique to work in 
partnership with my software praxis, rather than simply allowing the delegated technique, 
inherent to my software, dictate my compositional direction. This is a difficult undertaking to 
consider, if not entirely unfeasible; I will need to work out a careful balance between the 
appropriate technical modes and a more personal, poietic, crafting approach to techne. 
 Manning also notes a primary compositional dilemma identified by Agostino Di 
Scipio, familiar to electroacoustic and studio composers: “How can I use the available 
existing task-environment to realise my own ideas of composition?” Or more flexibly, not to 
mention dauntingly, “How can I design the tools that are necessary to realise my own ideas of 
composition?”209 These are questions continually raised by composers and producers, whether 
consciously or not (as in the common and indirect case of continual equipment acquisition, 
especially typical of electronica producers),
211
 and illustrate the issue of where to draw the 
line with respect to the authorship of one’s musical tools in addition to the actual music. 
Software such as Cycling ‘74’s Max/MSP are arguably more open-ended than a linear 
sequencing program such as Steinberg’s Cubase, yet also consequently require much more 
technical groundwork to serve a comparatively simply task of multitrack recording. Max/MSP 
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is best suited to solve a very specific problem, such as orchestrating the interaction of 
different sensors or triggers with appropriate sound-manipulation effects within an art 
installation, for example. By contrast, attempting to bend the artistic assumptions imposed by 
an empty Cubase project to similarly specific and individual artistic needs will be frustrating. 
Such software varies in its flexibility, and in this case, a high level of flexibility inherently 
comes at a price of technical aptitude and preparation (i.e. time spent not writing music). One 
may argue that the technical awareness required for proficient use of Max/MSP will engender 
precisely Heidegger’s technical modes of revealing, affecting any subsequent composition. 
Moreover, the object-oriented nature of the program, involving highly interconnected causal 
modules to be patched together, practically illustrates Enframing explicitly.  
 Even within a relatively prescriptive framework, as presented by a blank Cubase 
project, I can feel as though I have to re-invent the wheel with each composition. Reticent to 
reuse or recycle effect or synthesiser presets lest my compositions appear lazy or contrived, I 
am feeling an increasing arduousness about my practice, which I feel would not exist if I 
were, for example, scoring for a small string ensemble. The string instruments are accepted as 
providing a limited breadth of tones and timbres, yet are clearly perfectly suited for realising a 
composition, capable of evincing a huge range of expressive articulation. They are still 
technically ‘presets’, much in the same way as any synthesiser sound is ‘pre-set’, yet they 
provide me with a more streamlined platform for composition. Why is this so? Let us consider 
the term used to denote single synthesiser presets, or ‘patches’. The term is a relic of the age 
of modular synthesisers, whereby to achieve a particular sound, every synthesiser had to be 
physically patched together using a series of audio cables, akin to ‘patching’ into a telephone 
exchange.
212
 Each synthesis element, whether a sound-generating oscillator, a sound-sculpting 
filter module, an envelope generator or an amplifier, was a discrete physical box to be 
connected together with patch cables. Again, like its virtual counterparts such as Max/MSP or 
Native Instruments’ Reaktor, the modular synthesis is an explicit depiction of Enframing, as a 
schematic (from the Greek schema, meaning ‘form’) representation of an interconnected 
system or network.
213
 Once this network has been revealed to you, it of course beckons you to 
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get involved, to lose yourself amidst the interactions between its myriad elements, enticing 
you with the notion that you can create an infinite number of sounds. Vitally, we will not 
recognise that these infinite sounds must therefore be realised within the confines of such a 
system, and as such will require the adoption of a technical mode of revealing. The narrow-
focus intricacies considered when creating a synthesiser patch will therefore take precedent 
over the wide-angle narratives of musical composition, engendering a Heideggerian modal 
rupture between them. 
 Indeed, when working within a clear genre or writing for a specific instrument, I can 
shrug off the bulk of decisions usually encountered when preparing an electronic piece of 
music, such as: Which synthesiser should I use? What kind of sound should I create on it? 
Should I use, create or process samples for this piece? Such technical or engineering 
decisions, while often resulting in creative additions to a piece of music, also tend to interrupt 
or conflict with the flow of tonal composition. Deliberately restricting oneself to writing for a 
particular instrument, on the other hand, may ensure a free-flowing of lyrical musical form 
and composition, at the expense of the odd, rich other-worldliness that I love so much about 
electronic music. Certainly, the compositional limitations, whether imposed deliberately, by 
the nature of the software used, or by the modes of revealing necessitated by them, can all 
foster a state of creativity. However, I feel software answers a very specific question rather 
than offering a blank canvas. Carefully chosen for a specific purpose, complementing 
techniques provided by a particular software environment can result in effortless composition. 
But unless you have a specific problem, software instead offers infinite limitations; technical 
answers to questions posed in a language foreign to that of musical composition.
214
 
 As far as Di Scipio is concerned, whether a composer has designed tools specifically 
for a particular creative vision, or worked within the constraints of an existing tool, both 
remain integral facets of a crystallised praxical journey, underlining the importance of this 
technologically-delegated techne during the aesthetic consideration of electronic music.
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discuss later in this thesis, as it has deep implications for techno-romanticism and its predilection for 
technological emancipation. 
214
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4.3 The Mind-Body Dualism: Creative and Technical Modes of Engagement 
But what of the body in my own practice? If the use of my computer and its music software is 
a McLuhanistic extension of my nervous system, and the techne involved in using such a 
compositional system has resulted in a delegation of technique to my software, informed by 
my knowledge of the sequencing environment, then it would appear I have almost completely 
bypassed the use of my body. Or at least, the physical extent of my composing inside Cubase 
boils down to a set of abstracted skills bearing little relation to the compositional results; to 
witness my typing or mouse-clicking betrays no connection with a particular piece of 
software, never mind the music. Instrumental performance is certainly one way to circumvent 
this technological abstraction, as is singing, reintroducing the body into the compositional 
process. Indeed, as documented in the last chapter, I have incorporated both into my practice, 
but have found they both require separate modes of engagement from those of the computer 
(as I discovered during the creation of my album, flitting between either activity involves a 
jarring rupture of the unconscious ‘flow’ involved with creative engagement),217 and as such 
resist integration, steadfastly remaining individual activities. But while at the computer, 
programming and composing with my virtual synths and samplers, my body may as well be 
bypassed completely, as though attempting to realise a Cartesian fantasy of direct connection 
between the mind and the technical software. 
 Sociologist Daniel Bell labels computers as part of a group of ‘intellectual 
technologies’, which extend our mental capabilities rather than physical, in contrast to the 
production machinery of the industrial age.
218
 The strengths of software and computing lie in 
the speed and accuracy of calculations, and as such, music must be translated and converted 
into the digital realm to be processed and manipulated, whether explicitly via the direct digital 
encoding of audio streams, or implicitly via the semiotics of MIDI information. These actions 
are conveyed to us in terms and forms we can understand, such as musical notation, visual 
waveforms, and even graphical simulacra of tactile equipment (the mixing desk, effects units 
etc.). In an engineering environment such as the mixing or mastering stages of music 
production, the mental technical dialogue between engineer and computer software is 
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conducive to the workflow aims and demands, i.e. the engineer listens, and makes 
adjustments in response to what he hears. For electronic music, which often lacks distinct 
delineations between the songwriting, recording and engineering stages, the Heideggerian 
rupturing I mentioned earlier will invariably ensue; consequently, the technical mode of 
engagement will be biased towards the engineering processes. 
 Brian Eno voices similar concerns with a rupturing of the technical from the creative, 
and the suppression of bodily agency in the modern, software-centred studio. On the 
differences between traditional recording studio equipment and modern recording software, 
Eno noticed how the transparency and immediacy provided by single physical switches for 
each single function was compromised by “a several-step mental negotiation”219 involved in 
traversing software options and menus: “My engineer kept saying ‘Wait a minute’ and then 
had to duck out of the musical conversation we were having so he could go into secretarial 
mode to execute complex computer-like operations. It’s as though a new layer of bureaucracy 
has interposed itself between me and the music we want to make.”220 Additionally, Eno also 
notes that this ‘layer of bureaucracy’ has been inserted at the expense of bodily agency: 
Years ago I realised that the recording studio was becoming a musical instrument. 
... But now I’m struck by the insidious, computer-driven tendency to take things 
out of the domain of muscular activity and put them into the domain of mental 
activity. The transfer is not paying off. Sure, muscles are unreliable, but they 
represent several millions of years of accumulated finesse. Musicians enjoy 
drawing on that finesse (and audiences respond to its exercise), so when muscular 
activity is rendered useless, the creative process is frustrated. No wonder artists 
who can afford the best of anything keep buying ‘retro’ electronics and 
instruments, and revert to retro media.
221
 
The initial promise and potential of the software studio has been deflated somewhat following 
the identification and understanding of the ways in which software unwittingly alters and 
imposes a different technical mode of engagement (or ‘revealing’, in Heidegger’s term). In 
my own experience, the opportunities afforded by software composition are compromised, 
stifling my compositional creativity to the point where I will happily spend hours 
procrastinating, tweaking my music on a technical level long after the compositional aspect 
has been completed. It is becoming increasingly difficult to readjust to a creative, 
compositional mode once again when I start a new piece of music; once focused in a technical 
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mode of engagement, I am reticent to leave it. Moreover, as a pervasive centrepiece to my 
studio, my computer requires that I spend most of my time in this technical mode.
222
 
 Eno’s comments were made over a decade ago, which in the online computer world, 
feels like considerably longer. Since then, music software and PC hardware has vastly 
increased in its power, speed and flexibility, and the decentralised opportunities for online 
music distribution have exploded. Vast online music communities centring around the tools of 
music technology now exist,
223
 and yet they also appear to vindicate Eno’s concerns, 
fetishising expensive analogue equipment which would seem incredibly inflexible and limited 
compared to what we can accomplish using software. Electronics of the pre-computer age, 
such as valve/tube amplifiers, transformers and discrete op-amps are all revered for their 
supposed ‘warmth’ and ‘tone’ compared with equipment borne of modern manufacturing 
techniques, such as surface-mount integrated circuits or microprocessor-based DSP 
processors. I have no doubt that part of this reverence can be explained by a romantic 
‘technostalgia’ as Taylor would put it, casting our rose-tinted gazes back to a simpler Golden 
Age of recording. But there are also significant reasons for opting for these limited pieces of 
boutique equipment. 
 Taylor mentions a pertinent quote by Tim Gane, of the band Stereolab, discussing his 
predilection for vintage analogue equipment: “We use the older effects, they’re more direct, 
more extreme, and they’re more like plasticine; you can shape them into loads of things. 
Modern effects sound blander to me and are less human, more characterless.”224 Taylor 
suggests that this is an issue of agency, with more tactile and straightforward equipment 
(whether analogue or digital) affording a greater degree of control. There is no intrinsic reason 
why vintage equipment should feel any more ‘human’ than a piece of computer software (or 
software-driven hardware, such as most modern hardware synthesisers), but the tactile 
simplicity of a ‘one-button-per-function’ piece of hardware affords a greater sensory intimacy 
between operator and machine. In this instance, techne stills feels poietic, harmonious and 
intuitive, as its operation has not been abstracted to the realm of technical negotiation, as 
earlier observed by Eno. Eno sees a design flaw in equating more options with greater 
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freedom, purporting the opposite to be true, as “the instruments and tools that endure (because 
they are loved by their users) have limited options.”225 Here, single-purpose trumps the 
multipurpose, as only through the placing of distinct limitations may something be thoroughly 
mastered, or even creatively subverted; the inflexibility of a physical electronics circuit is 
balanced by the flexibility of permitting direct creative modifications and alterations.
226
 In the 
case of boutique audio equipment, it is the inherent limitations, flaws and nonlinearities that 
result in a ‘musical’ sound, due to electric current coursing through inefficient components, 
producing complex harmonic distortion. The contrasting perfection of software processing 
can often seem lacking in this respect.
227
 
In spending the last ten years or so working inside music sequencers like Cubase, not 
only have I had my compositional practice reshaped by the Heideggerian Enframing of my 
virtual compositional palette, I have also willingly delegated part of techne over to it (or have 
perhaps capitulated to amputation). Realistically, these effects cannot be reversed easily; I 
acknowledge that my skills have grown through the use of my software environments, and 
accept that this is where my compositional strengths lie. It would be imprudent and pointless 
for me to simply attempt to withdraw from such a system entirely, serving only as a Luddite 
denial of the practical knowledge I have developed (recalling Heidegger’s earlier assertion, 
“[w]e remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny 
it”).229 Therefore, rather than retreat, I prefer to understand my engagement and complement 
it accordingly, despite the inevitable compromise. My intention is not to demonise or offer a 
pessimistic bias against modern music technology, but to recognise the pragmatic limitations 
of the software environment and its effects on my creativity; a balance is required. I will 
accept this delegation of part of my artistic techne to my sequencer, yet will seek an 
alternative means of fulfilling the remaining poetic crafting aspect of techne. 
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Practical Rematerialising (Part B): A Reclamation of Techne 
Following my research into identifying and assessing the influence of technology in my 
practice, informed by McLuhan and Heidegger, I set about researching the means to balance 
my technical software expertise with a more poietic crafting. I hoped to achieve auratic 
restoration not only with the musical end product, but also as an inextricable component of 
the creative musical process, crafted using a prismatic balance of creative and technical 
modes. In theory, this would re-establish my practice, locating it more closely to an idealised 
state of techne, in its original meaning of a balanced and harmonious practical application of 
technique and poietic aesthetics. 
 I was inspired by composer Nicolas Collins’ book, Handmade Electronic Music, 
which resonated with my growing frustrations working within the immaterial software realm. 
The following playful paragraph from the book’s introduction was particularly salient, given 
my cause: 
Computers are wonderful, don’t get me wrong, but the usual interface—an ASCII 
keyboard and a mouse—is awkward, and makes the act of performing a pretty 
indirect activity, like trying to hug a baby in an incubator. ‘Alternative controllers’ 
(such as those made by Donald Buchla and artists working at STEIM) are a step 
in the right direction, but sometimes it’s nice to reach out and touch a sound. This 
book lifts the baby out of the basinet and drops her, naked and gurgling, into your 
waiting arms, begging to be tickled.
230
 
While Collins approaches this problematic disconnection from the perspective of 
performance, he nevertheless clearly illustrates the difficulty in really feeling part of the 
music created in such a medium. To be able to transplant the abstraction of software-
generated sound and place it in physical space creates a huge scope for crafting and tinkering; 
this reintroduces a sense of touch and materiality that was precluded by technical modes of 
engagement, biased, as they are, towards the mental and the visual. What I needed, was to be 
able to create a simple mechanical machine that could play notes, sequenced from my MIDI 
music software; rather than rely solely on virtual VST instrument plugins or hardware 
synthesisers, I would attempt to craft a physical, mechanical MIDI instrument—more of a 
poietic plug-in. 
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 Mechanical music instruments certainly have a rich history, from player pianos (tested 
to their limits by composers like Conlon Nancarrow) and barrel organs to more recent 
experimental instruments and pioneering machines from composer-inventors such as Gerhard 
Trimpin, and MIT Graduates Dan Paluska and Jeff Lieberman. These instruments often span a 
variety of aesthetics, from Paluska and Lieberman’s impossibly intricate ‘Absolut 
Machines’,231 to the more mysterious mechanisms of Trimpin’s ‘Sheng High’ installation,232 
or his colossal tower of self-playing guitars, ‘IF VI WAS IX: Roots and Branches’.233 Yet in 
most cases, one can look at these instruments, with their exposed mechanisms, and 
immediately understand how they work; these instruments present you with the multi-sensory 
poietic harmony that reveals the essence of their function, evoking a similar sense of simple 
awe as any well-crafted instrument or artwork. Although very much on a smaller scale than 
either of these industrial installations, I took steps towards creating my own poietic plug-ins, 
and documented the process on the following pages. 
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B.1 Poietic Plug-Ins 
Shortly after Christmas 2009, while researching suitable electronics platforms to meet my 
requirements, I discovered the ‘Arduino’ prototyping system. The platform represents a 
grassroots ‘physical computing’ movement that aims to unite computer software 
programming and real-world applications of robotics and craftsmanship.
234
 As such, it 
combines a flexible and affordable microprocessor, capable of addressing a variety of external 
inputs and outputs, with a software IDE (integrated development environment). The Arduino 
seemed like a capable method of bridging the gap between physical and virtual realms, being 
flexible yet relatively affordable. 
 While waiting for my Arduino ‘Duemilanove’ to arrive (Figure 14, above), I promptly 
set about researching the feasibility of creating a physical Arduino-based instrument that I 
could program to receive MIDI from my software sequencer, Cubase, and somehow 
mechanically trigger corresponding notes. It quickly became clear that the Arduino platform, 
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 <www.arduino.cc> (Accessed 17th September 2010). 
Figure 14. The Arduino Duemilanove, with (clockwise from top) output pins, input pins along the 
bottom, power adapter input, USB serial connection (for transferring programs over to the board). The 
most notable component on the board is the large ATMega168 microprocessor used for executing the 
resident program. 
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due to its incredible flexibility, was adopted by many hobbyists as their prototyping platform 
of choice. This in itself showcased one of the great advantages to online connectivity: 
community. The web is peppered with enthusiast sites replete with informative articles and 
community forums, and the official site naturally collects the best of these documents. 
 Thanks to the community documentation, I found a schematic that described a method 
of driving ‘solenoids’.235 These are small electro-magnetically driven pistons that extend 
(‘push’ types) or retract (‘pull’) their central shafts when a current is applied, typically used 
for electronic locks. Solenoids come in a variety of sizes and types, from large, heavy 
solenoids that work slowly but can exert huge forces, to small solenoids that fire extremely 
quickly but with little force. I then had the idea of using small solenoids as the mechanical 
basis for an idiophonic instrument such as a glockenspiel. As a complete electronics novice, 
the relatively simple mechanism would perhaps be a fitting project to begin with, at this 
relatively late stage in my research. 
 Now having an inkling of how to connect and trigger a solenoid, I would need to 
research the means of wiring up a MIDI input, so that event messages sent by Cubase could 
be interpreted by the Arduino microprocessor, triggering the correct solenoid for the note 
received. Sure enough, after a little online hunting, I managed to find a small guide to wiring-
up a standards-compliant MIDI input (requiring the use of an ‘opto-isolator’, to electrically 
decouple the connected MIDI devices).
236
 As MIDI is a serial protocol (i.e. only one message 
can be transmitted at a time), it did not require too much preparation to interface with the 
Arduino board (as it also uses a serial port for its communication with the IDE software). 
 With my shopping list prepared, I ordered the additional components needed to create 
a small test circuit, to verify that these circuits did indeed work (and that they worked 
together). While waiting for my components to arrive, I began researching the software side 
of Arduino, getting to grips with the code language used to write the programs that would run 
on the microprocessor. With some helpful input from the forum community, I had a 
barebones program that would trigger an LED on reception of a note-on message. This could 
then be adapted to drive the solenoid output with a little code shuffling. 
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B.2 Prototyping 
With all my components finally at hand, I set about constructing my prototype using a small 
‘breadboard’, allowing me to quickly create circuits simply by pushing component pins and 
wires into sprung terminals, without the need for soldering. 
I developed a working breadboard prototype (Figure 15, above) which takes a single 
MIDI input, interprets the MIDI data to send a note-on message to a corresponding Arduino 
pin output for the note, which then triggers a solenoid for a set period of time, before 
deactivating. With the basic circuit finalised, complete and working, I removed the MIDI 
circuitry from the breadboard and soldered it to stripboard, resulting in a more robust, 
permanent circuit (Figure 16). I now needed to purchase the necessary glockenspiel to be 
adapted for mechanical performance, as well as the additional solenoids and components. 
Furthermore, I would have to refine the programming code, tightening it up considerably to 
be as efficient as possible. 
At this stage, my wish to reintroduce a crafting element to my practice seemed distant; 
deciphering schematics, constructing circuits and writing computer code, only served to 
Figure 15. A working prototype, constructed on a temporary breadboard. 
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remind me of the technical nature of such practices, evoking Heidegger’s Enframing. Yet 
these stages were a necessary compromise if I was to fully realise my wishes of crafting 
physical instruments that would, to borrow Collins’ phrase, allow me to ‘reach out and touch 
sound’. I comforted myself knowing that I could adapt the existing circuitry and programming 
framework to create a variety of different instruments. This preparation would stand me in 
good stead when it came to expanding my imagined arsenal of Poietic Plugins, yet I was also 
rapidly becoming aware of how much this technical activity was further expending time that 
could be used composing music. 
  
Figure 16. The prototype daughterboard. More permanent than the breadboard, it still required interfacing with 
the Arduino board. MIDI input at the bottom-right, power and serial communication at the top-left edge, and 
solenoid output at the top, behind the (somewhat over-specified) TIP102 transistor driver. The central 6N138 
opto-isolator chip ensures electrical isolation between the MIDI input and the remaining circuitry. 
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B.3 Circuitry and Carpentry 
Pleased that the code performed as it should, and now furnished with the necessary 
components to realise my mechanical idiophone, I decided to purchase a small glockenspiel 
as the basis for my instrument. Mechanically simple, the glockenspiel would provide a good 
basic foundation for my initial instrument, and as the solenoids would strike the keys directly, 
it posed a minimum of mechanical issues and potential complications. 
 Rather than use the Arduino circuit board, plus a separate board for the MIDI and 
solenoid driver circuits (as in Figure 16), I decided to replicate the Arduino board completely, 
(Figure 17) without the unnecessary additions such as the USB port. I did not require a direct 
computer interface with the programming IDE; I could simply load the program into the 
processor chip using the main Arduino board, then unplug the chip and slot it into a socket on 
my instrument. This kept extraneous circuitry and components to a minimum, streamlining 
the circuit design and keeping the board size down. 
Figure 17. The complete self-contained circuitry, combining the MIDI input (bottom-left), core processing 
circuitry, solenoid transistor driver arrays (top) and 13 grey solenoid output terminals (top, top-right). 
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 Using an online guide,
237
 I duplicated the core components from the Arduino board on 
a small section of stripboard, which allows for components to be soldered in place 
permanently, providing parallel conductive tracks on the underside of the board to 
automatically join components situated on the same track. The main components I needed to 
duplicate were the filtered power supply, accepting a 2.5mm barrel power plug, the timing 
crystal, a reset switch, and of course the ATMega168 microprocessor, to run the program and 
address the MIDI inputs and solenoid outputs. 
 Next to the core processing circuitry, 
I soldered the components that comprised 
the MIDI input circuit and the solenoid 
driver circuitry, which included two 
ULN2803AN transistor arrays, each 
effectively containing eight transistors, to 
cover the needs of an inclusive chromatic 
octave of notes, i.e. thirteen outputs. Using 
these transistor arrays rather than individual 
transistors (such as the functional, but over-
specified TIP102 I used on the breadboard 
and daughterboard prototypes) saved a lot of 
space, requiring just a single ground 
terminal per array. 
 With the electronics and software 
complete, I began crafting the wooden frame 
of the instrument (Figure 18) that would accommodate the solenoids beneath the keys (as the 
original frame supplied for the glockenspiel was too low), and so started removing the keys 
from the shop-bought glockenspiel, ready to be transplanted onto the new frame. Once I had 
crafted a frame I was happy with, I gave it a coat of white paint, before devising a height-
adjustable caddy that would accommodate the solenoids. As wood would be too thick to 
allow me to use the threaded nuts on the metal solenoids, I decided to use a small strip of 
3mm-thick acrylic instead, and ordered a few custom-sized strips, ready to be drilled to 
accommodate the threaded solenoids. 
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Figure 18. The basic frame for the glockenspiel. 
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Once assembled, I then had to test the striking action of each solenoid, ensuring a clean strike 
that rang the note soundly without choking it. I had programmed each note to strike for a set 
duration (20 milliseconds), regardless of how long the MIDI note was, ensuring a consistent 
strike each time. The down side to this, was that every note was also of a uniform force, 
regardless of the incoming MIDI note velocity. Given the use of digital output pins on the 
Arduino, I could not figure out a way to create a smoothly ramped strike, according to the 
velocity; the notes were either on or off. The adjustable nature of the acrylic support (Figure 
19) meant I could test the lowest note, adjusting the distance from the steel key as necessary, 
then test the highest note, and once an acceptable striking action was achieved all the notes in 
between should, in theory, follow suit. However, I had not accounted for the added weight of 
the solenoids once the support bar was fully loaded, and so consequently the bar bowed 
slightly in the centre. Tying a support strut solved this problem, but in future iterations of the 
instrument I will consider alternative materials (an aluminium ‘U’-shaped channel would be 
ideal, offering rigidity and low weight). 
 One final issue was the solenoids themselves, which did not have a means of securing 
the central plungers. As they are oriented vertically when loaded into the glockenspiel, the 
Figure 19. A close-up showing the adjustable acrylic support bar, accommodating the threaded solenoids. 
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plungers would simply fall out under gravity. I found that using some spare screw terminals 
clamped down over the end of the plunger, acted as sufficient catches to keep the plunger 
from falling out. I initially wondered if the extra weight added by the screw terminals altered 
the action of the solenoids, but thankfully it did not appear to appreciably effect the striking 
response. 
  
Figure 20. One key removed, revealing the end of a solenoid plunger, secured with a screw terminal to prevent 
it falling out under gravity. 
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B.4 The ‘Poietic Plug-In’ Glockenspiel [ref. included media: CDR tracks 6-8, and DVD 
title 2] 
Finally complete (Figure 21), I could now enjoy using my mechanical MIDI glockenspiel in 
my music. Witnessing a physical instrument playing in front of me, performing MIDI 
sequences programmed into Cubase, is an enjoyably bizarre spectacle. The process of 
building the instrument was in itself hugely satisfying, and now opens up the possibility of 
creating physical ensembles of ‘Poietic Plug-ins’, to either perform pieces in the studio, or as 
part of installation-based performances. Indeed, while the purpose of my research was 
focused primarily on the process of rematerialising my creative practice, as well as crafting a 
permanent instrument, there is undoubtedly potential for creating performances. I plan to 
experiment further with the materiality of the instrument, ‘preparing’ the surface to affect the 
timbre and tone of the notes, and capping the solenoids with different materials to change the 
tone. 
 The creation of such instruments also raises the possibility for further development of 
the site-specific aurality explored by Reception, providing opportunities for unique 
Figure 21. The complete ‘Poietic Plug-In’ Glockenspiel, with a 12V power supply input on the left, and MIDI 
input on the right. 
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Figure 22. Complete and operational. 
installations and performances. Artist and 
musician David Byrne, formerly of the new 
wave band Talking Heads, used a similar 
technology with his ‘Playing the Building’ 
installation, whereby an old pump organ was 
used to trigger solenoids, motors and air 
pumps connected to the structure of various 
buildings, effectively turning the whole 
building into an instrument.
238
 However, 
Byrne’s installation was premised on 
extending the physical instrument of the 
pump organ to the materiality of building itself, and is played by members of the public 
striking the keys directly. My Poietic Plug-in, on the other hand, represents a means of 
extricating my sequenced music from the immaterial digital domain of the software 
sequencer; physically realised in the material world, yet still connected to, and accessible 
from, the software realm. 
 Of course, there are still a number of hurdles to overcome in order to implement a 
performance-ready instrument. The means to store MIDI sequences onboard, in addition to 
accepting MIDI input, would prove a huge advantage, negating the need for a laptop or 
computer. This would greatly increase the portability of the instrument, although to be fully 
portable it would require a considerable twelve-volt battery source, which I have not been 
able to implement yet. I am also unsure just how long such a power source would last, firing 
all these solenoids; perhaps the ability to charge the battery with a small solar panel would be 
feasible. Being able to encase the circuitry within the instrument is also a necessity that needs 
to be addressed. All these practical considerations are exciting for me, and are borne entirely 
out of the limitations faced by the process of rematerialising instruments. 
 Compositionally, the limitations imposed by the physical instrument force me to shape 
my creative process accordingly; during testing, I initially found myself often running out of 
notes when writing melodies, falling outside the octave offered. This served to reign in my 
usual tendencies to make the most of the near limitless polyphony of virtual instruments, with 
wide chords, instead focusing on the timbre of the instrument. Unlike sampled instruments, no 
two notes will sound exactly alike, allowing me to multitrack the same melody and pan each 
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channel across the soundstage to achieve a natural chorus effect, making this diminutive, 
simple glockenspiel sound much larger. I have found that this effect works particularly well 
with prepared keys, such as placing coins across the top of the notes [ref. CDR track 8, DVD 
title 2]. As this instrument is played from beneath, I am free to place various objects on the 
top to rattle and vibrate sympathetically, or alternatively dampen the tone. Indeed, even the 
simplistic timbre of the glockenspiel, replete with the clattering of solenoids, makes for a 
welcome contrast to the pure (or sterile) realm of software synthesis. Simply setting up a 
microphone to record the glockenspiel from different angles results in a different tone—a 
different amount of ‘air’ and ‘room’ that is missing from the clinical synth-based music I 
usually compose. 
 Now that the groundwork has been laid, I hope to move on to more complex and 
interesting instruments. Although, this project has been a great way for me to understand what 
is possible with something as relatively accessible as Arduino, plus some basic electronics, I 
still feel I have much to learn. Nevertheless, I hope to be able to craft more instruments in 
order to create a small ensemble of various plucking, striking, scratching and thumping 
instruments. In this respect, my journey from a computer musician to a tinkering craftsman, 
documented over the course of this thesis, is a small leg of a potentially much larger journey.  
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Chapter 5. Platonic Origins: Faith of the Techno-Romantic 
For the final chapter of this thesis, I wish to probe further into nature of techno-romanticism, 
to explore and reveal the roots to our modern predilection for regarding technology as a 
means for emancipation or empowerment, and examine the implications of taking these 
standpoints to their extremes. Given Heidegger’s illustration of how the two vital components 
of techne, i.e. an artistic crafting plus a technical understanding, became divorced as a result 
of increasing technological mastery, it would now be useful to investigate how such a division 
relates to our modern propensity for quixotic proclamations of techno-romanticism (such as 
the position promoted in Attali’s phase of Composing). As Heidegger places the root of this 
division with the ancient Greeks, it would be fruitful to use the surrounding mythology as a 
means of uncovering a link with our modern technological attitudes, as well as drawing 
parallels between modern information technology and the techne of writing. 
 As Heidegger and McLuhan warned, when seduced by the apparent myriad 
possibilities of augmentation and extension, the techno-romantic will be blinded to the risks 
of amputation; moreover, Erik Davis contends that this technical outlook is enforced by an 
almost faith-like verve. Davis suggests this techno-romantic utopianism stems from a variety 
of “mystical impulses that continue to spark and sustain the Western world’s obsession with 
technology, and especially the technology of communication”.239 Within the context of music, 
this appears to have less to do with the future of music production and listening, and more 
about fulfilling the quasi-spiritual fantasies of today’s technological proselytisers. 
 One prime example of this theologically-infused futurism is the idea of the ‘Celestial 
Jukebox’, as mentioned by Paul Goldstein,240 or the more recent development of the term 
‘Cloud Computing’, to denote remote application use and remote data storage/retrieval. 
Goldstein admits the ‘celestial’ term is metaphoric, as it is more practical and likely to exist as 
a web server, set up in the decidedly unromantic data storage centre within a nondescript 
industrial park, than an orbiting satellite. Yet he is clearly moved by the romantic 
connotations conjured up by a heavenly (and thereby implicitly dematerialised, as post-
corporeal) stronghold of information, bestowing all the music we could wish for upon our 
playback devices.
241
 For me, this is another reason to be cautious, as behind the transcendental 
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imagery we have effectively relinquished control of our information, data, music collections 
etc., to the companies’ operating our cloud services.242 It is a worrying aftertaste as part of our 
personal mobile empowerment, which can easily also be read as another facet of technology’s 
symptom of social alienation through simulacra, as users ‘connect’ through these ‘social’ 
portals via mobile technology. Typically, these concerns are easily masked by the tantalizing 
tropes commonly encountered among the techno-romantic, such as the animistic, 
transcendental dichotomies of offline/analogue/corporeality and online/digital/spirit-soul. 
 Davis locates the twin themes of spirit and soul as central to our rejuvenated techno-
mysticism, as separate but intertwined core threads, enhanced and elucidated by our 
technological media catalysts. “By soul, I basically mean the creative imagination, that aspect 
of our psyches that perceives the world as an animated field of powers and images. ... Spirit is 
an altogether different bird: an impersonal, incorporeal spark that seeks clarity, essence, and a 
blast of the absolute.”243 To reframe with the web in mind, regarding our online and offline 
selves, if our soul lies at the nucleus of our corporeality, in command of our minds and 
bodies, our spirit lies online with our avatars, aliases and alter-egos, as they interact with 
those of other users. Although this will undoubtedly initially appear far-fetched, in 
understanding the animistic techne of the written word, and its subsequent online digital 
simulacra, it will seem logical to imagine an online unification of the soul and spirit, akin to 
one of William Gibson’s ‘Neuromancers’. 
 Davis argues that this ‘technomysticism’ originates from Greek mythology, 
specifically the messenger god, Hermes, about whom the initial strands of magic, media and 
the mind were interwoven. Wearing wing-tipped sandals, acting as mediator of gods and man 
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as well as a ‘psychopomp’, guiding souls between the land of the living and the afterlife, 
Hermes is particularly well-suited as a mythic encapsulation of the web: “Indeed, with his 
mischievous combination of speed, trickery, and profitable mediation, he can almost be seen 
as the archaic mascot of the information age. ... Hermes rules the trans-temporal world of 
information exchange that you and I are participating in right now, myself as I tap out these 
pixelated fonts and you as you absorb their printed twins through your eyeballs and into your 
brain.”244 
 But, according to Davis, it wasn’t until the Greek Hermes was filtered through 
Egyptian mythology, alloyed with the Egyptian scribal god Thoth, that we could witness the 
predication of modern techne, from which our view of technological progress and civilisation 
arc towards our utopian ideals. Emerging from the Hellenistic theological and technological 
melting pot of Alexandria, this rebranded Hermes ‘Trismegistus’ (or ‘thrice-great’) served as 
the source of a host of neoplatonic writings. Although considered a divine entity, 
Trismegistus was also often portrayed as an ingenious engineer, attributed with the invention 
of writing and music by Greek historian Hecateus of Abdera, while also credited by Artapan 
as the inventor of water pumps and stone-lifting machines.
245
 
 An account of one of Trismegistus’ utopian civic visions in the medieval Arabic tome, 
the Picatrix, details how he creates mechanisms for regulating the Nile against tidal 
fluctuations. Additionally, Trismegistus creates a city around a temple featuring animal 
images set into each of four walls, with each animal symbol imbued with benevolent spirits 
who can speak to the city’s inhabitants. Through carefully placed engravings situated around 
the city, the whole populace would be made “virtuous and withdrawn from all wickedness and 
harm”.246 
 Here we witness a utopian vision of a city taming and regulating the Nile with a 
practical technology, as well as regulating the well-being of its population through the use of 
a magical “symbolic technology”.247 Davis continues: “The Picatrix reminds us that utopian 
thought is technological from the beginning. Trismegistus’ magic kingdom is a perfectly 
designed cybernetic environment, whose feedback mechanisms automatically amplify human 
virtue even as they dampen human wickedness.”248 However, on the other hand, the watchful 
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eyes of Trismegistus’ City spirits cast over his city’s population also anticipates a surveillance 
state, reminiscent of Orwell’s totalitarian 1984. Nevertheless, this Platonic utopian vision of 
technological, mystical and symbolic mastery working hand-in-hand is a prime example of 
the kind of idealistic social engineering that would continue to influence technocratic cities 
through to the modern day.
249
  
 Writing, as the medium through which this techno-romanticism is initially 
disseminated, is itself not free from animism, despite being considered a quintessentially 
modern information technology—an axiomatic cornerstone of education. In Plato’s Phaedrus, 
on broaching the topic of writing, Socrates introduces us to the tale of Theuth (a 
crystallisation of the mythic Hermes/Thoth chimera that would eventually develop into 
Trismegistus), who offers the techne of writing to the Egyptian King Thamus, claiming it will 
“make the Egyptians wise and give them better memories; it is a specific both for the memory 
and for the wit.”250 Thamus replies: 
O most ingenious Theuth, the parent and inventor of an art is not always the best 
judge of the utility or inutility of his own inventions to the users of them. And in 
this instance, you who are the father of letters, from a paternal love of your own 
children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have; for 
this discovery of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners’ souls, because 
they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters 
and not remember of themselves. The specific which you have discovered is an 
aid not to memory, but to reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but 
only the semblance of truth.
251
 
Socrates’ phonocentric tale of Theuth and Thamus is a classic example of understanding 
technological determinism,
252
 albeit a more extreme example; Thamus rejects Theuth’s gift on 
the grounds of its amputating properties, without considering its augmenting possibilities, and 
profoundly positive democratising effects. It is all the more rare an example precisely because 
of its focus on the amputating; Thamus does not become starry-eyed, seduced by the idealistic 
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possibilities of writing and the dissemination of knowledge, nor is he flattered by the prospect 
that the people of Egypt will no doubt praise him for this gift. As King, dependent on 
oratorical proficiency, Thamus (like Socrates) sees writing as a secondary technology, merely 
supplemental to the primacy of speech; writing would exist to record his authoritative 
dictation. Thamus also saw the written word, as a ‘child’ of Theuth the messenger, as 
similarly ineffectual, serving as a conveyance of shallow knowledge; Theuth carried the word 
of Gods, but did not create or produce these words, thus writing is deemed a subservient 
‘child’ (a bastard son at that)254 to its authoritative, paternal spoken word. 
 Thamus feared, as Davis puts it, “that writing would erode the oral context of 
education and learning, allowing knowledge to escape from the teacher-student relationship 
and pass into the hands of the unprepared. Consumers of books would then ape the wise, 
presenting a superficial counterfeit of knowledge rather than the real deal.”255 Free from the 
orator’s guidance and control, writing allows information to extend its reach far further than 
ever before, through both time and space, to a greater number of individuals. However, 
writing is also free to be interpreted and misinterpreted, which also then extends its reach. 
 It is highly unlikely that the bizarre irony of reading Socrates’ phonocentric censure of 
writing in Plato’s texts will have passed unnoticed. Yet given our nature as a literate culture, it 
is perhaps prudent to assume that any changes we will have endured through the absorption of 
the techne of logos will remain unknown to us. Again, we will proclaim that writing has 
immeasurably enriched and augmented our lives, our cultures and societies, remaining 
ignorant of any amputation precisely because of this augmentative transformation. 
 Jacques Derrida explores this Socratic exposition of speech against the written word, 
logos, in Dissemination, and it is through revisiting these Greek terms we encountered earlier 
with Heidegger, that Derrida chooses to weigh up the case of techne and its instrumentality, or 
lack thereof, in the discovery of aletheia (which we recall as from Heidegger as ‘truth’). 
Derrida defines teche as “an art capable of engendering, pro-ducing, bringing-forth: the clear, 
the sure, the secure (saphes kai bebaion). That is, the aletheia of the eidos, the truth of being 
in its figure, its ‘idea’, its nonsensible visibility, its intelligible invisibility. The truth of what 
is: writing literally hasn’t a damn sight to do with it.”256 Derrida, at least at first, appears to 
stress Thamus’ point that writing conveys the sign of knowledge, not the knowledge itself, 
and thus as a mere messenger of signification risks a useless impotency to anyone not already 
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familiar with the signified truth. Derrida sets up these differences in now-familiar terms 
following my examination of Attali in chapter one: “mneme/hupomnesis, the subtle difference 
between knowledge as memory and non-knowledge as rememoration, between two forms and 
two moments of repetition: a repetition of truth (aletheia) which presents and exposes the 
eidos; and a repetition of death and oblivion (lethe) which veils and skews because it does not 
present the eidos but re-presents a presentation, repeats a repetition.”257 
 However, we should be wary of assuming that Derrida also attributes a primacy to 
speech. Neither an advocate of phonocentrism or logocentrism, Derrida argues that the 
primacy of the spoken word is ultimately undermined by writing; speech is just as dependent 
upon writing, as writing is a technical subservience to speech. Derrida exemplifies his 
methods of deconstruction in illustrating this point, appropriating the word ‘supplement’ from 
romanticist Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who, in a phonocentric decrying of the written word, 
states: “[l]anguages are made to be spoken, writing only serves as a supplement to speech.”258 
As Jonathan Culler explains, a dictionary definition of ‘supplement’ is “something that 
completes or makes an addition”,259 with the inference here that speech must therefore be 
incomplete to require supplemental writing (Culler reminds us that a supplement to a 
dictionary contains words missing from it). Derrida’s concept of the ‘supplement’, therefore 
“harbors within it two significations whose cohabitation is as strange as is necessary.”260 
Culler succinctly clarifies this dual meaning: the supplement is both “an inessential extra, 
added to something complete in itself, but the supplement is [also] added in order to 
complete, to compensate for a lack in what was supposed to be complete in itself.”261 Derrida 
contends that Rousseau overlooks this second meaning and its implications, revealing shaky 
assumptions about writing as a supplemental technique. 
 Moving away from this contested issue of primacy, Derrida’s elucidation of techne is 
reminiscent of Heidegger’s illustration of a perverting role of technology in the ‘poetic 
revealing’ of aletheia; that the deployment of technology taints subsequent modes of 
revealing to be only technical in nature. An inaccurate codification of alethic signification in 
writing will therefore result in a repetition of misunderstanding. Falsehood, as well as truth, is 
perpetuated by writing, disunited from the mind of the writer, and therefore absently 
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impervious and oblivious to immediate refutation. Yet, while mneme is hardly itself infallible, 
it does not rely on external hupomnemata (writing notes) or signification; the danger in 
introducing hupomnesis, is its effect on not only the accuracy of the mneme in question, but 
how it affects the way in which we create and store subsequent mnemes. Walter Ong notes, in 
Orality and Literacy, that mnemotechnologies have been used throughout the ages, whether a 
row of pebbles, a notched stick or some other tallying aid.
262
 But like a piece of string tied to 
one’s finger while one sleeps, these aides-memoire do not in themselves carry intrinsic 
meaning; there are but prompts for a meaning already understood. Such aids are akin to 
Heidegger’s windmill, functioning harmoniously without the potentially destructive 
corruptibility of misinterpretation. Writing is Heidegger’s ‘enframing’ hydroelectric dam, not 
merely enhancing or augmenting speech, but transforming and restructuring it, homogenised 
by these new technical modes of revealing, as it shifts speech from the oral to the visual, 
permanently transforming both speech and thought as well.
263
 
 Davis elucidates this concern, reminding us that writing is a technology we have so 
thoroughly absorbed “that it is extremely tough to figure out where writing stops and the mind 
itself begins.”264 Ong also states that “[w]ithout writing, the literate mind would not and could 
not think as it does, not only when engaged in writing but normally even when it is 
composing its thought in oral form. More than any other single invention, writing has 
transformed human consciousness.”265  
 Given Socrates’ understanding of just how the human mind could be permanently 
transformed by a techne such as writing and the alphabet, it is surprising to imagine complex 
modern technology still only as a passive tool. Throughout this thesis, I have raised my 
concerns regarding the delegation of musical techne to my computer software, as well as the 
lack of aura surrounding the resulting dematerialised music. Yet a sense of utopian optimism 
persists concerning the use of computers and the web to produce and distribute music. If the 
absorption of a new techne, whether writing, computers and their software, or surfing the 
internet, transforms its users so thoroughly as to make them blind to its amputating effects, I 
wish to explain why we choose to embrace such techne in the first place, by returning to 
Plato. 
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5.1 The Platonic Space Shuttle 
The development of writing did more than simply augment and externalise our memory; 
writing also externalised our ideas, subjecting them to further scrutiny outside of the 
psyche.
266
 The philosopher and writer, Eric Havelock, contends that it was this opportunity 
for self-reflection, afforded by the alphabet and writing, that inspired and catalysed Plato’s 
mind/body dualism, illustrated famously by Plato’s ‘Cave’ allegory. Indeed, to illustrate how 
Platonic thought helped establish modern Western thought of visual contemplation, Havelock 
notes that the Greek word for ‘view’ or ‘contemplation’, theoria has transmuted into the 
modern word theory, as we understand as signifying an abstracted mental process.
267
 
 The Homeric age of the mnemonic, didactic poetry thus slowly capitulated to an age 
of an external memory techne, creating objects of contemplation and critical enquiry, free to 
be considered with the mental faculty now liberated from a sacrifice of mnemonic tradition. 
For Plato, these subjective ruminations of the psyche (which Havelock describes as a 
‘discovery of intellection’)269 would affirm the existence of the soul as a separate ethereal 
entity to the bodily, entrapped until death, whereby the soul will return to the realm of the 
Forms (the ‘universals’, as they were also known, existing outside the corporeal realm of 
cyclic entropy, as ‘perfect ideas’ or timeless technical ideals, such as mathematics and 
Pythagorean geometry). Havelock sums up this transformation thus: “One way of expressing 
this novelty would be to say that a psychic mechanism which exploited memorisation through 
association was being replaced, at least among a sophisticated minority, by a mechanism of 
reasoned calculation.”270 Due to this novel lucidity of the psyche’s separate contemplation of, 
and therefore access to, the Forms, Plato sought to oppose the oral, poetic ‘memorisation’, 
which he saw as inextricably convoluting the soul and the self. Poetry was a “memorial habit 
of self identification with the oral tradition”, merging “the personality with the tradition, and 
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made a self-conscious separation from it impossible”.271 For this reason, Plato would exclude 
poetry (and similar arts such as music and theatre) from his utopian Republic. 
 The primacy Plato attributed to his idealistic realm of the Forms created a profound 
technical bias, the influence of which we still bear witness to today within modern music 
technology. As I noted earlier in my discussion of Heidegger’s Question Concerning 
Technology, the schematic, interconnected, modular nature of music software necessitated 
such an acute  technical mode of engagement that it ended up explicitly illustrating 
Enframing. Similarly, a link with Plato’s theory of the Forms is also highly evident; I contend 
that this schema (which we recall as the Greek term for ‘form’), as the logical architecture to 
which computer software conforms, is a direct descendent of Plato’s theory. Computer 
software is a manifestation of the mathematical constructs that would theoretically populate 
such a Platonic realm, and as such, the technical bias inherent to the use of music software 
reflects the very same primacy of logic and the immaterial mind as Plato’s Forms. 
 Plato’s mix of rational idealism and mythical transcendentalism (developed further by 
notable Neoplatonists such as Plotinus, Aristotle and Augustine) thus helped instigate a very 
literal interpretation and development that would underscore Western theology up to the 
present day. The common themes of transcendentalism, overcoming our corporeal trappings 
so that one’s soul can exist in an eternal purity, whether via Gnostic understanding, ascetic 
mastery or dogmatic adherence, are all common threads to Western theology. This theological 
device is what cultural historian Ioan Culianu termed the ‘Platonic Space Shuttle’,272 though, 
as I will shortly explain, such a train of thought is by no means limited to theology. If the 
techne of writing, as an instrument of external, contemplative memory, assisted in catalysing 
the animistic notion of dualism, then we might reasonably expect to discover similar notions 
present amidst the landscape of contemporary information technology and online culture. 
5.2 Cartesian Refinement of Platonic Dualism 
To understand the resurfacing of dualistic mythology within contemporary techno-
romanticism, we need to investigate how Platonic hermeneutics bubbled-up through modern 
technology. The notion of technological progress as evolving hand-in-hand with human 
progress is, for us, something of a given, considering how mass manufacturing, information 
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technology and medical breakthroughs all help elevate and extend our quality of life. 
Following the seventeenth-century Ages of Reason and Rationalism, fuelled by fifteenth-
century moveable type and the printing press, science and technology would promise an end 
to superstition, ignorance and suffering. But as Jacques Ellul reminds us, “[a]ll myths directly 
or indirectly go back to the myth of Paradise; and the technical productivity man is witnessing 
seems to have spurred a proliferation of myths.”273 Whether via mystical or technical 
methods, the differing means are to the same ends; with this in mind, it should be less 
surprising to discover a blurring at the edges of each. 
 One of the key figures of our early scientific age, philosopher and mathematician, 
René Descartes, would refine the Neoplatonic ontologisms of body, soul and spirit, reducing 
these to merely body and mind (or soul). Richard Coyne expounds these rationalist 
deductions, and how they differ from Platonic and Neoplatonic constructs: 
Descartes drew attention away from the soul and its desire to return to the unity 
from whence it came and on to our capacity for thought and reason. For 
Descartes, the goal of improvement is knowledge, which is the responsibility of 
the subject (the ego) who thinks. Contemplation does not take you out of the 
material world, but draws attention to objects, things that are situated in 
geometrical space in the world. On the other hand, for Platonic and Neoplatonic 
idealism, the real resided in the supradivine realm beyond human experience, in 
which one participated through study, meditative exercise, or the workings of the 
symbol.
274
 
Descartes’ rational purging of a ‘supradivine’ conveyance of the soul was a casualty of his 
corporeal-centric drawing together of body and mind. Still a theologian, Descartes’ radical 
philosophical style of introspective, rational deduction saw the material body as a sensory 
mechanism under control by the nonmaterial mind, in what has become known as Cartesian 
dualism. This mechanistic, mathematical outlook of matter and motion, viewing the body as a 
machine or biological tool would prove prescient to technological modernity.
275
 Instead of 
considering contemplative thought as existing as a foreign and ethereal tourist to our 
corporeal host between trips to the realm of the Forms, Cartesian dualism used our very 
egocentricity around which to justify our subjective existence, with the famous dictum: ‘I 
think, therefore I am.’ 
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 However, though Cartesian dualism, in using the ego as the locus for reality, appears 
to tighten the physical relationship between body and mind (or soul), this link is undermined 
by Descartes’ rejection of sensory perception, which he deemed as somewhat spurious and 
prone to inaccuracy (reminiscent of Plato’s ‘Cave’). As Coyne clarifies: “The mind is the 
prime means of appropriating the real. The body acts as a means of receiving sense data 
through which we can interpret the real, but through its frailty and susceptibility to persuasion 
it also acts as an impediment, and Descartes was at pains to divorce reason from the vagaries 
of carnal weakness and passions.”276 What amounts to a distrust in what makes us human, 
while facilitating vast technological advances in science, medicine and information 
technology (aided and abetted by movable type), would also create the ideological legacy that 
contemporary technologists, techno-romantics and futurists would inherit. Such an influence 
has certainly not spared the music technology industry. 
 Indeed, as Brian Eno noted earlier, this curious exclusion of bodily interaction, 
muscular activity and multi-sensory engagement is typical of the modern computer-based 
home recording studio. The technical modes of revealing that favour a bypassing of bodily 
agency and tactile feedback, emblematic of modern music software, are conspicuous in their 
contrast with preceding recording technologies such as tape (which, by its physical nature, 
necessitated a high level of tactile expertise to edit accurately). This post-Cartesian bias is 
particularly evident with music software, being free from the physical interface design 
constraints of dedicated hardware, resulting in myriad menu functions and options. The link 
between our use of technology (whether music-specific or not) and techno-romantic tropes of 
emancipation are profound. Such neo-Manichean
277
 modes of thinking do not simply catalyse 
romantic visions of technological post-human transcendence, but instead posit these notions 
as an inevitability resulting from our information technology lineage. As will be evident 
shortly, we are less inclined to question just why this post-corporeal yearning, or 
‘posthumanism’, is positioned as a logical conclusion of technoromanticism, but more when. 
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5.3 Technical Modes of Revealing the Body 
A prime example of our technologically-tinted self-reflection can be found when examining 
technological progress at its most intimate nexus with the human body, within the medical 
industry. Postman uses the stethoscope to illustrate the shift in the medical industry from 
treating the patient, to treating the disease, as a corollary of the increasing technological 
divide between doctor and patient: “[I]nterposing an instrument between doctor and patient 
would transform the practice of medicine ... Doctors would lose their ability to conduct 
skillful examinations and rely more on machinery than on their own experience and 
insight.”278 Postman references a salient quote from physician and historian, Stanley Joel 
Reiser, who likens the objective detachment afforded by medical technologies such as the 
stethoscope with the similar detachment created by the printed word. For Reiser the 
stethoscope “helped to create the objective physician, who could move away from 
involvement with the patient’s experiences and sensations ... Undistracted by the motives and 
beliefs of the patient, the auscultator [i.e. the doctor using the stethoscope] could make 
diagnosis from sounds that he alone heard emanating from body organs, sounds that he 
believed to be objective, bias-free representations of the disease process.”279 Reminiscent of 
Cartesian logic, the doctor deems the patient’s report to be unreliable, and instead is able to 
use technology to locate the root source of the ailment; more than this, the doctor is also able 
to interface his medical technology with the mechanics of the patient’s body directly. 
 This in itself might not seem problematic, but as Reiser notes, we witness a shift from 
subjective evidence (in the form of the patient’s oral account of his or her ailment) to 
technological evidence, which has “exchanged one partial view of disease for another”.280 
Reiser’s concern is that technology has not merely supplemented the doctor’s prior expertise 
and means of amassing evidence, but has instead supplanted it. In Heideggerian terms, this 
technical mode of revealing has, of course, rendered all non-technical modes of revealing as 
spurious, not to mention simply inconvenient. The apparent objective simplicity of a binary 
right/wrong or positive/negative value is undoubtedly attractive to a medical professional 
seeking quick results; but as patients we also come to expect definitive results as part of our 
treatment, and trust medical technology to placate these expectations. Clearly, in a medical 
environment, filtering out the many nuances and complex constituent elements of disease in 
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order to accommodate the rigid diagnosis criteria of test machinery will be problematic. The 
most convenient means of addressing such an issue, of course, is to embrace our technical 
modes of revealing, and consider the human as a machine, the brain a computer. 
 Since the development of modern computers based around the binary arithmetic of 
Boolean
281
 logic (implemented first by American mathematician and engineer, Claude 
Shannon in 1938), discussions concerning the nature of the human brain, parallel to 
developments within computing and microprocessing, often share a substantial amount of 
terminology. In what amounts to one of the most explicit and common acknowledgements of 
the computer as a means of storing and accessing information external to us in our own 
image, we call on the computer’s ‘memory’, differentiating between the volatile short-term 
memory of a computer’s working RAM and the long-term storage memory of the hard disk 
drive. Unsurprisingly, similar terms are used to describe our own brain’s short-term and long-
term memory. Such rudimentary mechanisms based on the processing and storing of 
information via logic relays famously stirred mathematician Alan Turing to envisage the 
possibility of what John McCarthy would term ‘Artificial Intelligence’. Indeed, as Postman 
notes, McCarthy would go so far as to claim that the cold logic upon which such an 
intelligence would be built, amounts to a belief system, citing a thermostat as an example of a 
mechanism with three beliefs, that the room is either too cold, too hot, or just right.
282
 Such a 
belief system, Postman argues, incorrectly implies that simulating this interpretation of an 
idea is tantamount to reproducing an idea. Such beliefs also belie the biological foundation to 
the mind, instead envisaging the mind as interchangeable with computer technology. Again, 
this is another clear example of a technical mode of revealing obscuring all other modes, 
dictating subsequent modes of enquiry, and yet we witness the continued osmosis of computer 
and biological terminology every day in our casual use of computers. We speak of 
‘contagious’ computer ‘viruses’, ‘worms’, and ‘quarantines’ of ‘infected’ software files to be 
‘inoculated’, regarding these snippets of software code as biological entities with biological 
treatment.
283
 As Postman states, “From the proposition that humans are in some respects like 
machines, we move to the proposition that human beings are little else but machines and, 
finally, that human beings are machines.”284 It is certainly little wonder, given this continued 
technologically-reframed reductionism, as we shall soon see, that some come to believe we 
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may extricate the human consciousness from the body entirely, as an interchangeable 
component of man and machine; information technologies have, in essence, convinced us that 
the human condition can be boiled down to binary information. 
5.4 Social Revelations through a Technical Lens 
But is this not the inevitable conclusion of a society that remains dissatisfied with the 
promises of technological progress? Repressing the mystical and spiritual motives and 
reassurance previously employed to keep us in ‘high spirits’, and replacing them with Lewis 
Mumford’s mytho-technological ‘megamachine’285 of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
Industrial Revolution, was very much a logical catalyst for fulfilling a utopian vision in a 
technical mode; one of efficiency and productivity, economic might and national pride. The 
‘psychal’ rewards, to use Mumford’s term,286 i.e. the rewarding but dangerously inconsistent 
gratification felt by the hunters and farmers as a result of their exhausting labour, had been 
sacrificed for a dehumanized and detached way of life, deemed acceptable due to the 
relatively affluent comfort and security it promised. As Ellul points out, the explosion of 
technological growth experienced during the past two centuries occurred at such a rate as to 
inspire fanciful visions of societal stability and peaceful contentment (which assumed a 
consistent cultural rate of change), culminating in the mid-twentieth century, despite the 
passing of two World Wars.
287
 Nevertheless, the birth of the silicon microchip offered another 
shot in the arm for techno-romantics, and led to the airing of optimistic television 
programmes such as the BBC’s Tomorrow’s World, which ran from 1965 to 2003. The 
cancellation of Tomorrow’s World reflected the zeitgeist of waning millennial excitement, 
indicating that the technological optimism of the late twentieth century was beginning to sour. 
The romantic ideas of a tech-enabled Paradise appeared increasingly naive in the face of 
towering global corporations; the firm grip on fossil fuels illustrated civilisation’s reliance on 
what now seems hopelessly archaic against the optimistic projections of the past fifty years. 
Ellul suggests we adopt a more sober and pragmatic assessment: “We have had to lower our 
sights. Man is not yet relieved of the brutal fate which pursues him. What appeared so near 
has again been postponed.”288 Ellul is not specific about this ‘brutal fate’, but we may assume 
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it to be, as Shakespeare put it in Hamlet, any number of “the thousand natural shocks that 
flesh is heir to”, as well as, of course, our eternal struggle with universal entropy. Given the 
contrast between our techno-romantic dreams and the realities of a world swollen with 
powerful global corporations (who are happy to nurture and encourage our fantasies), plus 
incessant marketing and advertising, it is indeed perhaps an opportune moment to return our 
eyes to the ground and consider each step we take. However, a core group of techno-romantic 
posthumanists still hold hope in technology to provide one last hurrah for boarding the 
‘Platonic Space Shuttle’, permanently escaping the biological human condition and all its 
associated modern-day trappings. Though given that these trappings must of course include 
such musical bodily pleasures such as performing and listening to music, then I content that 
such a technically-informed teleology is problematic for the computer musician. My growing 
awareness of an increasingly technically-entrenched musical practice has motivated me to 
reverse this technical trend, rather than embrace and encourage it. 
5.5 The Techno-Romantic In Extremis: Digital Transcendence and Posthumanism 
Before we venture onwards with what I argue as the ultimate inevitability of the effects of 
technical mode of revealing, I wish to briefly recapitulate the connections I have traced so far 
between computer music software, Heidegger, through to Plato and towards the techno-
romantic disposition. 
 As we recall, Heidegger’s technical modes of revealing do not bring forth a poetic 
revealing of the essence of a technology, but instead reveals Enframing, as a causal network 
or interconnected system. Such a technical mode operates on a modular logic, challenging the 
subjects of this mode with an assessment of potential, ripe for exploitation; our focus and 
engagement through technical modes reveals what Heidegger called its ‘standing reserve’. I 
believe that such a technical mode is evidenced in how we engage with music software, with 
flexible modular software environments in particular exhibiting the characteristics of 
Enframing. But the notion of limitless possibilities to be leveraged from our music software is 
but one aspect of their attraction that subsumes and reframes our attention, polarising our 
modes of engagement so that our subsequent considerations are also technical in nature. The 
dematerialised state of computer software itself presents an attractive proposition. 
 The schema or form of music software reflects a man-made realm of Plato’s Forms; a 
software conjuration of a world bound by promises of a digital, mathematical perfection—
immaterial universals immune to the entropy of the material and physical world. Driven by 
115 
the post-alphabetical technological progress shaped by Neo-Platonism and refined by the 
rationalism of Cartesian logic, our computers are technical machines that belie our mystical 
impulses, as Davis and Coyne have shown. As I have argued throughout this thesis, this 
substance dualism, dividing mind and body as an aftershock of Platonic-Cartesian thought 
that still hold profound influence over us today, introduces problems for the computer 
musician. A technical mode of revealing (or as I prefer, engagement), as a conduit biased 
towards logic and mental negotiation between the mind and software, immediately puts 
bodily agency at a disadvantage; such a state neglects myriad alternative modes of 
engagement, technically homogenising the dialogue between musician and software. This is 
only further compounded when the use of the computer and music software is championed as 
a democratising force; such proclamations ignore these modal complications and the 
subsequent polarising effects of technology, and obscure an opportunity for critical 
assessment. As I will illustrate shortly, so unyieldingly resolute and faith-like is the 
enthusiasm and support for the assumption that technological progress is inextricably linked 
to the development of humanity, that for one to consider negative effects of technology risks 
being branded as a Luddite. In continuing my investigation as to why this is the case, I feel it 
would be productive to continue tracing the trajectories of key lines of thought running 
through techno-romanticism and techno-utopianism. By following these trajectories towards 
their extremes, I will be able to illustrate and articulate my reasons for taking up a critical 
stance towards these ideological discourses in my own work. 
 Modern medicine has, through advances in medical technology and scientific rigour, 
managed to curtail mythical and theological beliefs concerning the nature of the body and 
mind (or soul). For some, however, technological advances in computing appear to offer a 
very real hope for fulfilling dreams of transcendentalism. In the early years of the internet’s 
development, the prospect of an alternate online reality offered a tantalising glimpse of a bold 
new frontier, a digital ‘Wild West’. Indeed, the seed of such ‘frontierism’ would inevitably 
germinate within the fertile minds of a ‘hermetic America’,289 thanks to a rich melting pot of 
Puritanism, Masonic enlightenment and fiercely libertarian spirit. Davis conveys the seductive 
potency of the myth of the American frontier: “The frontier was a liminal zone beyond the 
mundane boundaries of civil society, with its archons of politicians, lawyers, and established 
religious institutions. ... The rhetoric of the frontier became an indelible component of 
America’s peculiarly stubborn optimism, its worship of the free self and free enterprise, its 
                                                 
 
289
 Davis, TechGnosis, p. 124. 
116 
utopian imagination and its incandescent greed.”290 The technological and economic boom of 
the nineteen eighties in America would exhibit all of these characteristics to provide the 
foundation for Silicon Valley’s mid-nineties dot-com boom (and bust), ahead of the 
infrastructural growth of the internet necessary to support such a growth. Nevertheless, this 
technological gold rush was enough to inspire a new online frontier of pioneering cyber-
libertarianism, reflected in zeitgeist novels such as William Gibson’s 1984 novel, 
Neuromancer. 
 Gibson’s prescient portrayal of Henry Case as a computer hacker able to ‘jack in’ to 
cyberspace (a term Gibson coined two years prior in the short story, Burning Chrome), able to 
escape his dystopian surroundings of Chiba City and traverse the online matrix as 
disembodied consciousness, sparked the popularity of the ‘cyberpunk’ subgenre of science 
fiction. Colloquially termed as a ‘cowboy’ within the novel by Gibson, Case was a knowing 
nod towards the dematerialised frontier spirit that would persist in the following decade as 
online culture developed in earnest throughout the nineties. But it wasn’t until Electronic 
Frontier Foundation founder John Perry Barlow delivered his ‘Declarations of Independence 
of Cyberspace’ in 1996 (in response to the Telecommunications Act of that year) that the 
rhetoric of frontier mythology became fully crystallised and transposed to the dematerialised 
online realm. In a startlingly grandiose statement, Barlow illustrated cyberspace as a Gnostic, 
digital realm of the Forms, evoking imagery of a Platonic soul rendered as pure information, 
free from corporate grasp: “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh 
and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you 
of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where 
we gather.”291 Continuing with a rallying cry of pioneering independence, Barlow stated: 
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You have 
neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, 
nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not 
think that you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You 
cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective actions.
292
 
Davis notes the curious designation of cyberspace as an ‘act of nature’, mythologising 
cyberspace as a newly-discovered continent in a similar manner to the pioneering colonists’ of 
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America.
293
 Barlow is clearly roused by the alluring frontierism that entices with libertarian 
imagery, such as individual freedom, unchartered space, and the opportunities to start 
afresh—a cybernetic year zero. However, the American ‘Wild’ West frontier was very much a 
tale of hardship, physical toil and exhaustion, savage battles and desperate land-grabs; all 
these aspects have softened considerably given the nostalgic mythologising of a re-imagined 
and romanticised Wild West. However, being of a dematerialised nature, the allure of 
cyberspace is strengthened in presenting itself as free of these considerations of physical 
suffering. 
 I also find Barlow’s ‘act of nature’ designation intriguing; the internet is clearly a 
technical construct of interconnected computer networks, yet the domain of the world wide 
web that inhabits these vast networks appears to him as an immaterial realm of the Forms that 
breathes life into the parallel body of computer networks, when populated with avatars, digital 
spirits and souls. I believe this is the crux of the techno-romantic issue, an important revealing 
of the techno-romantic’s true colours, plus the ideologies and beliefs that fuel his zeal and 
faith in technology. The internet is a very technical mode of mystical revealing, offering 
dematerialised immortality for those who believe, once again revealed via technical modes, 
that consciousness can be re-encoded as information—the currency of the online information 
realm. For the techno-romantic, what we once considered our soul has been reformatted, 
ready for the digital age. Plato’s realm of the Forms, now constructed and realised as the 
internet, is ready to accommodate our digital souls just as soon as Platonic ecstasis can be 
realised; via a cybernetic rapture, the ‘Platonic Space Shuttle’ can finally launch. Indeed, 
Michael Heim is willing to cut to the chase, proclaiming that “[c]yberspace is Platonism as a 
working product. The cybernaut seated before us, strapped into sensory input devices, appears 
to be, and indeed is, lost to this world.”294 As premature a proclamation as this currently is, 
when cast in an optimistic, polarised light of technical revealing, the techno-romantic will 
undoubtedly be apt to conclude that “inFORMation in cyberspace inherits the beauty of 
Platonic FORMS.”295 As a technical substantiation of Plato’s realm of the real, cyberspace 
would validate Descartes dream of, as Postman puts it, “the mathematization of the world”,296 
as well as the realising of a reified ‘mathematization’ of the realm of the Forms. Notions of an 
alternative interconnected information ecology had been previously posited most prominently 
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by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin during the mid-twentieth century, with his theory of a global 
‘noosphere’, predating McLuhan’s visions of a ‘global village’.297 
 Ultimately, we witness a syncretism between scientism and mysticism, their respective 
ideological arcs, once divergent, finally converge on a technical means of challenging death, 
with a creation of our own posthuman afterlife: “Cyberspace consists of transactions, 
relationships, and thought itself, arrayed like a standing wave in the web of our 
communications. Ours is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where 
bodies live.”298 
 If Barlow’s manifesto is a largely symbolic rebuttal of governmental meddling, there 
are still plenty of futurists armed with a more literal ideology, quietly researching and 
devising methodologies to facilitate their dreams of post-corporeal existence. One such group 
of cyber-libertarian ‘posthumanists’ (or ‘transhumanists’)300 were the Los Angeles-based 
futurists, the ‘Extropians’.301 Forming in 1987, three years after the publication of 
Neuromancer, the Extropians, as their name suggests, set about limiting or evading the 
degenerative effects of entropy, artificially boosting what they saw as human evolution with 
programmes of transhuman augmentation. Much of their transhumanist research investigated 
fashionable topics of the period, reading like a list of science fiction plot subjects, such as 
cryogenics, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, space colonisation and of course, life 
extension. Buoyed by Silicon Valley-infused optimism, Extropy founder Max More penned a 
similarly impassioned manifesto to that of Barlow, exuding a fierce utopian cyberlibertarian 
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spirit in his periodically revised ‘Principles of Extropy’,302 intended to “codify proactive, life-
affirming and life-promoting ideals”,303 via transhuman means. As Davis observes, despite the 
Extropians’ attempt to follow an open-minded path of rational scientific empiricism, defiantly 
rejecting “totalistic dogmas”,304 it appears to remain “blissfully ignorant of the often naive 
assumptions that lie beneath its own, almost adolescent enthusiasms.”305 Indeed, More’s 
‘Principles’ read like a list of techno-romantic ideals, self-improvement goals and nebulous 
new age jargon. On self-improvement, sounding eerily like an emotionally detached artificial 
intelligence, More states: “Perpetual self-improvement requires us to continually re-examine 
our lives. Self-esteem in the present cannot mean self-satisfaction, since a probing mind can 
always envisage a better self in the future.”306 Shunning faith in God, the State or any other 
external influence, More nevertheless appears to be under the quixotic spell of technology, 
ever optimistic of a utopian ‘open society’ of self-actualised individuals, free of impulsive or 
irrational, negative emotions. More can so easily envisage this seamless technological 
upgrade of the human body as it undertakes its transhuman voyage towards transcendental 
posthumanism precisely because he already views the human body through a lens polarised 
by a technical mode of revealing.
307
 Yet, somewhat mysteriously, the Extropy Institute closed 
its doors in 2006, eighteen years after its official founding; the Institute provides little 
clarification on its decision to cease, other than it “deems its mission as essentially 
completed”.308 Still, its community remains active as an ongoing resource for transhumanist 
information and discussion. 
 If the Extropy Institute positions itself as a research corporation, remaining nebulous 
about all but its core mission statement, then Ray Kurzweil is unabashedly explicit in his 
personal hopes for immortality via the digitisation of consciousness. An award-winning 
inventor, founder of his eponymous keyboard musical instruments, and an enthusiastic 
futurist, Kurzweil is a heavyweight in the field of computer science, building a reputation for 
technological prescience. Within his writings, he evinces a feverish techno-optimism 
concerning the development of artificial intelligence, as well as expressing similar posthuman 
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desires to those of the Extropians, and as such is a notable example of the powerful 
romanticism that fuels modern technological progress. 
  For Kurzweil, as detailed in his 2005 book The Singularity is Near (an elucidation of 
forecasts expressed in The Age of Spiritual Machines in 1999), the twenty-first century will 
inevitably deliver the promise of post-biological immortality, as a result of the continued 
growth in computing power.
309
 Kurzweil’s faith in such an epochal event assumes a 
continuation of Moore’s Law, describing the doubling of computing power approximately 
every two years (which, given current microchip architecture, is understood as doubling the 
number of transistors per each silicon chip).
310
 This ensuing exponential growth in computing 
power, Kurzweil posits, will result in a technological ‘singularity’,311 whereby a moment of 
rapid technological growth will occur as a result of computers becoming powerful enough 
(i.e. exceeding human intelligence, which Kurzweil predicts will occur around 2020)
313
 to 
initiate a chain reaction of recursive self-improvements. Accordingly, once we have reached 
this point in technical evolution, “the innovation needed for further turns of the [evolutionary] 
screw will come from machines themselves.”314 This theme of accelerating technological 
progress, as illustrated by Moore’s Law, is what Kurzweil terms the Law of Accelerating 
Returns, and is a central tenet to his faith of an impending posthuman revolution. 
 Kurzweil’s assumptions that underlie his faith are not solely limited to a belief in 
Moore’s Law. His predictions rely on the technical nature of our understanding of evolution, 
specifically the biological mechanisms involved in regulating the replication of DNA.
315
 
Again, I contend that this technical means of understanding the ‘blueprint’ of the human body 
is problematic. Just as computer and network vernacular is peppered with biological terms 
such as ‘virus’, ‘inoculation’, ‘worms’ and ‘spiders’ etc., so Kurzweil describes the biological 
evolutionary process in computer terms, deeming evolution a ‘master programmer’, and talks 
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of the ‘error-correction’ capabilities of ‘little chemical machines’ as they go about their 
‘information-processing transaction’, during DNA replication.316 It is little surprise that 
Kurzweil believes that the transhuman process is an inevitability of the near future; according 
to the cyborgian terminology he uses, we have already begun such a transformation. To 
Kurzweil, DNA code is merely computer code waiting to be translated and compiled, and he 
believes that we can use the Law of Accelerating Returns to create and accelerate our own 
evolution of machine intelligence.
317
 The very notion of DNA as ‘information’ is itself 
animism manifested through literacy, as though a riddle waiting to be solved before 
whispering its secrets to us. 
 Following his conflation of technological and biological evolution, Kurzweil hopes to 
utilise the vast post-singularity computational power to reverse-engineer the human brain, 
unlocking the secrets of consciousness from its bodily shell. Paul Myers, associate professor 
at the University of Minnesota Morris and the author of the evolutionary biology blog 
Pharyngula, criticises Kurzweil’s technological reductionism of the brain as a program borne 
of a DNA computer code base:  
Its design is not encoded in the genome: what’s in the genome is a collection of 
molecular tools wrapped up in bits of conditional logic, the regulatory part of the 
genome, that makes cells responsive to interactions with a complex environment. 
The brain unfolds during development, by means of essential cell-cell 
interactions, of which we understand only a tiny fraction. The end result is a brain 
that is much, much more than simply the sum of the nucleotides that encode a few 
thousand proteins. He has to simulate all of development from his codebase in 
order to generate a brain simulator, and he isn't even aware of the magnitude of 
that problem.
318
 
In essence, Kurzweil’s stance is a technical development of Cartesian logic, viewing the brain 
as a neural net processor on which the ephemeral software processes of consciousness can 
run. This stance disregards the notion of the brain as developmentally reliant on sensory 
stimulus, that is itself dependent on the external environment, experientially bridging the 
divide between the core DNA ‘instruction set’ and the billions of interconnected neurons that 
create an emotional consciousness. Instead, this view regards the brain as a separate 
component within the human machine, capable of processing sensory information. Myers 
argues that without considering and understanding the complex iterative protein interactions 
                                                 
 
316
 Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines, p. 46. 
317
 Ibid., p. 47. 
318
 Myers, Paul Zachery, <http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/2010/08/ray_kurzweil_does_not_understa.php> 
(Accessed 14th September 2010). 
122 
involved during the development of the brain, we cannot possibly understand the brain. 
Simply waiting for sufficient computing power to model (i.e. reverse engineering) the brain as 
a collection of interacting neurons, in the hope that consciousness will be sparked into life, is 
for Myers, a technical, materialist misinterpretation of the culmination of biological 
development. Envisaging neurons as biological transistors is a fallacy epitomising technical 
conceit. In Heideggerian terms, Kurzweil views the DNA codebase as ‘standing-reserve’, to 
be exploited technically through Enframing—a technical mode of revealing. However, as 
Myers implies, this technical mode of revealing will not result in an alethic poiesis, but only 
the technical ends of a technical means, and as such will not bring forth an understanding of 
consciousness, only the structure of the brain.  
 Indeed, Kurzweil’s faith in Moore’s Law and his Law of Accelerating Returns, as well 
as his monistic materialistic faith that a brute force method of modelling the human brain will 
explain consciousness is typical of what, in the late seventies, science philosopher Karl 
Popper, termed ‘promissory materialism’.319 Popper defines this as consideration of the 
present untenability of materialism, yet expectantly “offers us the promise of a better world, a 
world in which mental terms will have disappeared from our language, and in which 
materialism will be victorious.”320 
 Following his work with Popper, the Nobel Prize-winning neurophysiologist, John 
Eccles, succinctly articulated his issue with promissory materialism: 
I regard this theory as being without foundation. The more we discover 
scientifically about the brain the more clearly do we distinguish between the brain 
events and the mental phenomena and the more wonderful do the mental 
phenomena become. Promissory materialism is simply a superstition held by 
dogmatic materialists. It has all the features of a Messianic prophecy, with the 
promise of a future freed of all problems—a kind of Nirvana for our unfortunate 
successors.
321
 
Eccles appears to pinpoint Myer’s previous inference of Kurzweil’s enthusiastic but 
misguided attempts to understand and recreate consciousness via technical means, and 
illustrates my contention of techno-romanticism as hinging on a set of utopian faiths that belie 
the ostensive rational logic of these technical means. It is beyond the remit of this thesis to 
speculate on the accuracy of Kurzweil’s predictions; his chosen technical mode may well bear 
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fruit eventually, but given his chosen methodology the outcome is moot. Kurzweil’s faith in 
his Law of Accelerating Returns, and his consequent faith in Moore’s Law is reflected across 
the technology; as such, mythology drives progress. I feel it is imperative to acknowledge and 
understand the sentiments behind such myths lest I become unwittingly entwined within the 
subject of such myths, specifically pertaining to the future of computer music practice. As 
philosopher Mary Midgley reminds us, reflecting McLuhan’s warnings of the hidden message 
of media: 
We have a choice of what myths, what visions we will use to help us understand 
the physical world. We do not have a choice of understanding it without using any 
myths or visions at all. Again, we have a real choice between becoming aware of 
these myths and ignoring them. If we ignore them, we travel blindly inside myths 
and visions, which are largely provided by other people. This makes it much 
harder to know where we are going.
322
 
Kurzweil’s faith in the technical may be an extreme example of techno-utopianism, yet the 
mythology that drives him is an ontological constant; his fear of death, a shadow on the 
inexorable axis of entropy, is an essential human understanding, and a core motivation for his 
faith.
323
 The core premise of opposing entropy, given the tantalising purity and apparent 
longevity of information within a system of accelerating returns, is an attractive and fitting 
inevitability for a society increasingly polarised by technical modes of revealing. Indeed, I can 
sympathise with Kurzweil as a musician, in that my attempts to fashion music, as an ordering 
of noise, are my very own means of briefly challenging inexorable entropy; playing my part 
on an Attalian stage, channelling the violence of noise. 
 Interestingly, though unsurprisingly, there appears to be a pattern emerging to the 
epochal proclamations made by futurists concerning exactly when the technological 
singularity will occur. In the 1993, MIT researcher Pattie Maes gave a talk at the Ars 
Electronic conference in Linz, Austria, explaining a tendency among her (mostly male) 
colleagues to predict the occurrence of a favourable technological singularity as just within 
the limit of their lifespan, at around their seventieth birthday.
324
 Joel Garreau, author of 
Radical Evolution, in which he examines the implications of transhumanism, discussed 
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similar findings to those of Maes, yet it was not until these collective observations reached 
Wired editor Kevin Kelly that they gained traction. Kelly crystallised this apparent cognitive 
bias as the ‘Maes-Garreau Law’, proposing that “[t]he latest possible date a prediction can 
come true and still remain in the lifetime of the person making it is defined as The Maes-
Garreau Point. The period equals to n-1 of the person's life expectancy.”325 Although the 
observations of Maes and Garreau are little more than anecdotal, they do hint at the romantic 
utopian mechanisms that fuel and propel technological progress. 
5.6 Understanding the Techno-Utopia 
As previously noted, using Moore’s Law as an example, the mythic catalyst of techno-
romantic narratives appears to sustain technological progress; once a particular technology 
becomes commonplace, a superseding technology revives the surrounding mythology, 
reigniting techno-romanticism. Coyne recalls Martin Plattel’s main characteristics of utopian 
narratives,
326
 which prove helpful in summing-up the techno-romantic narratives I have 
encountered and outlined throughout this thesis. 
 Firstly, we must contend that utopian narratives are moralistic, creating an idealised 
vision different to that of contemporary culture, in order to create a motivational goal. Plattel 
suggests that this moralistic viewpoint arose from a breakdown of the “medieval pattern of 
life, based on the idea of a transcendent and divine Providence … The Renaissance breaks 
away from the axiom that the lot of man and society is immutably set by God and must be 
accepted”.327 This emerging utopian characteristic would be literary in nature (being catalysed 
by technology), exemplified in 1516 by Thomas More’s Utopia. Instead of considering the 
Platonic ideal as a realm existing beyond reality, More would place it within the borders of 
society’s ideals, acknowledging man as an agent of his own dominion. Of course, a utopian 
goal remains, by name, unattainable, yet must appear feasible at all times to function. As 
McLuhan and Heidegger remind us, this illusion remains hidden from us for as long as we are 
uncritically involved with the subjects of a technology,
328
 such as the internet, blinded by the 
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romantic mythology of promissory materialistic projections, granting myriad possibilities and 
opportunities. 
 This leads to Plattel’s next characteristic, namely the presentation of a one-
dimensional representation of utopia, rarely turning inward for reflexive criticism. This 
characteristic develops the technologically enabled agency of man, as “utopian interest no 
longer seeks to find new possibilities but tends to make and create them.”329 As our rate of 
scientific progress increased, from the eighteenth century onwards, improving our standards 
of living and economic productivity, we adopted an increasingly positivistic bias regarding 
societal progress. Up to this point, man managed to retain a unified utopian outlook with the 
technological progress relied upon to work towards it; faith in an unalloyed march of progress 
was balanced between utopian ideals and rational, scientific practice: “But the rise of 
positivism overemphasised the value of science at the expense of utopian thinking. The 
consequences of this were that, on the one hand, the utopian approach was reduced to a 
prescientific way of thinking and, on the other, that reason increasingly assumed the form of a 
narrow and functional rationality.”330 With the rise of the social sciences, our social 
considerations, previously contemplated in formulating a utopian response, would now be 
addressed in scientistic terms. As Kurzweil unwittingly illustrated, technological modes of 
revealing seduce us, reframe our reference points and polarise our dreams. Attali also displays 
evidence of such a characteristic with his nebulous portrayal of ‘Composing’, side-stepping 
the issue of an information glut of musicians’ online work crying out for attention, as well as 
steering focus away from the issue of remuneration for his Composers. Only the scientistic 
social ideal can be viewed in clear focus; non-technical contingencies cannot be addressed. 
 The characteristics of a techno-romantic narrative, according to Coyne, function 
dialectically, mirroring Hegel’s model as an indeterminate process that propels progress: “The 
concepts of the past glory, the present distress, and the future salvation are informed by one 
another”,331 as a mechanism of diachronic feedback and introspection. The most enticing 
utopianism “exhibits the pattern of paradise, fall, and salvation”,332 which can be seen in 
Attali’s Noise; a fall from Sacrificing, through Representing to a hyper-commoditised 
Repeating. Posited as an Adornian crisis of meaningless and endless consumption, awash in a 
glut of post-auratic product, Repeating functions as the bleak present (though as I have argued 
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in the first chapter, this outlook depends on whether one functions primarily within the modes 
of production, or consumption). Composing should therefore be situated as the salvation to 
Repeating’s fall. However, according to Plattel, we risk creating a future ideal in response to 
our technological present, imagining technical solutions to technical problems. In doing so, 
we forego the utopian dialectic in attempting to create a stable, step-by-step means of 
realising such a future. Instead of using utopian ideals as a goal, we fabricate technological 
social myths lacking the essential vector to set us in the correct direction. 
“It is no coincidence that the rise of industrial civilization took place at the same 
time as the birth of social myths. Modern technological power forces man to 
assume responsibility for his own destiny. The tempestuous evolution in industry 
automatically orientates society to the future. Not the past but only the future can 
be the norm. The familiar religious worldview and picture of man has lost 
credence, but faith in the new values which give direction to the future is still 
missing.”333 
This raises the question: is Composing a realisable state, driven by utopian dialectics, or a 
social myth, constructed within the fog of our technological present? When Attali spoke to 
update Composing in 2001, in light of the emergent decentralised potential for online music 
distribution, he attempted to ground his evocative romanticism with the present, thus creating 
a powerful and persuasive means of perceiving Composing (if not the actual means of 
realising it). But given the technical nature of this missing link, Attali’s update appears to fall 
foul of Plattel’s characteristic of technological emancipation as social myth. Plattel sums up 
the precariousness of our technocratic society, stating: “On the one hand, it is the prisoner of 
its own freedom since it has no possibility of identifying with spiritual values which give 
meaning and direction to life. On the other, the technocratic and bureaucratic order is a golden 
cage, which offers society only the freedom allotted to a prisoner.”334 It is little wonder, then, 
that we find instances of a technocratic society replacing the eschatological myths of theology 
with similar social myths of technology, as Kurzweil and Attali both do. 
 For McLuhan, following the potential of an electric age to deliver us from our 
detached age of mechanised alienation, a new global village re-cast in the glow of online 
technology promised the electronic retribalisation of the West.
335
 Even so, I argue that such a 
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retribalisation stresses McLuhan’s dictum of the media as message, encoding its promise as a 
technical mode of dematerialised information; the web is a literal encoding of text, sound and 
vision—a quintessential alphanumeric environment. Experiencing this technical mode, our 
salvation is consequently re-written to respond to the needs of our digital post-Cartesian 
selves, with the kind of utopian romanticism postulated by futurists such as Kurzweil. Far 
from harking back to a pre-Socratic society, prior to our alphabetic ‘reformatting’, to a 
‘Golden Age’ of idyllic tribal Arcadia, the web compounds our technicality as the 
unconscious message of the medium while we constantly receive conflicting conscious 
messages of emancipation. It is our golden cage. 
 One of the early proponents of online culture, musician, writer and computer scientist 
Jaron Lanier (who pioneered developments in ‘Virtual Reality’—a term he coined during the 
late eighties), has observed what he feels is the web’s fall from grace since its initial promise 
of a collaborative and democratic global village. Being a musician, as well as a respected 
futurist, Lanier is well placed to understand the effects of the online economy on creative 
practices. After his initial excitement at the prospect of decentralised distribution during the 
late nineties (sentiments then shared by myself as a fledgling musician), Lanier appears to 
have had second thoughts over the direction in which online culture is heading. 
 Expressing his fears over the corporatising of the web, as the largest companies 
typically seek to absorb and aggregate information, Lanier uses the fall of print media to 
illustrate his concern: “In the new environment, Google News is for the moment better funded 
and enjoys a more secure future than most of the rather small number of fine reporters around 
the world who ultimately create most of its content. The aggregator is richer than the 
aggregated.”336 I argued the exact same concern with the rise of online music aggregation and 
commerce: download stores such as iTunes and Amazon mp3 generate value as a company by 
leveraging musicians, themselves of negligible value, using long tail economics to aggregate 
millions of artists’ output into a profitable model. The current trend towards access to music 
via streaming rather than downloading, as exemplified by the ad-supported services Spotify
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and We7,
338
 only exacerbates the difficulty in remunerating individual artists. Often likened to 
a flexible broadcast model of music distribution, these streaming services pay artists a fraction 
of the earnings derived from conventional downloads, or traditional media such as radio 
airplay and physical sales.
339
 
 It does indeed appear that while I spent my formative years as a starry-eyed musician, 
naively dreaming of distributing my music directly to listeners, corporate venture has swept in 
and wrung the online economy for all its worth, strengthening its previous stranglehold on the 
music market. Casting back to Attali’s predictions for the future of online music distribution, 
as detailed at the start of the first chapter, it seems our choice boils down to an acceptance of 
this persistence of Repeating, dominated by corporate aggregation, or giving our music away. 
The economic net result of either option is very similar. As New York Times writer John 
Tierney sympathises: “In the 1990s, when I was writing paeans to the dawning spirit of digital 
collaboration, it didn’t occur to me that the Web’s ‘gift culture’, as anthropologists called it, 
could turn into a mandatory potlatch for so many professions—including my own.”340 Paul 
Goldstein’s ‘Celestial Jukebox’ has indeed come to pass, yet the sacrifices that have hitherto 
remained obscured in the golden glare of utopian techno-romantic projections, are now clear 
as day. Lanier describes this predicament in terms of ‘digital peasants’ being forced to 
produce free material for the large aggregative ‘lords of the cloud’ such as iTunes, Google 
and YouTube.
341
 We are essentially digital proletariats, producing information such as 
dematerialised music for our techno-bourgeoisie masters, despite the self-help, mystical 
positivism frequently espoused by futurists such as Anderson and Kelly of Wired, whom 
Richard Barbrook calls prime proponents of the ‘Californian Ideology’.342 
 Like Lanier, I was initially seduced by the notion of a decentralised online musical 
agora, and indeed, ten years ago I am sure that I too would have been proclaiming the dawn of 
Attali’s Composing. But this past decade has seen considerable changes occur in the online 
ecology, as the increasingly crowded web teems with dizzying torrents of information, 
moving with such speed and momentum that to add one’s music to such a fierce current is but 
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a drop in the ocean, instantly anonymised amid the deluge. To continue the metaphor, the 
only way to organise and process such a fragmented and variegated glut of information is to 
create an organisational structure on the scale of Google, iTunes and Facebook, to trawl so 
deeply and broadly that the cumulative pickings create a profit. 
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Conclusion 
When I first began my research, attempting to articulate my concerns as a computer musician 
in an age of increasingly dematerialised music, I had naturally hoped to be able to conclude 
with a definite trajectory in place for addressing the issues I had uncovered. To a certain 
extent this is true, as I have experienced elements of success throughout my efforts to restore 
auratic uniqueness, creative meaning and value to my work. The vague anxieties I had 
struggled to express have, unsurprisingly, turned out to be reflected by what I perceived as an 
increasingly vague and homogenised creative practise. Yet, although I now feel better able to 
address these issues, the processes I have undertaken so far, documented over the course of 
this thesis, have served to illustrate just how deeply entrenched I am in my practise as a 
creative technician; the magnitude of the challenges presented by this research has slowly 
revealed itself to me as I sought to address them. As such, the path I have taken, on reflection, 
appears meandering and laboured; unable to fully grasp the route of this journey, the 
trajectory of my creative practice has necessarily been continually adjusted and corrected, in 
light of my ongoing research. What is now clear, however, is that this progression towards 
creative rematerialisation represents a small leg of a larger journey. 
 The notion that Attali’s age of Composing has finally arrived, catalysed by the 
development of the web, belies the complexities of the myriad factors at play, encountered 
from the perspectives of both musician and listener; these respective stances of production 
and reception regard the facets of such an age with varying weight and significance. 
Dematerialised music, existing as pure use-value, presents a problem for recording artists 
attempting to secure an audience for their music. For a society weaned on music as a 
Debordian spectacle, with an inherent friction between its physical form, its exchange-value 
and its function or use-value, the move towards dematerialised music creates a rupture 
between the perceptions of use-value and the costs of production. It is unclear whether such a 
rift will heal, as the music industry is finally shifting towards a model of access and 
convenience rather than simply production; in such a model, the aggregator retains power 
over both modes of production and reception. 
 In this sense, a technologically-mediated ambivalence has been created between the 
modes of production and reception; portable, ubiquitous music allows listeners to reverse the 
systematic destruction of ritual value in music, re-ritualising music as part of the prismatic 
affordances of music through its quotidian use. Repeating, for modes of reception at least, is a 
liberating age of abundance, convenience and expression, opposing Attali’s pessimistic 
131 
portrayal. Contrasting this with the other side of the balance, modes of production cannot be 
said to have been leveraged by the same degree, as production is now mediated by technical 
simulacra that cast the compositional process in their own technical light. As music becomes a 
data sign with function but no form, modes of musical production have been technically 
polarised and homogenised to create a model of digital neo-Fordism, the resulting ‘long tail’ 
output of which is harvested by the data-crunching, hegemonic ‘lords of the cloud’, being the 
only mechanisms large enough to assimilate and process such volumes of music. Being one of 
the producers within such a chain of production does not feel empowering or liberating, but 
more akin to a hyperextension of Attalian Repetition, fuelled by the techno-romantic myth of 
Composing. 
 Regarding the modes of engagement assumed when negotiating the online economy, 
Tara McPherson sums up the issue: 
Thus, it’s important to recognise that these emergent modes of experience are 
neither innocent nor neutral, simple expressions of the material forms of the 
digital. They model particular modes of subjectivity which can work all too neatly 
in the service of the shifting patterns of global capital. ... 
In conclusion, we might ask why, in a culture increasingly subject to simulation, 
volition (or its illusion) [at the core of the interactive ‘Web 2.0’] emerges as such 
a powerful modality of experience, such a visceral desire. If Walter Benjamin 
reminds us that early film served to drill the viewer in the modes of perception 
structured by the mechanical era, how do Web spaces function as instructions for 
our bodily adaptation to virtuality?
343
 
As we have seen, the proclamations made by techno-romantics and technologists in response 
to the perceived possibilities offered by decentralised, online disintermediation, do not 
consider the effects of such technologies; critical observations are obscured during 
engagement with these technologies, as McLuhan and Heidegger have illustrated in their own 
differing ways. Furthermore, the lure of the utopian with regard to music and the web neglects 
to address just how readily such a technological framework succumbs to corporate 
appropriation. The web does not so much provide ‘instructions for our bodily adaptation to 
virtuality’ as disregard bodily agency entirely; as we witness with posthumanists such as 
Kurzweil, what seem technologically-assisted inevitabilities emerge as a result of this 
technological polarisation, biased, as it is, towards the logic of the mental and non-physical as 
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a reflection of itself. Such symptoms are central to the conceit of ‘progress’ as measured by 
technological advancement. 
 Yet musical practice consists of a balance between technical and creative modes of 
revealing, and is therefore the perfect vantage point from which to observe these modal shifts. 
As I have argued, my personal practice has seen a shift in favour of these technical modes, at 
the expense of creative modes of engagement. It reflects a wider cultural shift that has split 
the nucleus of techne, resulting in a dominant technical mode of Enframing, as Heidegger 
asserts. The dematerialised schema of computer software reinforces this modal domination, 
functioning as direct insight into fundamental ideologies that have crystallised over the past 
two and a half thousand years with the ontological development of Platonic thought—itself 
catalysed by technology. The idealistic ‘forms’ of the software realm, free from physical 
decay and the laws of entropy, continue to assert the primacy of technology as bound with 
progress. Such a trajectory is illustrated explicitly by the techno-romantic posthumanists, 
betraying their fears of mortality and their yearning for technological ecstasis; this trajectory 
is shared by the tech-evangelists who encourage would-be Attalian Composers. 
 Only in my attempts to rematerialise my practice, then, has the full extent of my prior 
technological entrenchment become apparent. My delegation, or submission, of techne to my 
music software rests at the foundation of my practice, and I have built upon this with practical 
knowledge accordingly. It is therefore unrealistic and unwarranted for me to attempt to 
extricate my practice from this technological bedrock completely, and so my strategies have 
instead attempted to readdress the balance of techne by combining my technological praxis 
with a tactile engagement of crafting. In restoring the full spectrum of creative modes to work 
in tandem with technical modes, I have addressed the issues with dematerialised music that I 
formerly struggled to articulate. 
 By establishing a means of auratic restoration, in the form of my ‘Auratic Artefacts’ 
series, the site-specificity of Reception, and my ‘Poietic Plug-ins’ project, I have journeyed 
towards a greatly fulfilling and much-needed reclamation of techne. Yet, they have also 
served to remind me of the chaotic nature inherent to a full spectrum of creative modes, once 
extracted from the technically streamlined realm of pure software. This introduces a host of 
practical issues, posing problems to be solved, hurdles to be cleared. Yet all these practical 
and logistical issues make the end result feel more satisfying. Seeing an instrument that has 
been crafted into being, not only serves as a memento of the effort entailed during its creation, 
but also a physical, qualitative reminder of its uniqueness and potential; an artefact or trophy 
of permanence, that was lacking from dematerialised music and its practice. 
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 The time spent creating and organising these ventures may have detracted from my 
compositional output in terms of quantity, yet what I feel I have achieved is of greater 
meaning and satisfaction, richer in quality because of it. Moreover, the groundwork has been 
laid for further expansion towards an ensemble of Poietic Plugins, or the creation of 
interesting musical artefacts, plus installations and performances that break out of the 
idiomatic rigidity I feel I had imposed on myself. In this respect, this conclusion serves as a 
launchpad for further exploration, of which I now feel more capable.  
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Appendix 
Arduino Code for the Poietic Plug-in Glockenspiel 
I used the following code to power my Poietic Plug-in, building on code originally developed 
by the Arduino Community.
344
 (With thanks to the user ‘kuk’, for the foundational code to 
process MIDI input.) I have included in-line comments, where appropriate, to explain the 
function of notable portions of code. 
 
byte incomingByte; 
byte note; 
byte velocity; 
 
int action = 2; // A means of storing the current note state (1 = note-on, 
0 = note-off, 2 = nothing has happened). 
int count = 0; 
int interval = 10; // How long we want the solenoid to be firing for. 
int intervalLED = 10; // How long we want the MIDI activity LED to blink 
for. 
int pinArray[] = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14}; // Our 
solenoid output pins, in array form. 
int statusLED = 15; // MIDI activity LED. 
 
long previousMillis[14] = {0}; // The solenoid timer, which checks how long 
each solenoid has been active aginst the interval set above. 
long previousMillisLED = 0; // The timer for the MIDI activity LED. 
 
void setup() { 
  pinMode(statusLED, OUTPUT); // Declare the status LED pin as an output. 
  for (count = 0; count < 13; count ++) // Count 13 pins ready to declare 
their function (ins or outs). 
    pinMode(pinArray[count], OUTPUT); // Declare all the solenoid pins in 
the array as outputs. 
  Serial.begin(31250); // Set the serial baud rate as per MIDI spec. 
  digitalWrite(statusLED, LOW); // Ensure the MIDI status LED is off to 
begin with. 
} 
 
void loop () { 
  if (millis() - previousMillisLED > intervalLED) // If the MIDI LED has 
been on for longer than the LED interval time, then turn it off. 
    digitalWrite(statusLED, LOW); 
  if (millis() - previousMillis[2] > interval) // If the solenoid has been 
on for longer than the interval time, then turn it off. 
    digitalWrite(2, LOW); 
  if (millis() - previousMillis[3] > interval) 
    digitalWrite(3, LOW); 
  if (millis() - previousMillis[4] > interval) 
    digitalWrite(4, LOW); 
  if (millis() - previousMillis[5] > interval) 
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    digitalWrite(5, LOW); 
  if (millis() - previousMillis[6] > interval) 
    digitalWrite(6, LOW); 
  if (millis() - previousMillis[7] > interval) 
    digitalWrite(7, LOW); 
  if (millis() - previousMillis[8] > interval) 
    digitalWrite(8, LOW); 
  if (millis() - previousMillis[9] > interval) 
    digitalWrite(9, LOW); 
  if (millis() - previousMillis[10] > interval) 
    digitalWrite(10, LOW); 
  if (millis() - previousMillis[11] > interval) 
    digitalWrite(11, LOW); 
  if (millis() - previousMillis[12] > interval) 
    digitalWrite(12, LOW); 
  if (millis() - previousMillis[13] > interval) 
    digitalWrite(13, LOW); 
  if (millis() - previousMillis[14] > interval) 
    digitalWrite(14, LOW); 
   
  if (Serial.available() > 0) { // If we receive MIDI information, then 
blink the MIDI activity LED. 
    blink(); 
    incomingByte = Serial.read(); // Read the MIDI input and store it as 
the 'incomingByte' variable. 
    // First we wait for the status byte. 
    if (incomingByte == 144) { // If the incoming byte is a note-on 
message, then set the action variable to '1' for further checks. 
      action = 1; 
    } 
    else if (incomingByte == 128) { // If it's a note-off message, then set 
the action to '0'. Set to '2' if you wish to ignore note-off messages 
(useful for timed solenoids). 
      action = 0; 
    } 
    else if (incomingByte == 208) { // For aftertouch. 
    } 
    else if (incomingByte == 160) { // For Poly pressure (i.e. polyphonic 
aftertouch). 
    } 
    // Then we wait for the data byte. 
    else if ((action == 0) && (note == 0)) { // If a note-off is received, 
but no note number, then wait for a note number. 
      note = incomingByte; 
      playNote(note, 0); 
      note = 0; 
      velocity = 0; 
      action = 2; 
    } 
    else if ((action == 1) && (note == 0)) { // If a note-on is received, 
we wait for the note number. 
      note = incomingByte; 
    } 
    else if ((action == 1) && (note != 0)) { 
      velocity = incomingByte; 
      playNote(note, velocity); 
      note = 0; 
      velocity = 0; 
      action = 0; 
    } 
    else { // If no serial information has been received, do nothing. 
    } 
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  } 
} 
 
/* Function to blink the MIDI activity LED */ 
void blink() { 
  digitalWrite(statusLED, HIGH); // Blink the MIDI activity LED. 
  previousMillisLED = millis(); // Reset/sync the MIDI activity LED timer. 
} 
 
/* Function to play the correct MIDI note */ 
void playNote(byte note, byte velocity) { 
  int value = LOW; 
  if (velocity > 0){ 
    value = HIGH; 
  } 
  else { 
    value = LOW; 
  } 
  if (note >= 36 && note <= 48) { 
    int myPin = note - 34; 
    digitalWrite(myPin, value); 
    previousMillis[myPin] = millis(); 
  } 
} 
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